WO2004055680A1 - メモリデバイスとそれを使用する電子機器 - Google Patents
メモリデバイスとそれを使用する電子機器 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2004055680A1 WO2004055680A1 PCT/JP2003/016000 JP0316000W WO2004055680A1 WO 2004055680 A1 WO2004055680 A1 WO 2004055680A1 JP 0316000 W JP0316000 W JP 0316000W WO 2004055680 A1 WO2004055680 A1 WO 2004055680A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- area
- authentication
- memory
- secure
- control unit
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0866—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means by active credit-cards adapted therefor
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
- G06F12/1416—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights
- G06F12/1425—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights the protection being physical, e.g. cell, word, block
- G06F12/1433—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights the protection being physical, e.g. cell, word, block for a module or a part of a module
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/326—Payment applications installed on the mobile devices
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/363—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes with the personal data of a user
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- G—PHYSICS
- G11—INFORMATION STORAGE
- G11C—STATIC STORES
- G11C5/00—Details of stores covered by group G11C11/00
- G11C5/005—Circuit means for protection against loss of information of semiconductor storage devices
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a memory device such as a semiconductor memory card and an electronic device for writing / reading data to / from this memory device, and in particular, to realize a storage medium having a high security level, a large size, and a storage capacity. Things. ⁇ Background technology>
- a “memory card” has a smaller storage capacity than a disk-shaped storage medium such as a DVD, but does not require a large mechanism, is compact, easy to handle, and has excellent earthquake resistance. Recently, its use as a storage medium suitable for portable use has been expanding.
- Patent Document 1 describes a memory card in which a non-volatile memory is provided with an authentication area that can be accessed only by an external device that has been successfully authenticated, and a non-authentication area that can be accessed by any of the external devices. Using this memory card, the encrypted music content is stored in the non-authentication area, and the decryption key for decrypting it is stored in the authentication area, so that the copyright of the content can be protected.
- the function of the CPU in such a memory card is to perform read / write processing, and there is authentication processing of the external device for permitting access to the authentication area by the external device.
- the operation of the CPU in the memory card is limited to reading and writing of the memory and those associated therewith, and control of data recorded in the memory is performed by an external device.
- an IC card with a built-in CPU also has a memory area together with a CPU in a tamper-resistant module. External devices cannot directly access this memory area because of tamper resistance. For this reason, IC cards have high confidentiality against duplication and counterfeiting, and are used in digital cash services that require a high security level.
- the function of the CPU in the IC card is not limited to reading and writing of memory, but also covers a wide variety of functions, such as encryption of externally input data, signature generation, signature verification, and input password verification.
- control of data recorded in the memory of the IC card is performed by the CPU inside the IC card.
- the CPU of the IC card has more functions and higher security than the CPU built in the conventional memory card.
- the memory card described in Patent Document 1 can variably set an authentication area, and thus can have a certain amount of information capacity.
- this authentication area is an area that can be directly controlled by external devices, and therefore has a lower security level than IC cards.
- the present invention is to solve such a conventional problem, and provides a memory device having a large storage capacity and a memory area having a security level equivalent to that of an IC card.
- the purpose is to provide electronic devices to be used.
- a memory device that is fixedly or detachably connected to an electronic device has a normal area that can be accessed from the electronic apparatus and a secure area that cannot be directly accessed from the electronic apparatus.
- the tamper-resistant first memory and the tamper-resistant second memory that cannot be directly accessed from the electronic device are provided, and access to the secure area of the first memory is performed by accessing the second memory. It is configured to be possible only through a secure control unit that manages
- This secure area has a higher security level than the conventional authentication area because external devices cannot directly access it. Further, since this secure area is provided in a non-tamper-resistant memory, a large storage capacity can be obtained at low cost.
- the first area which is the non-tamper resistant memory area of the memory device
- the second area which is the memory area of the memory
- Access to the third area which is a tamper-resistant memory area of the memory device, after authentication with the secure control unit via the overall control unit and the secure control unit, It is configured to perform the access.
- This electronic device can realize various services by utilizing a memory device such as a semiconductor memory card.
