12 Of The Sketchiest Things The DEA Has Done While Waging The War On Drugs

We have the war on drugs to thank for these.
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This is part one of a two-part series. Read part two here.

The Drug Enforcement Administration was established under the Justice Department in 1973 by President Richard Nixon. Its mission was to keep the nation off and away from drugs, which, at least according to the White House, were a moral evil and catalyst of criminal behavior. The agency was formed just two years after Nixon launched what became known as the "war on drugs." Congress and the rest of the nation remained convinced that the scourge of narcotics and drug abusers -- and perhaps particularly those who were young, poor or black -- was pounding at the gates. Over the next four decades, with most drug policy now firmly in the grips of law enforcement officials, the DEA's annual budget saw a fortyfold increase, going from a paltry $75 million to nearly $3 billion in 2014.

With more than 11,000 employees and a host of responsibilities, the agency's activity has expanded worldwide, all the while attracting scrutiny from critics of the drug war who contend that the DEA is an ineffective agency that uses controversial tools to enforce often misguided or unjust federal drug laws.

The catalog of controversies below helps explain why the public has often questioned the DEA's priorities, as well as the methods it employs to advance them. While the DEA does its best to keep many of its dealings out of the public eye -- it regularly claims secrecy is imperative to the success of its anti-drug operations -- here are some of the most sketchy, messed up things that we know it has done:

The DEA claimed Prohibition was a success.

Most historians believe the "noble experiment" of alcohol prohibition in the 1920s backfired, creating a myriad of negative unintended consequences and serving as a lesson about the hazards of governing public morals. The DEA, however, tells a different story. In 2010, the DEA and the International Association of Chiefs of Police released a report providing key arguments against drug legalization. In one passage, first highlighted by the Republic Report, the report set out to combat what it called the "myth" that "prohibition didn’t work in the 20’s and it doesn’t work now." Its main argument was that the 18th Amendment didn't go far enough to restrict the manufacturing and consumption of alcohol at the onset of Prohibition.

Citing figures that suggest there was a decline in alcohol use during that 13-year period -- statistics that are regularly contested and impossible to verify -- the document argues that Prohibition was a successful policy. The report also downplayed the secondary effects of banning alcohol, such as the precipitous rise of organized crime, at one point suggesting that those effects were increasing before the enactment of Prohibition.

Unsurprisingly, the report made no mention of the clear negative parallels between early-20th century Prohibition laws and today's laws that target drugs. In both cases, strict prohibition has taken away resources from treatment for addiction and abuse, overburdened court systems and jails, fostered corruption in law enforcement, propped up organized crime and even, some argue, created a damaging disrespect for the rule of law. In return, these incredibly costly enforcement experiments have largely failed to actually limit people's consumptive habits.

The DEA imprisoned an innocent suspect in a holding cell for five days without food or water.

In 2012, 24-year-old Daniel Chong was detained by DEA agents in San Diego after his friend's house was targeted by a drug raid. Chong was told there were no plans to charge him and that he'd be released the same day. But he wasn't released, and agents who heard or saw him over the next five days did nothing, each believing he was somebody else's responsibility. Chong was trapped in a windowless 5-by-10 enclosure without food or water, all for the crime of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. When he was finally discovered, he was incoherent and required medical attention. He said he'd drank his own urine to survive, and at one point attempted suicide. At some point, Chong began to carve "sorry mom" into his arm with broken glass from his eyeglasses, which he ate before being released.

The ordeal ultimately ended in a $4.1 million settlement for Chong. Shortly thereafter, the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General released a report excoriating top DEA officials not only for the incident itself, but also for failing to immediately report it to their office.

A DEA agent shot himself in a classroom full of children.

Anyone who's spent too much time watching viral videos is familiar with this one:

In April 2004, DEA agent Lee Paige was giving a gun safety demonstration to a classroom full of children when he delivered this now-famous line: "I am the only one in the room professional enough, that I know of, to carry this Glock 40." Moments later, he shot himself in the foot. Rather than take the embarrassing incident in stride (or limp?), Paige eventually sued the DEA, claiming the agency had released the video footage of him. After a prolonged legal battle, he lost the suit.

DEA agents have lost their guns in weird places, including an airport bathroom.

At least Paige knew where his gun was when he shot his foot. An ABC News report in 2008 found that the DEA lost 91 weapons from 2002 to 2007, often in humiliating, or at least seemingly implausible, fashion. Guns were left in supermarkets, at bars, or on top of vehicles; they were stolen from hotel rooms and purses. One "may have fallen into trash basket at work," according to the report. Fighting the war on drugs is apparently not always very precise work.

In 2012, the lapses turned downright dangerous when one DEA agent left his loaded Glock in a crowded airport bathroom beyond the security checkpoint.

A DEA agent left important case documents lying around a suspect's house.

By now we know the DEA has had trouble keeping track of its weapons, and apparently that carelessness also can occasionally extend to physical evidence in the cases it's pursuing. According to a report in the Fairbanks Daily News-Miner earlier this month, an agent accidentally left key documents about a methamphetamine case in the house of a suspect he was arresting. Later, the suspect's father (who was also a suspect in the drug raid) found the documents, which contained information about a confidential DEA informant who had helped build the case. The father angrily contacted the informant, according to reports, and the confrontation eventually led to the father's arrest as well.

