WO2011154938A2 - System for risk management of a cargo flow - Google Patents

Abstract

A system 100 for risk management of a cargo flow is disclosed. The aforesaid system comprises: (a) a data receiver 110 connectable to at least one database 200; the database 200 accommodating records pertaining to traffic entities and legal regulations applicable thereto; the receiver adapted for receiving said records; (b) a query engine 120 (c) a behaviour pattern manager 130 adapted for organizing the records into a behaviour patterns pertaining to the traffic entities; (d) a rule engine 140 adapted for executing the legal regulations to the obtained traffic entities' behaviour patterns; (e) a database 150 accommodating what-if scenarios (f) means 160 for analyzing said obtained traffic entities' behaviour patterns and potential developments according the scenarios; the means adapted for ranking potential threats of the scenarios applied to the traffic entities; (g) a data distribution unit 180 the data distribution unit connectable to a client domain.

Description

SYSTEM FOR RISK MANAGEMENT OF A CARGO FLOW

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to a system for automation, and, more specifically, to computer- implemented system and method for risk management of a cargo flow.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

In order to identify abnormal behavior it is necessary to understand normal behavior in its appropriate context, and this knowledge, which derives from many varied sources must be applied taking into account risk, cost and hazard.

Terrorists engage in a variety of non-terrorist criminal conduct prior to the commission of any terrorist act. These non-terrorist acts include crimes related to the creation of false identities for group members, thefts to procure funding for the group, thefts of weapons or explosive materials and, frequently, crimes related to the maintenance of internal security (Hamm, 2007; Smith and Orvis, 1993; Smith, 1994; Smith and Damphousse, 2002; Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts, 2006). These behaviors ultimately culminate in acts of terrorism. By examining these preparatory behaviors, patterns of activity may be identified.

The literature on this subject is characterized by two major problems. First, literature on terrorist targeting based on empirical findings is extremely scarce (e.g., see Turk, 1979; Crenshaw, 1992; Hoffman, 1992; Wardlaw, 1989; Blumstein, 1996). Recent advances, particularly in the development of relational database methodologies, have resulted in new efforts to engage in the predictive modeling of terrorist group activities (Ward, 2005; LaFree, 2004). However, these efforts focus on issues other than the temporal and spatial relationships between pre-cursor crime and terrorism incidents. Second, reliance on the general criminological literature to identify testable hypotheses relative to terrorist behaviors is extremely difficult. The demographic characteristics of traditional offenders are substantially different from those persons indicted for terrorism related crimes here in the United States. Some terrorist groups include disproportionately higher percentages of females and white persons than non-terrorist criminals (Smith, 1994; Smith and Damphousse, 1996; 1998; 2003b). Some of these same groups also tend to be slightly better educated and they include more persons from middle and upper class backgrounds than the conventional criminal population (Smith and Morgan, 1994; Corley, Smith, and Damphousse, 2005). Most importantly, they are significantly older than traditional offenders, indicating a pattern of career criminality uncharacteristic of common criminals (Smith and Damphousse, 1996; 1998; Bradley, Smith, and Damphousse, 2007). These demographic variations reflect the motivational differences between terrorists and traditional criminals (Schafer, 1974). In other words, the causes of traditional criminality appear to be fundamentally different from the causes of terrorism, thereby making generalizations from one to the other tenuous at best.

Target- specific literature: Despite this, some theoretical efforts have been made to predict the targets of terrorism. Most of these efforts focus upon ideology as a predictor of terrorist group activity (Drake, 1998). Crenshaw (1988), however, notes that other factors may be equally as important. Specifically, she contends that terrorist groups are, in practice, organizations advocating political change and that the "fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself (Crenshaw, 1988:19). From this perspective, terrorism targets are analyzed not as ends in themselves (i.e., to attain specific political goals), but as the outcome of efforts to maintain the integrity of the terrorist organization. Rapoport (1992) suggested that well over 90 percent of terrorist organizations have a life expectancy of less than one year. Crenshaw contends that the longer a terrorist group survives, the more likely its targets will reflect a concern for maintaining the group and its organizational structure. These assertions have important implications not only for the spatial distribution of ancillary and preparatory terrorist crimes, but also for the temporal characteristics of terrorist planning.

A dominant theme that has emerged in the evolution of the terrorism literature is the acknowledgment that the criminality of terrorists is more widespread and complex than previously discussed (Smith, 1994). Crenshaw's (1988) expansion of terrorist targeting to include "organizational maintenance" crimes and Hoffman's (1998) argument that the overriding tactical imperative of many terrorist groups "has been the deliberate tailoring of their violent acts to appeal to their perceived constituencies" (Hoffman, 1998: 158) are particularly intriguing when applied to the study of environmental and international terrorist groups, both of which have experienced substantial structural change over the past decade.6

General Criminological Literature Relative to Spatial and Temporal Patterns: In recent years geospatial and temporal research has emerged as a viable technique to identify patterns of behavior due to the development of geospatial technologies. However, criminology already as a rich tradition in this arena stretching back to the early 20-th century. Included among these early works are the contributions of Park and Burgess (1925), and Shaw and McKay (1942) as part of the Chicago Area Project. While their findings may not be specifically relevant to the study of terrorism, these early studies revealed the importance of an "ecological" or "environmental" approach to examining the changing patterns of criminal conduct within, in their case, a city and its environs. This methodology has become increasing important as new technologies have emerged that allow easier access to, and analysis of, geospatial data.

Since these early efforts, ecological approaches have manifested themselves in several important theoretical works. Although Wolfgang's (1958) work on patterns of criminal homicide is not generally identified within the spectrum of ecological theories, his analysis of homicides in Philadelphia produced some of the earliest spatial and temporal patterns involved in criminal conduct. His analysis and findings stimulated a number of subsequent theorists interested in temporal and spatial relationships. More recent efforts to examine the spatial distribution of crime have included Newman's (1972) work on "defensible space" and C. Ray Jeffrey's (1971) concept of "environmental design." Both of these noted works focus upon the reduction and prevention of crime through manipulation of the social and physical environment.

More recent examinations of the geospatial relationship to victimization and crime include Cohen and Felson's (1979) "routine activities theory" and Clarke's (1992) "situational crime prevention." Both of these perspectives have direct relevance regarding terrorist behavior and targeting. Research on routine activities theory has focused primarily upon "suitable targets" and the "absence of capable guardians," two of the three major elements that must converge to produce criminal conduct. Less research has been done on the third component - the presence of capable or motivated offenders (Paulsen and Robinson, 2004). Despite its relevance, however, little empirical work has appeared in which this model has been used to predict terrorist activity. In contrast, Clarke and Newman (2006) have applied the situational crime prevention model to preventing terrorism in their new work entitled Outsmarting Terrorists. Clarke and Newman, however, also acknowledge the lack of empirical data available to adequately test their perspective, calling for a DHS commitment to examine the issue.