- FIG. 1 is a conceptual diagram of a secure memory card in an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a secure memory card in an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram of a system using a secure memory card according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of the R / W device according to the embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a sequence illustrating a writing procedure of the secure memory card according to the embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 6 is a sequence showing a continuation of the writing procedure of the secure memory card in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a sequence showing another writing procedure of the secure memory card in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing a structure of a large-capacity nonvolatile memory of the secure memory card according to the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram showing a logical-to-physical address conversion table according to the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram showing another example of the logical-physical address conversion table according to the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 11 is a diagram showing a different structure of the large-capacity nonvolatile memory of the secure memory card according to the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 12 is a diagram showing another example of the logical-to-physical address conversion table in the embodiment of the present invention.
- the reference numbers in the figure are: 10 --- Secure memory card; 1 1 --- IC section; 1 2 --- I // F section; 1 3 --- IC command processing section; 1 4 --- File Management Department; 1 5 --- I
- a semiconductor memory card (hereinafter, referred to as a “secure memory card”) according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a nonvolatile memory module 41 having an internal nonvolatile memory 41 as shown in the conceptual diagram of FIG. (tamper resistant module: TRM) 40, a large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50 having an unauthenticated area 53, an authentication area 52 and a secure area 51, and an internal CPU 30 that accesses the internal nonvolatile memory 41 and the secure area 51 And communicate with the external CPU 60 of the electronic device (Read Z Write (R / W) device) to perform authentication processing! And a control unit 20 for permitting access to the authentication area 52 of the authenticated external CPU 60.
- TRM read resistant module
- the non-volatile memory 41 of the TRM 40 is composed of, for example, an EEPROM that can be erased and written in 16-byte units, and the large-capacity non-volatile memory 50 is, for example, erased in blocks of 512 bytes or the like and performed in units of 1 byte. It consists of a flash memory that can be written in
- the external CPU 60 can access the non-authentication area 53 unconditionally, and can access the authentication area 52 when authentication by the control unit 20 is completed. However, the external CPU 60 cannot know the existence of the secure area 51 and the internal nonvolatile memory 41, and cannot directly access them.
- the difference between the secure area 51 and the internal nonvolatile memory 41 is that, while the internal nonvolatile memory 41 is provided in the TRM 40, the secure area 51 is provided in the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 53 that does not have tamper resistance. Have been It is a point. Therefore, the secure area 51 can have a larger storage capacity than the internal nonvolatile memory 41.
- the security level is lower than that of the internal nonvolatile memory 41 provided in the TRM 40. The security level of the four areas is lowest in the non-authentication area 53, and is higher in the order of the authentication area 52, the secure area 51, and the internal nonvolatile memory 41.
- the secure memory card can be used, for example, in the music distribution system shown in FIG.
- a secure memory card 10 is attached to a mobile phone 61 as an R / W device.
- the system also includes a distribution server 94 for distributing music via a network 95, a payment server 93 for performing payment processing, and a charge server 92 for charging digital cash to the memory card 10. And a terminal 91 for charging digital cash.
- the mobile phone 61 includes a CPU 60 corresponding to the external CPU of FIG. 1, an authentication key group 622 used for authentication, and a command generation program 621, in advance.
- the stored ROM 62, RAM 63 used as a work area of the CPU 60, a liquid crystal display section 64 constituting a display screen, and a wireless communication section 6 for performing wireless communication via a network. 5, an operation button 66 operated by the user, a card I / F unit 67 connecting the secure memory card 10 to the internal path 70, and an authentication circuit 68 for performing mutual authentication with the secure memory card 10.
- These components are connected by an internal bus 70.
- the user charges the digital cash to the secure memory card 10.
- the user attaches the secure memory card 10 to the charging terminal 91 and operates the charging terminal 91 according to the displayed instruction.
- the charge terminal 91 requests the internal CPU 30 of the secure memory card 10 to start the deposit application.
- the internal CPU 30 that has started the deposit application determines from the command of the request that the data is to be written to the internal non-volatile memory 41, and checks the channel. The amount transmitted from the storage terminal 91 is written into the internal nonvolatile memory 41.