While a DEA spokeswoman has since said that the agency is dedicated to its undercover source's "safety and wellbeing," it's obvious that the original agent's negligence put the informant in needless danger.

A DEA agent impersonated a woman by creating a fake Facebook profile in her name.

Earlier this month, BuzzFeed reported on the case of Sondra Arquiett, a 28-year-old New York woman who recently sued the DEA in federal court after an agent impersonated her on Facebook. The agent created an entire fake profile purporting to belong to Arquiett, using personal information and pictures taken from her cell phone following Arquiett's arrest in a cocaine case. He even posted status updates and pictures of her and her children.

The Justice Department defended the sting, through which agents reportedly hoped to extract incriminating information from friends of Arquiett who might be involved with drugs. The Facebook page was eventually taken down, and the Justice Department announced that it was reviewing the tactics. Facebook later told the DEA to stop violating its policies with this bizarre scheme.

Corrupt DEA agents made millions off the drugs they were supposed to be taking off the street.

Giving anybody access to drugs worth millions of dollars can pose problems. But when those same people have spent years familiarizing themselves with networks that know how to turn drugs into profit, there's a clear potential for abuse.

DEA corruption was particularly rampant in the late 1980s. Much of this corruption was run-of-the-mill, such as DEA agents ripping off dealers for cash and drugs, which went largely unreported. But a number of more flamboyant scandals also surfaced, damaging the reputation of the agency.

In one notorious case, DEA agents were caught stealing drugs from the agency's evidence vault. The agents gave the drugs to an informant, who sold them and sent at least $1 million in profits to the agents over five years. Later, the same agents, who reportedly spent this dirty money lavishly, also confessed to stealing bundles of cash from drug busts.

Another case from two decades ago suggests that DEA corruption hasn't always been so blatant. In an undercover money-laundering operation in the 1990s that targeted narco-traffickers in Colombia, corrupt DEA operatives were regularly skimming cash from the pool of money they were supposed to be laundering, according to former agents with knowledge of the case. The agents' actions nearly got an informant killed, according to reports. One agent was found guilty of pocketing $700,000 during the operation and sentenced to two years in jail. He was the only person prosecuted as a result of the failed sting. Bill Conroy of the Narcosphere recently reported that $20 million is still unaccounted for in the case, which remains unresolved.

The DEA has terrorized and killed innocent people.

In 2003, 14-year-old Ashley Villarreal was shot in the head by a DEA agent while driving just blocks away from her San Antonio home. Agents who had been staking out the Villarreal household mistakenly believed the person in the car with the teen was her father, whom they suspected of dealing cocaine. Two days later, Villareal died. A few days after the shooting, Villareal's father was arrested on drug conspiracy charges.

The agents never faced charges in the teen's death, even though testimony from witnesses and subsequent reports conflicted with official accounts of the incident. The details of this case are painful to read, but perhaps most upsetting is the fact that they aren't necessarily unique.

Indeed, Villareal's case is an extreme example of what has become a trend of concerning incidents. As the DEA and other law enforcement agencies have ramped up their use of no-knock raids over the past 25 years, a pattern of disturbing behavior has emerged, with mistakes leading to the injuries and deaths of both civilians and law enforcement. Other times, the damage isn't physical. During a DEA raid in 2007, agents forced their way into a mobile home in California, allegedly shouting obscenities and pointing their guns at the heads of the 11- and 14-year-old girls asleep in the home. The girls were later handcuffed. A few hours later, agents realized they'd ransacked the wrong home. The family later filed a lawsuit claiming the DEA's actions constituted "intentional infliction of emotional distress."

The agency has even killed people on foreign soil.

DEA agents working with local authorities on a Honduran anti-drug mission shot and killed smuggling suspects in two separate incidents over the course of a few weeks in 2012. In both cases, officials claimed the suspects were armed and refusing to surrender, but the episodes nonetheless underscored emerging concerns about the DEA's respect for Honduran sovereignty.

Those killings came just a month after DEA agents took part in an anti-smuggling operation that led to the deaths of four innocent Hondurans, including a pregnant woman. Honduran police initially called the mission a success, but an investigation by journalists and human rights activists later revealed the truth -- the victims of the anti-drug operation that night were on a boat entirely unconnected to the supposed smuggling activity. U.S. officials defended the DEA's involvement, claiming agents didn't fire any rounds during the mission, but the incident sparked aggressive local protests calling for the DEA to leave the area.

Members of Congress later called for a further investigation into the episode and, specifically, the role DEA agents played. But the DEA declined to open an investigation. Months later, reports suggested the agency had not cooperated with local authorities investigating the incident, which led Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) to ask earlier this year: "Could U.S. agents engaged in the 'war on drugs' abroad operate without any sort of accountability?"

The DEA raided a woman's house because she'd shopped at a garden store.

In 2013, agents raided the Illinois home of Angela Kirking after a trip to a garden store led the DEA to flag her as a potential marijuana grower. Kirking said she'd only purchased fertilizer for her hibiscus plant, but this was enough to get her caught up in an operation that involved monitoring garden stores in search of suspects who might be cultivating marijuana.