Roach, Ekblom, and Flynn (2005) also apply the situational crime prevention model to the "conjunction of terrorist opportunity" to identify the conditions under which specific acts of terrorism might occur. In addition to motivational issues such as "readiness to act" and "ideological predisposition, Roach, Ekblom, and Flynn include training, resources, and targets, among others, as variables in their model. Efforts to obtain resources (through theft or legitimate activities) and training entail preparatory activities that can be measured to identify pre-incident indicators and patterns of precursor behavior. The identification of these antecedent behaviors may have important implications for preventing terrorism.

Studies of traditional criminality link a variety of antecedent crimes to the ultimate objectives of many types of offenders. The literature on drug use is replete with links to the use of antecedent preparatory crimes to fund an offender's addiction (e.g., Inciardi, Horowitz, and Pottieger, 1993; Kaplan, 1995). Wright and Decker's (1997) analysis of armed robbers characterizes armed robbery as an antecedent to the procurement of illicit drugs and alcohol. Similarly, the organized crime literature is saturated with descriptions of both legitimate and illegitimate ancillary activities related to the maintenance of crime cartels (Abadinsky, 2000; Albanese 1996).

These issues led us to consider terrorist group conduct as occurring along a continuum involving four major activities: (1) recruitment; (2) preliminary organization and planning; (3) preparatory conduct; and (4) terrorist acts. These general principles and examples of each type of behavior are presented in Fig. 1.

Temporal Patterns: Temporal measurements were made at four points during the planning process: (1) when the terrorist(s) were recruited as members into the terrorist group; (2) when the terrorist "cell" originated, usually measured as a function of the first planning meeting; (3) when preparatory acts occurred; and (4) when the actual terrorist incident occurred or, if it was preempted or prevented, the date that it was planned to occur. Temporal measurements proved to be the most difficult to identify. Although 191 temporal measurements were obtained in the original project, some events were substantially more difficult to measure than others. For example, temporal information regarding when various members joined specific terrorist groups was, in large part, non-existent. If this information was located, it was frequently provided in units of measurement that were so large (e.g., years) that calculations were unreliable. The basic findings from this pilot study are presented in Fig. 2.

Despite a lack of information regarding recruitment, sufficient temporal data existed to identify basic patterns of preparatory conduct. On average, the terrorist cells held their first planning meetings slightly over 3 months from the time they committed the terrorist incidents studied. This is generally consistent with Rapoport's (1992) notion that terrorist groups have a life expectancy of less than one year. The lifespan of these "cells" ranged from a few weeks to more than three years.

Of significant interest in these temporal averages is the finding that there tends to be a substantial lull between the conclusion of the preparatory conduct and the actual incident. The initial "planning phase" appeared to last, on average, between twelve days and approximately two months. It is during this period that law enforcement agencies would have the greatest probability of successful intervention. Initial analyses suggested that once preparatory behaviors begin, the process toward terroristic violence is relatively swift. Subsequent analysis suggested, however, that planning and preparatory activities are intermingled and not temporally separated (i.e. that not all planning meetings occur first, followed by preparatory acts). Substantial variation existed among types of terrorist groups (e.g. single-issue, international, etc.) regarding this issue. However, the limited amount of temporal data available from these case studies precluded further specification other than the overall pattern of conduct. In fact, the chart above should be viewed as mere "averages" rather than as patterns of behavior.

Spatial Patterns: Preliminary findings indicated that there is a strong relationship among the locations of the terrorist incident, terrorists' preparatory behaviors, and where these terrorists reside. For example, preliminary spatial analysis on 426 measurements of distance from terrorist residence to incident location have identified that 46% are within 30 miles, while 37% were 271 miles or greater (see Fig. 3). This bimodal distribution was most apparent among international, left-wing, and single-issue terrorists. Only right-wing terrorists did not fit this pattern of behavior.

According to the Customs Modernization Handbook (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005). in recent years the international trading environment has been transformed dramatically in terms of the manner in which goods are carried and traded, the speed of such transactions, and the sheer volume of goods now being traded around the globe. This, together with mounting pressure from the international trading community to minimize government intervention, has caused customs authorities to place an increasing emphasis on the facilitation of trade. In an effort to achieve an appropriate balance between trade facilitation and regulatory control, customs administrations are generally abandoning their traditional, routine "gateway" checks and are now applying the principles of risk management, with varying degrees of sophistication and success.

Border administrations, specifically, customs, like any other organization, need to manage their risks in an efficient and rapid manner. This requires the systematic application of management procedures designed to reduce those risks to ensure that its objectives are achieved as efficiently and effectively as possible. Such procedures include the identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring, and review of risks that may affect the achievement of these objectives. Sound risk management is fundamental to effective customs operations, and it would be true to say that all administrations apply some form of risk management, either formal or informal. Drawing on intelligence, information, and experience, customs has always adopted procedures designed to identify illegal activity in an effort to reduce its risks.

The more traditional procedures include physical border controls over the movement of goods and people consisting of documentary checks and physical inspections aimed at detecting illicit trade. The introduction of such controls constitutes a form of risk management, but not necessarily an effective or efficient one.

Recently, the increasing complexity, speed, and volume of international trade, fueled by the technological advances that have revolutionized global trading practices, have significantly affected the way customs authorities carry out their responsibilities. As a consequence, many administrations have implemented a more disciplined and structured approach to managing risk. This has also helped them to increase the efficiency of their operations and to streamline their processes and procedures, minimizing intervention in trade transactions and reducing the regulatory burden on the commercial sector. The two key objectives of customs are commonly referred to as "facilitation" and "control." In seeking to achieve an appropriate balance between trade facilitation and regulatory control, border administrations must simultaneously manage two risks— the potential failure to facilitate international trade and the potential for noncompliance with customs and other regulations.

The application of risk management principles provides the means of achieving this balance. Note that the phrase "facilitation and control" has been used in this context, rather than the phrase "facilitation versus control." It is a commonly held belief that facilitation and control sit at opposite ends of a continuum, and it is not uncommon for commentators to refer to the apparent "paradox" of achieving both facilitation and control. It is often assumed that, as the level of facilitation increases, the level of control decreases. Similarly, where regulatory controls are tightened, it is commonly assumed that facilitation must suffer. This is an extremely simplistic view, as it assumes that the only way a process may be facilitated is by loosening the reins of control. Such a contention is fundamentally flawed, because the concepts of facilitation and control represent two distinct variables, as depicted in the matrix in figure 4.