The DEA obtained a warrant to investigate Kirking, tracking her electricity consumption and digging through her trash to find a small quantity of marijuana stems. That was apparently enough to authorize a raid. When agents stormed into Kirking's house, they found a small baggie of weed, enough only for a misdemeanor charge.

The DEA once tried to ban pacifiers and glow sticks, claiming they were "drug paraphernalia."

In a prime example of the extreme lengths to which the DEA can go to combat drug use, the agency attempted in 2001 to ban popular symbols of rave culture at a prominent New Orleans club that had become associated with Ecstasy. The American Civil Liberties Union filed a complaint, arguing that items such as masks, glow sticks and pacifiers were not "drug paraphernalia" as the DEA claimed, because they played no part in the actual ingestion of any drugs. A federal judge ultimately barred the DEA from enacting such restrictions, finding that "the government cannot ban inherently legal objects that are used in expressive communication because a few people use the same legal item to enhance the effects of an illegal substance."

The agency is so unwilling to reconsider some of its outdated policies that the DEA chief once refused to acknowledge that marijuana is less harmful than crack and heroin.

For all of the sketchy things the DEA has done while waging the drug war, perhaps most upsetting to critics is the agency's often stubborn insistence that the war should be fought with the same aggressiveness on all fronts.

Earlier this year, the Drug Policy Alliance, an advocacy group dedicated to drug law reform, issued a report showing how the DEA has systematically rejected scientific evidence in order to maintain current prohibitive drug scheduling laws. The report cited a number of cases in which the DEA has undermined, ignored or circumvented research suggesting that marijuana and MDMA, or Ecstasy, don't belong in DEA's Schedule I, a category for substances with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse or severe psychological or physical dependence.

The agency's unwillingness to reconsider its policies in the face of countervailing scientific evidence was perhaps best demonstrated when DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart testified before Congress in June 2012. In her testimony, Leonhart refused to answer the seemingly straightforward and obvious question of whether heroin or crack are worse for a person's health than marijuana. State and local governments are increasingly acknowledging through policy shifts that marijuana is less harmful than those more potent drugs. But the DEA has insisted on treating marijuana with equal severity. Admitting that it is, in fact, less harmful could have been especially awkward for Leonhart, considering the DEA at the time was in the midst of an aggressive crackdown on medical marijuana facilities.

Raids on legal marijuana facilities have slowed in recent years, and Leonhart's stance on the drug war has appeared increasingly at odds with the more progressive views of Attorney General Eric Holder. Still, the DEA chief recently suggested that the push toward legalization only drives the agency to "fight harder."

The DEA again showed its rigidity in the drug war earlier this year when Kentucky legalized the cultivation of hemp, a plant that is related to cannabis but lacks the psychoactive ingredient that produces a high. With Kentucky expecting a shipment of 250 pounds of hemp seeds from Italy, the DEA stepped in, impounding the shipment and claiming the importation was still illegal because under current federal drug law, both hemp and cannabis are considered Schedule I substances. After a brief legal battle, the DEA released the shipment.

Be sure to check back soon for part two of this story.

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Before You Go

People Killed By The War On Drugs
Kathryn Johnston(01 of13)
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In November 2006, a narcotics team from the Atlanta Police Department apprehended a man with a known drug history. They planted marijuana on him, then threatened to arrest him unless he gave them information about where they could find a supply of illegal drugs. He gave them the address of 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston. Instead of finding an informant to make a controlled buy from the address, the officer instead lied on the search warrant, inventing an informant and describing a drug buy that never happened.When the police broke into Johnston's home on the evening of November 21, 2006, she met them with an old, non-functioning revolver she used to scare off trespassers. They opened fire. Two officers were wounded from friendly fire. The other officers called for ambulances for their colleagues. Meanwhile, they handcuffed Johnston and left her to bleed to death in her own home while one office planted marijuana in her basement.A subsequent federal investigation revealed that lying on drug warrants was common in the APD, the product of a quota system the department imposed on narcotics cops. That system was the result of the pool of federal funding for drug policing, funding for which the department competed with other police departments across the country. The federal investigation and media reports also found numerous other victims of wrong-door police raids in the years leading up to Johnston's death. The entire narcotics department was later fired or transferred. While Johnston's death led to calls for changes in the way the city enforces the drug laws, there was little in the way of real reform. The city instituted a civilian review board to oversee the police department, but its powers were severely weakened after complaints from the police union, and its first director eventually resigned in frustration.
Sources: Ted Conover, "Alex White, Professional Snitch," The New York Times, June 29, 2012; Rhonda Cook, "Chain of Lies Led to Botched Raid," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 27, 2007; reporting by Radley Balko.
Isaac Singletary(02 of13)
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Known around the neighborhood as "Pops," 80-year-old Isaac Singletary moved into his high-crime Jacksonville, Fla., neighborhood in 1987 to care for and protect his sister and mother, both of whom were sick at the time. The retired repairman was known to sit in front of his house in a lawn chair to shoo trespassers and drug dealers away from his property.But in January 2007, two undercover narcotics cops, posed as drug dealers, set up shop on Singletary's lawn. Singletary first came out of his house and yelled at them to leave. They didn't. He went back inside. Minutes later, he came out again and told them to leave, this time while waving a handgun. One of the cops then opened fire. Wounded, Singletary tried to escape into his backyard. The cops chased him down and shot him again, this time in the back. Singletary died at the scene. They never told Singletary they were police officers.The police initially claimed Singletary tried to rob them, then they claimed Singletary fired first. Five witnesses said that wasn't true. Three months later, investigating state attorney Harry Shorstein initially expressed some frustration with the operation. "If we're just selling drugs to addicts, I don't know what we're accomplishing," he told the Florida Times-Union.But three months later, Shorstein cleared the officers of any criminal wrongdoing. His report included a couple of inconsistencies. First, while attorneys for Singletary's family found four witnesses who said the police fired first, Shorstein could find only one -- a convicted drug dealer Shorstein deemed untrustworthy. Second, while Shorstein criticized the police officers for not identifying themselves before they started shooting at Singletary, he still put the bulk of the blame on Singletary himself. He concluded Singletary "was an armed civilian who refused orders to drop his gun," even though Singletary thought the orders came from two drug dealers.Ironically, Singletary's death came a little less than two years after Florida passed a highly publicized law expanding the right to self-defense. The "Stand Your Ground" law removed the traditional legal requirement that when faced with a threat, you must first attempt to escape before using lethal force. An internal report from the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office also cleared the two undercover officers, Darrin Green and James Narcisse, of violating any department policies. The report, written by five members of the sheriff's department, concluded that they had followed department procedures, and that "no further action" was necessary. Narcisse, the first officer to fire at Singletary, was later fired for disciplinary reasons that the sheriff's department said were unrelated to the Singletary case.Sheriff John Rutherford eventually conceded that Singletary was "a good citizen" and that his death was "a tragic incident." But he also rebuffed calls to end undercover drug stings like the one police were conducting on Singletary's property. Then-Florida Gov. Charlie Crist called it one of the "challenges" of keeping a community safe. In 2010, the city of Jacksonville agreed to pay Singletary's family a $200,000 settlement, though the city admitted no wrongdoing.
Sources: David Hunt, "In the wake of 2 fatal shootings, some question police tactics," Florida Times-Union, January 27, 2007; Mary Kelli Palka, "A neighborhood wonders: Why isn't the sheriff here?; Rutherford says a federal review isn't needed, defends not going to the scene," Florida Times-Union, January 30, 2007; Bridget Murphy, "Man's family wants cops to face charges," Florida Times-Union, July 28, 2007; Jessie-Lynne Kerr, "Board clears officers in shooting; 'No further action' is needed by police in the case of the January death of an 80-year-old man," Florida Times-Union, August 2, 2008; Matt Galnor, "City to pay $200,000 in shooting; Officers killed man in 2007," Florida Times-Union, June 22, 2010; Bridget Murphy and Jim Schoettler, "Drug stings to continue, sheriff says," Florida Times-Union, January 30, 2007.