The top left quadrant of the matrix (high control, low facilitation) represents a high-control regime in which customs requirements are stringent, to the detriment of facilitation. This may be described as the red tape approach, which is often representative of a risk-averse management style. In most modern societies such an approach is likely to attract a great deal of public criticism and complaint, due to the increasing expectations of the trading community that customs intervention should be minimized.

The bottom left quadrant (low control, low facilitation) depicts the approach of an administration that exercises little control and achieves equally little in the way of facilitation. This crisis management approach is one that benefits neither the government nor the trading community. The bottom right quadrant (low control, high facilitation) represents an approach in which facilitation is the order of the day, but with it comes little in the way of customs control. This laisser-faire approach would be an appropriate method of managing compliance in an idyllic world in which the trading community complies fully without any threat or inducement from government, because such an environment would present no risk of noncompliance.

Finally, the top right quadrant (high control, high facilitation) represents a balanced approach to both regulatory control and trade facilitation, resulting in high levels of both. This approach to compliance management maximizes the benefits to both customs and the international trading community. It is this approach that administrations should be seeking to achieve.

Effective application of the principles of risk management is the key to achieving an appropriate balance between facilitation and control. As the use of risk management becomes more effective (for example, more systematic and sophisticated), an appropriate balance between facilitation and control becomes more achievable. Thus, those administrations that are able to achieve high levels of both facilitation and control (the balanced approach quadrant of the Facilitation and Control Matrix) do so through the effective use of risk management. Similarly, administrations in a state of total crisis management (that is, zero facilitation, zero control) would essentially be adopting a compliance management strategy that is devoid of risk management.

However, any movement away from a state of total crisis management implies the existence of some form of risk management. For example, recognizing that risk is the chance of something happening that will have an impact on organizational objectives, a regulatory strategy that achieves some degree of control, however small, represents a method of treating potential noncompliance with customs laws. Equally, a strategy that achieves some degree of facilitation represents a method of treating the potential failure to facilitate trade. This relationship is depicted in the three-dimensional Compliance Management Matrix in figure 5.

The customs role is, therefore, to manage compliance with the law in a way that ensures the facilitation of trade. To achieve this, many administrations have already implemented compliance management strategies that are based on the principles of risk management. The Compliance Management Matrix provides a useful conceptualization of the interrelationship between facilitation, regulatory control, and risk management. The next step is to identify the components of a risk-based compliance management strategy.

The underlying elements of such a strategy are summarized in Fig. 7, which compares key elements of a risk-management style of compliance management with the more traditional gatekeeper style, which is typically characterized by indiscriminate customs intervention or a regime of 100 percent checks. Similarly, payment of duties and other taxes is a prerequisite for customs clearance under the gatekeeper model, and such clearance is invariably withheld until all formalities and real-time transactional checks are completed. A risk management approach, however, is characterized by the identification of potentially high-risk areas, with resources being directed toward such areas and minimal intervention in similarly identified low-risk areas. Such regimes adopt strategies that break the nexus between physical control over goods and a trader's revenue liability, and permit customs clearance to be granted prior to the arrival of cargo. The various elements of each style of compliance management can be broadly grouped into four main categories— a country's legislative framework, the administrative framework of a country's customs organization, the type of risk management framework adopted by a country's customs organization, and the available technological framework. Collectively, the four categories represent key determinants of the manner in which the movement of cargo may be expedited across a country's borders, and the way that customs control may be exercised over such cargo. An appropriate legislative framework is an essential element of any regulatory regime, because the primary role of customs is to ensure compliance with the law. Regardless of the compliance management approach that it is supporting, the legislative framework must provide the necessary basis in law for the achievement of the range of administrative and risk management strategies that the administration has chosen to adopt. For example, an appropriate basis in law must exist to enable customs to break the nexus between its physical control over internationally traded goods and the revenue liability (that is, customs duty and other taxes) that such goods may attract. This does not necessarily imply, however, that such a differentiation must be explicitly addressed in the relevant statutory provisions.

For example, if the legislation itself is silent on the relationship between customs control over cargo and revenue liability, sufficient scope is likely to exist for administratively flexible solutions to be implemented.

Underpinned by the relevant legal provisions, the various elements of the administrative and risk management frameworks employed by customs essentially reflect the underlying style of compliance management being pursued by the administration, with an increasing use of risk management principles as the administration moves away from the traditional, risk-averse gatekeeper style of compliance management to amore risk-based approach. The available technological framework represents an enabler that, while not critical to the achievement of a risk management style, serves to significantly enhance an administration's ability to adopt such a style.

The Risk-Based Compliance Management Pyramid (figure 6) draws together the various elements of a risk management style (that is, those on the right side of Fig.7) to provide a structured approach to the management of compliance. It provides a logical framework for demonstrating how various types of risk-based strategies, including non-enforcement strategies such as self-assessment, may be used to effectively manage compliance.

Fundamental to this approach is the need to provide the commercial sector with the ability to comply with customs requirements. This involves establishing an effective legislative base (the first tier of the pyramid) and an appropriate range of client service strategies (the second tier), including effective consultation arrangements and clear administrative guidelines. Such strategies are necessary to provide the commercial sector with the means to achieve certainty and clarity in assessing liabilities and entitlements. At the third tier of the pyramid, the elements of compliance assessment come into play, including risk-based physical and documentary checks, audits, and investigations. Such activities are designed to determine whether a trader is in compliance with customs law, and these are discussed in more detail in the next section. At the peak of the pyramid are strategies to address both identified non-compliers and recognized compilers. Strategies for the identified non-compliers include a range of enforcement techniques (see Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), while strategies for the recognized compilers include increased levels of self-assessment, reduced regulatory scrutiny, less onerous reporting requirements, periodic payment arrangements, and increased levels of facilitation (see Industry Panel on Customs Audit Reforms 1995 and Sparrow 2000). In assessing the level of compliance, customs will encounter two situations: compliance and noncompliance. The noncompliance spectrum will range from innocent mistakes to blatant fraud. If the error nears the fraudulent end of the spectrum, some form of sanction will need to apply, including administrative penalties or, in more severe cases, prosecution and license revocation. Before determining the need for, or nature of, a sanction, however, it is important to identify the true nature of the risk by establishing why the error has occurred. For example, the error may be the result of a control problem within the company due to flawed systems and procedures, or it may be the result of a deliberate attempt to defraud. It also may be that the relevant legislation is unclear or the administrative requirements are ambiguous. The type of mitigation strategy that customs should employ to ensure future compliance will depend on the nature of the identified risk. Unless the error is found to be intentional, it may be appropriate to address systemic problems within the company, or to provide the company (or perhaps an entire industry sector) with advice on compliance issues, or provide formal clarification of the law through binding rulings or other means (Widdowson 1998). In this regard, it is important to recognize that different solutions will be required to address honest mistakes on the one hand, and deliberate attempts to evade duty on the other. For example, industry familiarization seminars and information brochures may adequately address errors that result from a lack of understanding of the relevant regulatory provisions. However, if someone is actively seeking to commit revenue fraud, seminars and information brochures will have absolutely no impact on their activities. Indeed, such members of the trading community are likely to have an excellent understanding of their obligations and entitlements.

To treat the risks posed by such individuals (or organizations, for that matter), a rigorous enforcement approach is likely to be required. In applying the principles of risk management to the day-to-day activities of customs, one of the most critical areas is that of compliance assessment— determining whether an entity or transaction is in compliance with regulatory requirements. This represents the third tier of the Compliance Management Pyramid in figure 5.3. When developing strategies to assess compliance, it is important to consider a key principle of the Revised Kyoto Convention— that customs control should be limited to what is necessary to ensure compliance with the customs law (WCO 1999). Administrative regimes should be as simple as practicable, and should provide the trading community with cost-efficient ways of demonstrating compliance with the law. This principle applies to a range of customs controls, including physical control over goods, information requirements, timing and method of reporting, and timing and form of revenue collection. The use of documentary controls (information management) to monitor and assess compliance generally represents a far less intrusive and hence more facilitative approach than the use of physical controls. Similarly, post-transaction audit generally represents a more facilitative method of verification than checks undertaken at the time of importation or exportation.

For many developing countries, however, the task of introducing risk-based strategies can be daunting, particularly for those administrations that do not yet have the capacity to undertake post-transaction audits, or that currently rely heavily on manual processing systems. While it is clear that such impediments will limit the effectiveness of any risk-based strategies, applying a risk management approach to existing manual systems will prove far more effective and efficient than continuing to apply a gatekeeper approach to those same systems.

For example, despite the fact that an administration may undertake all customs examinations and assessments at the time of importation, there is nevertheless an opportunity to replace an indiscriminate or random method of examining goods with one that takes account of the potential risks. Similarly, it is quite possible to apply documentary checks prior to the arrival of goods despite the fact that manual methods of processing are employed.

A case in point is Sri Lanka, which was successful in introducing pre-arrival screening and clearance for air express consignments prior to the availability of its automated systems. This consisted of a combination of manual documentary assessment, selective examination, and the establishment of x-ray facilities to address the potential risk of mis-description. Consolidated manifests were manually submitted to customs prior to aircraft arrival, together with advance copies of air waybills and invoices. These were manually screened by customs to identify potentially high-risk shipments (based on intelligence, emerging trends, the previous compliance record of consignees and consignors, and so on). Any consignments that were considered to be high risk were identified for further examination upon arrival, together with certain dutiable and restricted goods that were held pending formal clearance. All other consignments (that is, low-risk shipments) were available for delivery on arrival.

Administrations that have adopted a risk-based approach to compliance management, regardless of whether their systems are automated, are also selective in their use of the broad range of controls that are available to them. In being selective, they recognize that individual members of the trading community present customs with varying levels of risk in terms of potential noncompliance with relevant laws. For example, traders with a good record of compliance are unlikely to require the same level of scrutiny as those with a history of poor compliance. Consequently, if a trader is judged to be relatively low risk, customs may reduce its level of regulatory scrutiny and place greater reliance on the company's self-assessment of compliance.1 This particularly effective strategy is a commonly used method of recognition, and forms the right half of the peak of the Compliance Management Pyramid.

Risk-based compliance management results in a situation where low-risk traders are permitted to operate under less onerous regulatory requirements and may anticipate little in the way of customs intervention, and therefore receive relatively high levels of trade facilitation. Transactions of high-risk traders, however, are more likely to be selected for higher levels of customs intervention and control. Customs intervention for high-risk traders may include documentary checks or physical examinations at the time of importation or exportation, higher levels of audit activity, physical controls at manufacturing premises, and relatively high security bonds. In all cases, however, the level and type of intervention should be based on the level of identified risk.

Sometimes confusion arises over the terms used to describe the management of risk, and often terms are used interchangeably. The simple scenario in Fig. 4 of a country that recently accepted the WTO obligation on valuation Effective risk management is central to modern customs operations, and provides the means to achieve an appropriate balance between trade facilitation and regulatory control. The principles of risk management can be applied by all administrations, regardless of whether they operate manual or automated systems, if they adopt strategies that incorporate the key elements of a risk-based approach to compliance management. To manage risk effectively, administrations must gain a clear understanding of the nature of risks to the achievement of their objectives and devise practical methods of mitigating those risks. Finally, there needs to be a demonstrated commitment from the highest level of the organization to support the transition to a risk-based approach to compliance management.

US Patent Application 2006/0085201 ('201) discloses a multi-user, multi-organization web- based system for processing customs information. The system includes a server device connected to a communication network and having a communication server module for communicating over the network. The server device receives a declaration pertaining to a consignment, including identification of specific goods in the consignment and predetermined parameters of the consignment. The server device further includes an application program module that verifies the declaration, conducts a risk analysis of the received information, calculates an amount of customs duty and taxes for the consignment, and determines whether or not to initiate an inspection process based on the risk analysis. A computer-implemented method for processing the customs information is also provided. The method includes the steps of receiving a declaration pertaining to a consignment, and verifying the declaration. Also included are the steps of conducting a risk analysis of the received information, calculating an amount of customs duty and taxes for the consignment, and determining whether or not to initiate an inspection process based on the risk analysis.