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Johnathan Ayers(03 of13)
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In September 2009, Johnathan Ayers, a 28-year-old Baptist pastor from Lavonia, Ga., was gunned down by a North Georgia narcotics task force in the parking lot of a gas station. Police would later acknowledge he was not using or trafficking in illicit drugs. Instead, Ayers had been ministering to Johanna Barrett, the actual target of the investigation.According to an interview Barrett gave to a North Georgia newspaper shortly after Ayers' death, on the day he died the pastor had seen her walking near a gas station on her way back to an extended-stay motel where she lived with her boyfriend. Ayers had known Barrett for a number of years, and offered her a ride back to the motel. He also gave her the money in his pocket, $23, to help pay her rent.The police were trailing Barrett at the time. But instead of apprehending her at the motel, they instead followed Ayers, who they saw hand Ayers cash. They followed Ayers to a nearby gas station where he withdrew some money from an ATM. Shortly after he got back into his car, a black Escalade pulled up behind him. Three officers, all undercover, rushed Ayers' vehicle and pointed their guns at him. The pastor panicked and attempted to escape. As he backed out, Ayers' car grazed one police officer. Officer Billy Shane Harrison then opened fire, shooting Ayers in the stomach. Ayers drove for another thousand yards before crashing his car. He died at the hospital. His last words to his family and medical staff were that he thought he was being robbed. The police found no illicit drugs in his car.A grand jury later declined to indict Harrison for any crime. District Attorney Brian Rickman praised the Georgia Bureau of Investigation for going to "very extraordinary lengths" to conduct a fair investigation. But a civil suit suggested otherwise. The complaint alleged that Harrison wasn't authorized to arrest him. On the day Ayers was killed, Harrison had yet to take the firearms training classes required for his certification as a police officer. In fact, Harrison had no training at all in the use of lethal force. Harrison's lack of training was later confirmed by local TV station WSB-TV and, after the fact, by the GBI. Harrison was suspended. The civil suit also alleged prior disciplinary problems with Harrison and another officer involved in her husband's death, including alleged drug use.
Sources: Rob Moore, "Case File: Ayers Feared a Robbery," The Northeast Georgian, December 29, 2009; Steve Huff, "Did a Good Dead Lead Pastor Jonathan Ayers to his Death?" September 10, 2009; Jessica Waters, "GBI Findings Outlined," The Toccoa Record, December 28, 2009; Denise Matthews, "Grand Jury Declares Ayers Shooting Justified," Franklin County Citizen, December 24, 2009; Charlie Bauder, "District Attorney Defends Investigation of Preacher's Death," Anderson Independent-Mail, December 22, 2009; Estate of Jonathan Ayers v. Officer Billy Shane Harrison, et al., complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, March 15, 2010; "Arrest Made in Pastor Death Case," Actions News 2, WSB-TV Atlanta, June 18, 2010; Rob Moore, "NCIS Officer on Leave Pending Probe," The Toccoa Record, March 29, 2010; Jessica Waters, "Ayers Federal Civil Case Updated," The Toccoa Record, January 6, 2011.
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Donald Scott(04 of13)
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In October 1992, a team of police from state and federal agencies raided the ranch of 61-year-old Malibu millionaire Donald Scott. The raid was led by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, even though Scott actually lived in Ventura County. The police in that county weren't notified of the raid. Scott's new wife first encountered the police in the kitchen. Hearing her scream, Scott armed himself, and went to meet the intruders. He was shot dead in his home. Scott was suspected of growing marijuana. Friends and relatives would later say that while Scott was a hard drinker, he wasn't a drug user, and in fact deplored the use of illicit drugs. The raid turned up no marijuana plants, nor any evidence of marijuana growth.A subsequent investigation by Ventura County District Attorney Michael Bradbury was highly critical of the investigation, raid, and motives of the police agencies involved. Bradbury found ample evidence that the police agencies -- particularly the L.A. County sheriff's office -- were eyeing Scott's $5 million ranch for asset forfeiture, and had been told by the DEA that it could initiate forfeiture proceedings if authorities found as few as 14 marijuana plants. The report found that the warrant affidavits included false information, misleading information, and omitted information that would have indicated to a judge that Scott wasn't engaged in any illegal activity.In 2000, Francis Plante -- Scott's widow -- settled with the various agencies involved in her husband's death for $5 million. No police officers were ever disciplined for Scott's death.
Sources: Michael Fessier Jr., "Trail's End; Deep in a Wild Canyon West of Malibu, a Controversial Law Brought Together a Zealous Sheriff 's Deputy and an Eccentric Recluse. A Few Seconds Later, Donald Scott Was Dead," Los Angeles Times Magazine, August 1, 1993; Michael Bradbury, "Report on the Death of Donald Scott by Ventura County District Attorney Michael Bradbury," March 30, 1993.
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Esequiel Hernández, Jr(05 of13)
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Esequiel Hernandez, 18, was herding goats near his home in Redford, Texas, when he was killed by a team of U.S. Marines in 1997. Dressed in camouflage, the Marines were deployed near the border town as part of a federal program aimed at stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from Mexico.Hernandez carried a rifle to scare off predatory animals. When he heard noises from the hiding Marines, he fired in their direction. One Marine fired back, striking Hernandez in the chest. The U.S. government later paid the Hernandez family a $1.9 million settlement. None of the Marines was criminally charged.