'201 is silent about obtaining information from external information sources, specifically, commercial shipping data bases, security-oriented data bases and others and analysis of the obtained data in terms of non-compliance with current laws/regulations and potential threats from export and import operations. Thus, there is a long-felt and unmet need in a system and method providing acquisition data pertaining to entities involved in the export and import operations, analysis of the potential threats and choice of the optimal automatic inspection procedure characterized by optimal manpower effort and reliability of inspection results.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is hence one object of the invention to disclose a system 100 for risk management of a cargo flow at a border terminal. The aforesaid system comprises: (a) a data receiver 1 10 connectable via a communication channel to at least one database 200; the database 200 accommodating records pertains to traffic entities and legal regulations applicable thereto; the receiver adapted for receiving the records; (b) a query engine 120 adapted to collect the records; (c) a behaviour pattern manager 130 adapted for organizing the records into a behaviour patterns pertaining to the traffic entities; (d) a rule engine 140 adapted for defining and executing the legal regulations to the obtained traffic entities' behaviour patterns; (e) a database 150 accommodating what-if scenarios referring to the traffic entities' behaviour patterns; (f) means 160 for analyzing the obtained traffic entities' behaviour patterns and potential developments according the scenarios; the means is adapted for ranking potential threats of the scenarios applied to the traffic entities; (g) a data distribution unit 180 adapted for providing multi-level access to information pertaining to the traffic entities and the inspection procedure recommended thereto; the data distribution unit is connectable to a client domain.

It is a core purpose of the invention to provide the system comprising an automatic system managing unit 170 adapted to receive information concerning potential threats and provide the client domain with a recommended inspection procedure applicable to the traffic entity.

Another object of the invention is to provide the aforementioned system and method wherein the traffic entity is selected from the group consisting of a cargo, a consignor, a consignee, and a carrier.

A further object of the invention is to provide the system adapted for performing export, transit and import operations.

A further object of the invention is to provide the aforementioned system and method wherein the system is adapted for detecting a risk of activity selected from the group consisting of terror activity, smuggling including drug trafficking, human trafficking, submitting invalid information to administration of the border terminal and any combination thereof.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the records accommodated in the database connectable to the receiver which are selected from the group consisting of an EPIFACT messages, records pertaining to the traffic entities, customs regulations, border regulations, public law, commercial law, security law and any combination thereof.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein traffic entities' records comprise an origin of cargo, a cargo manufacturer, a producer price, a buying price, delivery terms, carrier's information, carrier's history and any combination thereof. A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the system is adapted for performing said risk management at least partially in an automatic manner.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the system is adapted for performing said risk management at least partially in a manual manner.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the criteria are modifiable according to customer requirement and local conditions, regulations and policy.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein records selected from the group consisting of .doc, .docx, .docm, .pdf, .xps, .mht, .mhtml, .htm, .html, .rtf, .txt, .ans, .asc, .odt, .ods, .wps, .xls, .xlsx, .xlsm, .xml, .csv, .prn, .dif, .xla, .mdb, .tft, .tif, .tab, .wks, .dat, .ora, .nsf, .myd, .mdf and any combination thereof.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein a criterion of threat level definition of the what-if scenarios is applied to the obtained entity behaviour pattern is defined by expert evaluation.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the system managing unit adapted for providing a multi-level access of personnel situated in the client domain to processed data according clearance level thereof

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the multi-level access of the personnel is provided by means of graphical user interface.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein inspection procedure data provided to a recipient in a protocolis selected from the group consisting of User Datagram Protocol, Transmission Control Protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, Telecommunications Network Protocol, Secure Shell, Post Office Protocol, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, Internet Message Access Protocol, Simple Object Access Protocol, Point-to-Point Protocol, Remote Frame Buffer, Remote Procedure Call and any combination thereof.

A further object of this disclosure is to disclose the abovementioned invention wherein the recipient is selected from the group consisting of customs and excise authorities, a frontier service, a security service, a government agency of interest and any combination thereof. A further object of the invention is to disclose the method 500 of risk management at a border terminal is disclosed. The aforesaid method is automated and comprises the steps of: (a) providing a system for risk management of a shipload at a border terminal (510), (b) connecting the data receiver to at least one database (520); (c) collecting records relevant to the traffic entity by the query engine (530); (d) organizing the records into the profile pertaining to the traffic entity by the profile manager (540); (e) defining and executing the legal regulations to the obtained traffic entity's profile by the rule engine (550); (f) analyzing the obtained traffic entity's profile and potential developments according the scenarios by the analyzing means (560); (g) ranking said potential developments over potential threat thereof (570); and (h) distributing information pertaining to the traffic entities and the inspection procedure recommended thereto; the information distributed above information recipients by means of the multi-level access (590).

The method comprises a step of receiving information about the potential threats and providing to the client domain a recommended inspection procedure applicable to the traffic entity (580).

The invention scope includes any overall risk management system at a border terminal.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order to understand the invention and to see how it may be implemented in practice, a plurality of embodiments is adapted to now be described, by way of non-limiting example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which

Fig. 1 is a flowchart of terrorist group activity;

Fig. 2 is a diagram of temporal averages of terrorist group activities;

Fig 3 is a diagram of spatial analysis of distances from terrorist residences to incident locations;

Fig. 4 is a diagram of the facilitation and control matrix;

Fig. 5 is a diagram of the compliance management matrix;

Fig. 6 is a diagram of the compliance management styles;

Fig. 7 is a diagram of the risk based compliance management pyramid; Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram of interaction of the system for risk management with information environment;

Fig. 9 is a block diagram of the system for risk management;

Fig. 10 is a schematic diagram of the databases connectable to the system for risk

management at the border terminal;

Fig. 11 is a schematic diagram of the client domain;

Fig. 12 is a schematic diagram of the outsourcing scheme; and

Fig. 13 is a flow chart of the method of making decisions at the border terminal.

Fig. 14 is an illustration presenting an overall view of a risk management system at a border terminal.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The following description is provided, alongside all chapters of the present invention, so as to enable any person skilled in the art to make use of said invention and sets forth the best modes contemplated by the inventor of carrying out this invention. Various modifications, however, are adapted to remain apparent to those skilled in the art, since the generic principles of the present invention have been defined specifically to provide a system and a method for risk management at a border terminal.

The term 'risk indicator' hereinafter refers to an event related to the traffic entity which indicates possibility of inflicting harm to vital interests of the client.

The term 'traffic entity' hereinafter refers to an entity which participates in freight traffic activity. A conception of traffic entity includes cargo, a cargo owner, a cargo carrier, a carrier vehicle, a consignor, a consignee and other relevant entities. The risk indicators are generated if, for example, an article of importation is prohibited for import, or a country of consignment is in the list of the countries supporting terrorist activity, or the traffic entity is in the Watch List, or passengers or traffic entity officials demonstrate diffidence in behaviour thereof.

The term 'legal regulation' hereinafter refers to a rule of order having a force of law, prescribed by a superior or competent authority, relating to the actions of those under the authority's control. In the present application, the legal regulations which are applied to the traffic entities are issued by state agencies. The legal regulations include norms of the law and administrative ordinances.