Sources: "Oversight Investigation of the Death of Esequiel Hernandez, Jr.: A Report of Chairman Lamar Smith to the Subcommittee on Immigration & Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary," House of Representatives, 150th congress. United States Government Printing, January 1998; Monte Paulsen, "Fatal Error: The Pentagon's War on Drugs Takes a Toll on the Innocent," Austin Chronicle, July 11, 2008.
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Tarika Wilson(06 of13)
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In December 2008, an undercover narcotics cop in Lima, Ohio, had bought cocaine from 31-year-old Anthony Terry. They could have arrested Terry then, but they didn't. They also could have arrested him two days before a raid on his home during a traffic stop when they found cocaine in the car. At the time he was pulled over, the police had been watching the home of Terry's girlfriend, 26-year-old Tarika Wilson. Instead, on Jan. 4, 2009, the Lima SWAT team staged a pre-dawn raid on Wilson's home.Terry, on the first floor at the time, surrendered immediately. As Sgt. Joseph Chavalia ascended the steps to the second floor, he saw signs of movement in a bedroom. He ordered whomever was inside to drop to the floor. At about the same time, downstairs in the kitchen, one of Chavalia's fellow officers fired a few rounds at Terry's dogs. Chavalia mistook those shots for hostile fire and opened fire on the upstairs room. Two bullets from Chavalia's gun struck Wilson in the neck, while she was on her knees, with one hand in the air. Her other hand was holding her 1-year-old son, Sincere. Wilson died. Sincere was shot in the shoulder, and had a finger amputated.Chavalia was charged with negligent homicide and negligent assault. A jury acquitted him on both charges. At the trial, a use-of-force expert and former Los Angeles Police Department SWAT member said that if anything, Chavalia should have fired at the unarmed woman sooner. Despite the prosecutor's decision to charge Chavalia, an internal Lima PD investigation found that he had followed department use-of-force protocol. After his acquittal, Chavalia was returned to the force. Lima Police Chief Greg Garlock said he had no plans to change the way the police department used its SWAT team. In January 2010, the city of Lima settled with Wilson's estate for $2.5 million. The money was put in a trust for Sincere and her other children.
Sources: Christopher Maag, "Police Shooting of Mother and Infant Exposes a City's Racial Tension," The New York Times, January 30, 2008; Sarah Stemen, "Five years later: Friends, family of Tarika Wilson say nothing has changed," Lima News, January 4, 2013; "Experts: Woman on knees when shot," Associated Press, July 31, 2008.
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Peter McWilliams(07 of13)
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Shortly after California legalized medical marijuana in 1996, the Clinton administration began drug raids on dispensaries and cultivators, even though they were complying with federal law. One of those raids was on the Los Angeles marijuana grow operation of Todd McCormick and Peter McWilliams. McCormick used pot to treat the pain associated with a cancer treatment that had fused two of his vertebrae. McWilliams had been diagnosed with AIDS, then with non-Hodgkins lymphoma brought on by AIDS. Smoking marijuana eased his nausea, which helped him keep take his medication both to manage his AIDS the chemotherapy for his lymphoma. McWilliams was a self-help author, and had become an outspoken civil liberties activist. With respect to pot, he also made no attempt to hide the fact that while it was medicinal, it also made him feel good. The high took his mind off the fact that he was battling two diseases.McWilliams and McCormick were raided in 1997, by DEA agents -- as McWilliams later described it, "guns drawn, commando-style." Because they were tried on federal charges, the jury wasn't allowed to hear that the two men had broken no California laws. McWilliams' doctors were also prohibited from testifying about his marijuana use. Because of those restrictions, McWilliams pleaded guilty and hoped for leniency.But after his arrest, McWilliams' mother put up her house as collateral to post his bail. One condition of McWilliams' bail was that he refrain from smoking marijuana. Prosecutors told McWilliams and his mother that if he failed a drug test or was caught with pot she'd lose her house. So McWilliams abstained from using the drug. Consequently, he got sicker.McWilliams was found dead in his apartment on June 14, 2000. Overcome with nausea, he had thrown up, then choked and aspirated on his own vomit. The conservative icon and legalization advocate William F. Buckley eulogized McWilliams in his syndicated column.
Peter McWilliams is dead. Age? Fifty. Profession? Author, poet, publisher . . . What was his offense? He collaborated in growing marijuana plants.What was his defense? Well, the judge wouldn't allow him to plead his defense to the jury. If given a chance, the defense would have argued that under Proposition 215, passed into California constitutional law in 1996, infirm Californians who got medical relief from marijuana were permitted to use it. The judge also forbade any mention that McWilliams suffered from AIDS and cancer, and got relief from the marijuana.What was he doing when he died? Vomiting. The vomiting hit him while in his bathtub, and he choked to death.Was there nothing he might have done to still the impulse to vomit? Yes, he could have taken marijuana; but the judge's bail terms forbade him to do so, and he submitted to weekly urine tests to confirm that he was living up to the terms of his bail . . .Peter was a wry, mythogenic guy, humorous, affectionate, articulate, shrewd, sassy . . . Imagine such a spirit ending its life at 50, just because they wouldn't let him have a toke. We have to console ourselves with the comment of the two prosecutors. They said they were "saddened" by Peter McWilliams' death. Many of us are--by his death and the causes of it . . .The struggle against a fanatical imposition of federal laws on marijuana will continue, as also on the question whether federal laws can stifle state initiatives. Those who believe the marijuana laws are insanely misdirected have a martyr.

Sources: Peter McWilliams, "The DEA Wishes Me a Nice Day," Liberty, May, 1998; William F. Buckley, Jr., "Peter McWilliams, R.I.P." Universal Press Syndicate, June 21, 2000; R.W. Bradford, "The Life and Death of Peter McWilliams," Liberty, August 2000; "Los Angeles Drug Case Bars Medical Marijuana Defense," The New York Times, November 7, 1999.
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Rev. Accleyne Williams(08 of13)
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The Rev. Accleyne Williams, a 75-year-old retired minister, died of a heart attack on March 25, 1994, after struggling with 13 members of a masked, heavily armed Boston SWAT team that stormed his apartment. The police later revealed that an informant had given them incorrect information.According to the Boston Herald, "a warrant authorizing the raid was approved by Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney Mary Lou Moran, even though the application supporting the warrant did not specify which apartment on the building's second floor was to be targeted. It also failed to provide corroboration of the confidential informant's tip that a Jamaican drug posse operated out of the building." Another police source told the Herald: "You'd be surprised at how easily this can happen. An informant can tell you it is the apartment on the left at the top of the stairs and there could be two apartments on the left at the top of the stairs . . . You are supposed to verify it, and I'm not making excuses, but mistakes can be made."Another Boston Herald investigation later discovered that three of the officers involved in the Williams raid had been accused in a 1989 civil rights suit of using nonexistent informants to secure drug warrants. The city had in fact just settled a suit stemming from a mistaken raid five years earlier. According to witnesses, one of the officers in that raid apologized as he left, telling the home's terrified occupants, "This happens all the time."Sources: Joseph Mallia and Maggie Mulvihill, "Minister Dies as Cops Raid Wrong Apartment," Boston Herald, March 26, 1994; Maggie Mulvihill, "Three Cops at Botched Raid Were Sued in Prior Gaffe," Boston Herald, April 1, 1994; John Milne, "Role of Informants Questioned," Boston Globe, December 27, 2005. (credit:Family photo)
Ismael Mena(09 of13)
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In 1999, a Denver SWAT team raided the wrong house, and in the process shot and killed 45-year old Ismael Mena, a Mexican immigrant and father of seven. The police were acting on a tip from an informant, and claimed they knocked and announced themselves. Mena's family said they never heard a knock or announcement. Once the police had broken into Mena's home, they ascended a staircase and kicked open Mena's bedroom door, where they found him standing with a rifle. The police claimed Mena fired at them first, and they responded by shooting him eight times. They found no drugs or contraband in the home.The Denver Police Department's Internal Affairs division was the first to clear the SWAT cops of any wrongdoing, although it did find that the officer who prepared the search warrant had falsified information on an affidavit. A special prosecutor then cleared them as well. But several weeks later, new details started to filter out, raising new questions about the investigation, the raid, and the aftermath.First, an assistant to the special prosecutor came out and said that Mena's body had been moved. A crime lab report then determined that the gunshot residue taken from Mena's hands didn't match Mena's gun. Instead, it was consistent with the sort of residue from submachine guns like those used by the Denver SWAT team. Neither Mena's gun, nor the bullets inside it had fingerprints on them. The mounting evidence suggested someone had tampered with Mena and his gun after the SWAT team killed him.The new evidence appeared to put Denver city and law enforcement officials on the defensive. Information began to leak out that Mena was a violent fugitive who was wanted in Mexico for murder. In truth, he had shot a man, claimed self-defense, and Mexican police declined to press charges. He wasn't a fugitive, and had returned to Mexico to visit family several times since the incident. The Denver Police Department Intelligence Unit also started a "spy file" on an activist group that formed in 2000 to advocate for police reforms in the wake of Mena's death. Several months later, Capt. Vince DiManna was transferred to lead that Intelligence Unit. DiManna also led the SWAT team that killed Mena.In March 2000, the city of Denver settled with Mena's family for $400,000.A subsequent Denver Post investigation found that the city's judges exercised almost no scrutiny at all when approving no-knock warrants. The Rocky Mountain News conducted its own investigation into the effectiveness of the warrants themselves. The paper found that of the 146 no-knock raids conducted in Denver in 1999, just 49 resulted in charges of any kind. Of those 49, two resulted in prison time. Of those who police argued in warrant affidavits were dangerous enough to merit such dangerous tactics, a little over 1 percent went to prison. One former prosecutor said of the investigation, "When you have that violent intrusion on people's homes with so little results, you have to ask why." The investigation concluded that, "almost all of the 1999 no-knock cases were targeted at people suspected of being drug dealers. . . . Often the tips went unsubstantiated, and little in the way of narcotics was recovered. The problem doesn't stem only from the work of inexperienced street cops, which city officials have maintained. Even veteran narcotics detectives sometimes seek no-knock warrants based on the word of an informant and without conducting undercover buys to verify the tips."A year before Mena's death, Colorado state senator Jim Congrove (R-Arvada), a retired undercover narcotics detective, introduced legislation that would have put tighter regulations on the deployment of SWAT teams, the issuance of no-knock warrants and the use of no-knock raids. The bill was rejected.
Sources: Alan Pendergrast, "Unlawful Entry," Denver Westword News, February 24, 2000; Mike Soraghan, "Outcry waters down no-knock measure," Denver Post, April 4, 2000.
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Veronica and Charity Bowers(10 of13)