The term 'behaviour' hereinafter refers to a behaviour model of the traffic entities.

The term 'records (facts)' hereinafter refers to documentary data pertaining to the traffic entities such as history of traffic entities, ownership thereof, shipping routes, traffic entities' officials and any other relevant data. The records can characterize business, criminal, security and other aspects of traffic entities' behaviour.

The term 'cargo behavior pattern' hereinafter refers to a method of identifying the traffic entities based on an analysis of the nature of the offense and the manner in which it was committed. The risk indicators are generated if unknown and/or illogical behaviour pattern is recognized. For example, the vessel flag and/or the house flag are changed or the importer and/or the supplier begun to import a new article (material) or the consignor is unknown or the vessel has changed the transportation route, or the vessel has lain in a certain port for time which is greater that a standard period.

The term 'shipping documents' hereinafter refers to an air bill, a bill of lading, a carrier certificate, a certificate of origin, packing list, captain's mail or other documents which are required to clear customs and take delivery. The risk indicators are generated if more than 1 bill of lading is submitted, or the same legal entity as a consignor and a consignee, or payments are performed in cash, or shipping cost is higher than customary, or articles to be imported or exported are identified in a too general manner or any other anomalous characteristic(s).

The term 'ranking' hereinafter refers to a procedure of rank calculation. The aforesaid rank indicates a level of potential threat coming from the traffic entities.

The term 'knowledge base' hereinafter refers to a collection of the records pertaining to the traffic entities.

The term 'rule' hereinafter refers to a logical maxim which determinate application of what- if scenarios to the traffic entities and records pertaining to them.

The term 'business rules' hereinafter refers to a collection of formalized maxims applicable to the records pertaining to the traffic entities and established practice (commodity prices, delivery routes and other). The term 'business rules engine' hereinafter refers to a software system that executes one or more business rules in a runtime production environment.

The term 'supply chain' hereinafter refers to a system of organizations, people, technology, activities, information and resources involved in moving a product or service from supplier to customer.

The term 'process' hereinafter refers to an aggregate of physical, computer-implemented and legal actions undertaken in event of frontier crossing.

The increase of the global terror has exposed the vulnerability and sensitivity of maritime cargo and aircraft cargo supply chains, especially, sea- and airports. In accordance with the International Trade Convention and International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code, data relating to the ship and its cargo are transferred prior to the ship entering into the port. Since July 2002, countries, shipping companies and ports have adopted security standards and procedures formed by governmental agencies and professional transport organizations. However, the aforesaid standards and procedures only give a partial response to the growing threats.. Custom authorities are making continual efforts to prevent smuggling and other illegal activities. According to the recommendations of the World customs organization Kyoto convention of 1999, customs authorities should reduce exclusive reliance on checking movements of goods and focus more on selective audit control by using risk management technique.

Another factor of making port operation difficult the past decade is growing lack of storage space with an emphasis on container terminals. Governmental agencies and customs authorities need an efficient way to target high risk cargo while promoting faster clearance and release of low-risk goods.

In the changing world, risk needs to be assessed, in terms of potential use of the goods, verification of origin and, most importantly, national and international security in relation to import, transit and export flows. Furthermore, if most or optionally, all of the steps and methods involved in assessing the risk associated with particular cargoes are automated, then the throughput velocity of cargo shipments in and out of a border terminal or crossing will be enhanced. This will be highly beneficial to all stakeholders directly involved in the process, and to the general public at large.

Reference is now made to Fig. 8, presenting, as an example of implementation of the present invention, interaction of a computerized automated system 100 for risk management of a cargo flow. Risk estimation of a specific shipment begins with reception of a shipping manifest from a ship/shipper 710/720. The shipping manifest includes records (data) of the ship/shipper, a port of exit, a port of arrival, a consignor and a consignee, terms of payment (bank records) and other. The system 100 interacts with administrations of ports 730, banks 740 and governmental agencies 750. The system 100 can validate the data of shipping manifest. Legal information and data of tax crimes and customs offences are received form customs and tax administration 800. data about general crimes and terroristic activities are inquired in law enforcement agencies 900. The commercial databases 250 (as detailed below) are available, as well. The system 100 provides a client (client domain) 300 with information about potential risk concerning a specific cargo and corresponding inspection procedure.

A core advantage of the proposed system over the prior art is in acceleration of the inspection procedure. Additionally, the proposed system 100 is arranged for operative adjustment of analysis criteria according to current environment and legal conditions.

Reference is now made to Fig. 9, presenting a computerized automated system 100 for risk management of a cargo flow.. The aforesaid system 100 is connectable to database 200 which accommodates records pertaining to traffic entities and legal regulations applicable to them. In accordance with the scope of the current invention, the accommodated records can include EPIFACT messages, computer-readable records pertaining to the traffic entities, customs regulations, border regulations, public law, commercial law, security law and any other information useful for detecting potential threat provided by the traffic entity. The traffic entity records are received by a receiver 110. The received records are collected by a query manager 120. Then, a behaviour pattern manager 130 organizes the traffic entity records into a behaviour pattern pertaining to the aforesaid traffic entity. The rule engine 140 defines and executes the legal regulations to the obtained pattern pertaining to the traffic entity. The traffic entity behaviour pattern generalized by means of the application of legal regulations thereto and potential developments according what-if scenarios are analyzed in analyzing means 160. The aforesaid what-if scenarios are accommodated in the database 150. The scenarios are created by means of expert analysis of case history. A system managing unit 170 receives information about the potential threats and according to expert-defined criteria automatically provides a recommended inspection procedure applicable to the traffic entity. Specifically, the level of potential threat is graded by means of the expert estimation. Each traffic entity is marked according to its level threat by means of a corresponding risk indicator. It should be emphasized that the aforesaid risk indicator can generated at any step of the process. The generated risk indicators are displayed in the security layer 430. A data distribution unit 180 provides a multi-level access to information pertaining to the traffic entities and the inspection procedure recommended thereto. The access is implemented at a client domain 300. The computer-implemented system is controlled by a specialized computer application 410 which is pre-programmed for receiving data concerning the traffic entities, analyzing them and providing recommended procedures applicable to the corresponding traffic entities. The system 100 is provided with internal database 420 adapted for logging the processed information and storing legal regulations and administrative ordinances.

It should be emphasized that the goods can be previously declared by the traffic entity of interest so that risk analysis and decision making pertaining to a proper inspection procedure including clearance without inspection will be performed before physical arrival of the declared goods to the border crossing. The advantages of this approach are: (a) reduction of loading/unloading time of vehicle, (b) decrease in demand for the storage facilities, specifically, customs shelter warehouses and (c) cost reduction for both traffic entities and border crossing administration. In other words, the proposed technical solution increases fixed asset turnover and overall efficiency of the border terminal.

The proposed system 100 for risk management provides assistance to the border crossing officials in defining a portion of the declared goods which is recommended to be released without customs inspection to expedite the cargo flow at the border terminal. Thus, the system 100 is designed to gain performance of supply chain functioning.

The system 100 is enabled to provide a service of remote risk analysis. Any commercial customer is able to electronically submit the records pertaining to a specific traffic entity to the aforesaid system 100 and receive a recommendation concerning an inspection procedure applicable to the specific traffic entity.

The system 100 is adapted for mainly automatic and manual modes of operation according to needs of the customer. The system 100 advantageously differs from the known systems because of modifiability of expert-determined criteria according to local laws, regulations and business conditions.

Reference is now made to Fig. 10, showing a detailed presentation of the database 200. The aforesaid database 200 comprises Edifact data 210, customs regulations 220, border regulations 230, security regulations 240, shipping database 250 (for example, http://www.shippingdatabase.conV, http://e-ships.net/, http://www.shipweb.com/, http://www.marbase.com/. http://www.seasearcher.com/lmiu/index.htm, http://www.ihsfairplay.com/, http://www.track-trace.com/, http://www.ihsfairplay.com/, http://www.track-trace.com/, http://www.e-ships.net/, http://www.dnb.com/, http : //www. shopping. com/, security databases (national and international) 260. The aforesaid security databases 260 can include databases belonging to intelligence service, counterespionage service, antiterror service, police and any other relevant databases.

Reference is now made to Fig. 11, showing a detailed presentation of the client domain 300. The aforesaid client domain includes custom administration 310, border administration 320, security organs 330, and government agencies 340. Any other government facilities and business entities are in the scope of the present invention.

Reference is now made to Fig. 12, presenting an outsourcing scheme allowing remote customers to receive the service of risk analysis and management in a real time mode. Specifically, the remote customers 451, 452 and 453 which may be foreign governmental agencies, professional transport and trade organizations and other entities of interest, provide the system 100 with data submitted by the traffic entities 460, 461 and 462 in order to gain border clearance. Any number of the remote customers and traffic entities are in the scope the current invention. As stated above, the system 100 is connectable to professional transport and security-oriented databases and obtains the records pertaining to the traffic entities 460, 461 and 462 customs regulations, border regulations, public law, commercial law, security law and any other information useful for detecting potential threat provided by the traffic entity.

The aforesaid records are organized into a behaviour patterns pertaining to the traffic entities. The legal regulations defined by the customers are applied to the obtained behaviour patterns pertaining to the traffic entity. Potential developments are analyzed on the base of what-if scenarios defined by the customers, as well. Notifications concerning the potential threats are automatically provided to the customers in the real time mode jointly with a recommended inspection procedure applicable to the traffic entity.

Reference is now made to Fig. 13, presenting a method of risk management at a border terminal 500. The aforesaid method 500 comprises the following steps.

The aforesaid method 500 comprises the following steps. In the beginning of the method 500, a system for risk management of a shipload at a border terminal is provided at the step 510. Then, at the step 520, the data receiver is connected to the database. The query engine collects records relevant to the certain traffic entity at step 530. The behavior manager organizes the records into the behavior pertaining to the traffic entity at the step 540. The rule engine defines and executes the legal regulations to the obtained traffic entity's behaviour pattern by said rule engine entity at the step 550. The analyzing means analyzes the obtained traffic entity's behaviour and potential developments at the step 560. Ranking the potential developments over potential threats is performed at step 570. Recommended inspection procedures applicable to the traffic entity are automatically provided by the system managing unit at the step 580 according to expert-defined criteria. The method is finished at the step 590, when the data distribution unit provides a multi-level access to information pertaining to the traffic entities and the inspection procedure recommended thereto. The access is provided at the client domain.

Reference is now made to a method of optimising the velocity of a cargo flow through a border terminal wherein the velocity is at least in part determined by the above mentioned automatic risk management system and method.

It should be emphasized that the proposed system and method for risk management at the border allow the officials to perform border control in a more effective and reliable manner with less labour contribution.

The proposed system and method for risk management provides the following benefits: (a) improved law enforcement; (b) enhanced security; (c) higher revenue collection; (d) combats illegal imports; (e) improved port and customs image deters terror and criminal activities; (f) improved flow of cargo; and (g) better service for customers.

Reference is now made to Fig. 14, presenting an overall illustration of a risk managementsystem at a border terminal.

Claims

A system 100 for risk management of a cargo flow at a border terminal, said system comprising:

a. a data receiver 110 connectable via a communication channel to at least one database 200; said database 200 accommodating records pertaining to traffic entities and legal regulations applicable thereto; said receiver adapted for receiving said records;

b. a query engine 120 adapted to collect said records;

c. a behaviour pattern manager 130 adapted for organizing said records into a behaviour patterns pertaining to said traffic entities;

d. a rule engine 140 adapted for defining and executing said legal regulations to said obtained traffic entities' behaviour patterns;

e. a database 150 accommodating what-if scenarios referring to said traffic entities' behaviour patterns;

f. means 160 for analyzing said obtained traffic entities' behaviour patterns and potential developments according said scenarios; said means adapted for ranking potential threats of said scenarios applied to said traffic entities;

g. a data distribution unit 180 adapted for providing multi-level access to information pertaining to said traffic entities and said inspection procedure recommended thereto; said data distribution unit connectable to a client domain; wherein said system comprises a system managing unit 170 adapted to receive information about said potential threats and provide said client domain with a recommended inspection procedure applicable to said traffic entity.

The system according to claim 1, wherein said what-if scenarios are flexibly adjustable at least partially according to instantaneous conditions.

The system according to claim 1, wherein ranking criteria are flexibly adjustable at least partially according to instantaneous conditions.

The system according to claim 1 , wherein said traffic entity is selected from the group consisting of a cargo, a consignor, a consignee, and a carrier.

5. The system according to claim 1, adapted for performing export, transit and import operations.

6. The system according to claim 1, adapted for performing said risk management at least partially in an automatic manner.

7. The system according to claim 1 , adapted for performing said risk management at least partially in a manual manner.

8. The system according to claim 1, adapted for detecting a risk of activity selected from the group consisting of terror activity, smuggling including drug trafficking, human trafficking, submitting invalid information to administration of said border teminal and any combination thereof.