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In 2001, the Peruvian Air Force shot down a plane flying over the Amazon after receiving information from the CIA that the plane was trafficking narcotics. It was actually filled with Christian missionaries. The attack resulted in the death of 35-year-old Veronica Bowers and her infant daughter, Charity. Their deaths were the product of a joint operation between the CIA and the government of Peru to shoot down suspected drug planes.Seven years later, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson issued a blistering report finding that the CIA repeatedly lied and covered up details about the plane intercept program, about the downing of Bowers' plane, and about similar incidents that never made the news."Within hours, CIA officers began to characterize the shootdown as a one-time mistake in an otherwise well-run program. In fact, this was not the case ... The routine disregard of the required intercept procedures in the ABDP led to the rapid shooting down of target aircraft without adequate safeguards to protect against the loss of innocent life," according to the report. The report found that officers in the program thought adhering to safeguards too strictly could allow drug-smuggling planes to escape, and that it was easier to shoot planes down than to force them down with other planes. Consequently, "in many cases, suspect aircraft were shot down within two to three minutes of being sighted by the Peruvian fighter - without being properly identified, without being given the required warnings to land, and without being given time to respond to such warnings as were given to land."
Sources: Ross Colvin, "CIA faulted in shooting down of missionary plane," Reuters, November 20, 2008; Joanna Sugden, "Veronica Bowers: the long fight for justice". London: The Times, February 4, 2010.
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Ashley Villarreal(11 of13)
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Ashley Villarreal, 14, was shot and killed by DEA agents in 2003 in San Antonio. Ashley was attempting to show off her driving skills to family friend David Robles by taking a drive around the block. But at the time, the DEA was investigating Ashley's father, Joey Villarreal, for drug trafficking. As Ashley pulled out of the driveway of the home where Joey Villarreal's mother and Ashley lived, the federal agents were in the process of staking out the house.Later explaining that they had mistaken Robles for Ashley's father, the agents boxed in the vehicle the girl was driving. They claimed she then continued driving toward them, at which point they opened fire, shooting her in the back of the head. Robles and several witnesses said the agents never identified themselves, and that Ashley posed no threat, given that her vehicle was already boxed in. The police found no drugs or weapons in the vehicle, or in the house, nor did they find any evidence that Ashley's father had been using the house for drug trafficking. Nevertheless, the agents were cleared of any wrongdoing. Joey Villarreal was later arrested, convicted of drug charges, and sentenced to 19 years in prison.
Source: Pete Brady, "The Murder of Ashley," Cannabis Culture, October 8, 2003.
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Rachel Hoffman(12 of13)
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Rachel Hoffman, 23, was murdered by drug traffickers in 2008 after agreeing to work as a police informant. In February 2007, Hoffman was arrested after a traffic stop search turned up 25 grams of marijuana. A year later, police searched her home and found another 5 ounces of pot, plus four Ecstasy pills. In exchange for dropping the charges, Hoffman agreed to become a confidential informant for the Tallahassee Police Department. Hoffman, a recent college graduate, was set up to buy $13,000 worth of cocaine, guns and MDMA from two men she had never met.During the transaction, the police lost track of Hoffman as the dealers took her to a different location than the one initially agreed upon. They murdered her with one of the guns she had intended to buy. Outrage over Hoffman's death spurred the Florida legislature to pass "Rachel's Law" in 2009, which requires extra training for police officers who work with informants, and removes the possibility of lighter sentences in exchange for informant work.
Sources: Brian Ross and Vic Walter, "Botched Sting: Killed With the Gun She Was Supposed to Buy," ABC News 20/20, July 25, 2008; Sarah Stillman, "Pawns in the War on Drugs," The New Yorker, September 3, 2012; Florida Criminal Statutes, Title XLVII, Chapter 914.28.
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Alberto Sepulveda(13 of13)
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On September 13, 2000, agents from the DEA, the FBI, and a Stanislaus County, California narcotics task force conducted a series of raids on 14 homes in the area of Modesto, Calif. According to The Los Angeles Times, the DEA and FBI asked that the local SWAT teams enter each home unannounced in order to secure the area ahead of federal agents, who then came in to search for evidence. Federal agents warned the SWAT teams that the targets of the warrants, one of whom was Moises Sepulveda should be considered armed and dangerous. When local police asked if there were any children in the Sepulveda home, federal agents answered, "Not aware of any."But Sepulveda had three children, a daughter and two sons. After the police broke into the Sepulveda home, Moises, his wife and children were ordered to lie face down on the floor as officers pointed guns at their heads. Moments later, Officer David Hawn fired his gun, killing 11-year-old Alberto Sepulveda from point-blank range.There were no drugs or guns in the Sepulveda home. A subsequent internal investigation by the Modesto Police Department found that the DEA's evidence against Moises Sepulveda, who had no previous criminal record, was "minimal." The city of Modesto and the federal government settled a lawsuit brought by the Sepulvedas for $3 million.Modesto police chief Roy Wasden initially seemed to question the policies and tactics that caused the boy's death. "What are we gaining by serving these drug warrants?" Wasden asked. "We ought to be saying, 'It's not worth the risk. We're not going to put our officers and community at risk anymore.'" Two years later, as part of its settlement with the Sepulveda family, Modesto implemented changes in the way its SWAT team conducted drug raids, but the drug raids themselves continued.A state commission assembled to investigate Sepulveda's death found that while SWAT teams in California were generally justified as necessary responses to emergency situations like hostage crises and terror attacks, they were most commonly used to serve drug warrants. But the panel's final recommendations did little to stop the practice. In fact, critics pointed out that even if the panel's suggestions had been implemented in the 1990s, the changes would not have prevented the death of Alberto, the reason the panel had been assembled in the first place.In 2002, Moises Sepulveda pleaded guilty to a charge of using a telephone to distribute marijuana. He was sentenced to probation.
Sources: Michael G. Mooney, "Panel's SWAT Review Delayed; "Lockyer Commission Formed after Shooting Death of Modesto Boy," Modesto Bee, August 13, 2001; Kimberly Edds, "Lack of Training, Resources Blamed for Botched SWAT Team Responses," Metropolitan News Enterprise, July 19, 2001; Loie Fecteau, "Ex-Secretary of State Supports Drug Reforms," Albuqerque Journal, March 16, 2001; California Department of Justice, "Attorney General's Commission on Special Weapons and Tactics (S.W.A.T.) Final Report," September 10, 2002.
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