9. The system according to claim 1, wherein said records accommodated in said database connectable to said receiver are selected from the group consisting of an EPIFACT messages, records pertaining to said traffic entities, customs regulations, border regulations, public law, commercial law, security law and any combination thereof.

10. The system according to claim 1, wherein said traffic entities' records comprises an origin of cargo, a cargo manufacturer, a producer price, a buying price, delivery terms, carrier's information, carrier's history and any combination thereof.

11. The system according to claim 3, wherein a format of said records is selected from the group consisting of .doc, .docx, .docm, .pdf, .xps, .mht, .mhtml, .htm, .html, .rtf, .txt, .ans, .asc, .odt, .ods, .wps, .xls, .xlsx, .xlsm, .xml, .csv, .prn, .dif, .xla, .mdb, .tft, .tif, .tab, .wks, .dat, .ora, .nsf, .myd, .mdf and any combination thereof.

12. The system according to claim 1, wherein criteria of threat level definition of said what-if scenarios applied to said obtained entity behaviour pattern is defined by expert evaluation.

13. The system according to claim 10, wherein said criteria are modifiable according to customer requirement and local conditions.

14. The system according to claim 1, wherein said system managing unit is adapted for providing a multi-level access of personnel situated in said client domain to processed data according clearance level thereof.

15. The system according to claim 1, wherein said multi-level access of said personnel is provided by means of graphical user interface.

16. The system according to claim 1, wherein inspection procedure data are provided to a recipient in a protocol selected from the group consisting of User Datagram Protocol, Transmission Control Protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, Telecommunications Network Protocol, Secure Shell, Post Office Protocol, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, Internet Message Access Protocol, Simple Object Access Protocol, Point-to-Point Protocol, Remote Frame Buffer, Remote Procedure Call and any combination thereof.

17. The system according to claim 13, wherein said recipient is selected from the group consisting of customs and excise authorities, a frontier service, a security service, a government agency of interest and any combination thereof.

18. A method 500 of risk management at a border terminal; said method comprising the steps of :

a. providing a system for risk management of a shipload at a border terminal (510), said system comprising:

i. a data receiver connectable via a communication channel to at least one database; said database accommodates records pertaining to a traffic entities and legal regulations thereof; said receiver adapted for receiving said records;

ii. a query engine adapted to collect said records;

iii. a behaviour manager adapted for organizing said records into behaviours pertaining to said traffic entities;

iv. a rule engine adapted for defining and executing said legal regulations to said obtained traffic entity's profiles;

v. a database accommodating what-if scenarios referring to said traffic entity's profiles;

vi. means for analyzing said obtained traffic entity's profiles and potential developments according said scenarios; said means adapted for ranking potential threats of said scenarios applied to said traffic entities; vii. a system managing unit adapted for receiving information about said potential threats and providing a recommended inspection procedure applicable to said traffic entity;

viii. a data distribution unit adapted for providing a multi-level access to information pertaining to said traffic entities and said inspection procedure recommended thereto; said data distribution unit connectable to a client domain;

b. connecting said data receiver to at least one database (520);

c. collecting records relevant to said traffic entity by said query engine (530); d. organizing said records into said profile pertaining to said traffic entity by said profile manager (540);

e. defining and executing said legal regulations to said obtained traffic entity's profile by said rule engine (550);

f. analyzing said obtained traffic entity's profile and potential developments according said scenarios by said analyzing means (560);

g. ranking said potential developments over potential threat thereof (570); and h. distributing information pertaining to said traffic entities and said inspection procedure recommended thereto; said information distributed above information recipients by means of said multi-level access (590);

wherein said method comprises a step of receiving information about said potential threats and providing to said client domain a recommended inspection procedure applicable to said traffic entity (580).

19. The method according to claim 18, wherein said what-if scenarios are flexibly adjustable by at least partially according to instantaneous conditions.

20. The method according to claim 18, wherein ranking criteria are flexibly adjustable by at least partially according to instantaneous conditions.

21. The method according to claim 18, wherein said traffic entity is selected from the group consisting of a cargo, a consignor, a consignee, and a carrier.

22. The method according to claim 18, adapted for performing export, transit and import operations.

23. The method according to claim 18, performed at least partially in an automatic manner.

24. The method according to claim 18, performed at least partially in a manual manner

25. The method according to claim 18, adapted for detecting a risk of activity selected from the group consisting of terror activity, smuggling including drug trafficking, human trafficking, submitting invalid information to administration of said border teminal and any combination thereof.

26. The method according to claim 18, wherein said step of connecting to said database further comprises connecting to databases accommodating records selected from the group consisting of an EPIFACT messages, records pertaining said traffic entities, customs regulations, border regulations, public law, commercial law, security law and any combination thereof.

27. The method according to claim 18, wherein a format of said records is selected from the group consisting of .doc, .docx, .docm, .pdf, .xps, .mht, .mhtml, .htm, .html, .rtf, .txt, .ans, .asc, .odt, .ods, .wps, .xls, .xlsx, .xlsm, .xml, .csv, .prn, .dif, .xla, .mdb, .tft, .tif, .tab, .wks, .dat, .ora, .nsf, .myd, .mdf and any combination thereof.

28. The method according to claim 18, wherein said traffic entity records comprises an origin of cargo, a cargo manufacturer, a producer price, a buying price, delivery terms, carrier's information, carrier's history and any combination thereof.

29. The method according to claim 18, wherein said criteria are modifiable according to customer requirement and local conditions.The method according to claim 16, wherein a criterion of threat level definition of said what-if scenarios applied to said obtained entity profile is defined by expert evaluation.

30. The method according to claim 18, wherein said system managing unit is adapted for providing a multi-level access of personnel to processed data according clearance level thereof.

31. The method according to claim 18, wherein said multi-level access of said personnel is provided by means of graphical user interface.

32. The method according to claim 18, wherein inspection procedure data are provided to a recipient in a protocol selected from the group consisting of User Datagram Protocol, Transmission Control Protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol, File Transfer Protocol, Telecommunications Network Protocol, Secure Shell, Post Office Protocol, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, Internet Message Access Protocol, Simple Object Access Protocol, Point-to-Point Protocol, Remote Frame Buffer, Remote Procedure Call and any combination thereof.

33. The method according to claim 32, wherein said recipient is selected from the group consisting of customs and excise authorities, a frontier service, a security service, a government agency of interest and any combination thereof.