- the cache information is stored in the internal nonvolatile memory 41.
- the digital cash can also be charged online by accessing the charge server 92 from the mobile phone 61 equipped with the secure memory card 10.
- the user accesses the distribution server 94 from the mobile phone 61 and requests purchase of music content.
- the distribution server 94 requests payment for the music content.
- the CPU 60 of the mobile phone 61 requests the internal CPU 30 of the secure memory card 10 to activate the payment application.
- the internal CPU 30 authenticates the mobile phone 61 and then subtracts the payment amount transmitted from the mobile phone 61 from the remaining amount of the digital cash recorded in the internal nonvolatile memory 41.
- the distribution server 94 sends the electronic receipt to the portable terminal 61, and the CPU 60 of the portable terminal 61 sends the storage request for the electronic receipt to the internal CPU 30 of the secure memory card 10. send.
- the internal CPU 30 determines from the command of the request that the data is to be written to the secure area 51 and accumulates the electronic account in the secure area 51.
- the settlement process can also be performed with the settlement server 93 by presenting the credit number stored in the internal nonvolatile memory 41 to the settlement server 93.
- the distribution server 94 sends the encrypted music content and its decryption key to the mobile phone 61.
- the CPU 60 of the mobile phone 61 determines the received data, stores the decryption key of the content in the authentication area 52 of the secure memory card 10, and stores the encrypted content in the secure memory card 10.
- the non-authentication area 53 of the mobile phone 61 determines the received data, stores the decryption key of the content in the authentication area 52 of the secure memory card 10, and stores the encrypted content in the secure memory card 10.
- the cache information is stored in the nonvolatile memory 41 of the TRM 40 of the secure memory card 10
- the electronic receipt is stored in the secure area 51
- the authentication information is stored in the authentication area 52.
- Indicates a decryption key and the non-authentication area 53 stores encrypted content.
- the block diagram in FIG. 2 shows the configuration of the secure memory card 10.
- the secure memory card 10 is roughly divided into a control unit 20, a large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50, It is composed of an IC unit 11 corresponding to TRM 40 in FIG. Large capacity nonvolatile memory
- Reference numeral 50 denotes a non-authentication area 53, an authentication area 52, a secure area 51, and an address information management area 54 in which address information of these areas is stored.
- the control unit 20 includes a data IZF unit 21 for exchanging data with the RZW device 69, a command IZF unit 22 for exchanging commands with the R / W device 69,
- a control authentication unit 23 that authenticates the RZW device 69, a control command processing unit 24 that interprets the received command and performs processing according to the command, and a large-capacity nonvolatile memory 5
- Large-capacity non-volatile memory I ZF part that controls access to 0 and transfers data between the access control part 25 and the large-capacity non-volatile memory 50 that acts as a contact point for data exchange with the IC part 11 2 and 6 are provided.
- the tamper-resistant IC unit 11 includes an internal non-volatile memory 41, an I-F unit 12 for transmitting and receiving data and commands between the control unit 20 and a command interpreting command.
- An IC command processing unit 13 that performs processing according to the data, a file management unit 14 that manages data stored in a file format in the internal nonvolatile memory 41 and the secure area 51, and a R / W.
- IC authentication unit 15 that authenticates the device 69 and permits the authenticated R / W device 69 to access data to the internal nonvolatile memory 41 and the secure area 51 1, and the internal nonvolatile memory 4
- An encryption / decryption circuit 17 that performs encryption / decryption using data stored in the internal nonvolatile memory 41 for data written / read to / from the secure area 51 and the internal nonvolatile memory 41; 4 1 and secure area 5
- Memory management unit 16 that manages 1 and internal nonvolatile memory 4 It has an internal non-volatile memory IZF section 18 for exchanging data with 1.
- the security control unit described in the claims corresponds to the IC command processing unit 13, the IC authentication unit 15, the encryption / decryption circuit 17, the file management unit 14, and the memory management unit 16 of the IC unit 11. I do.
- the control command processing section 24 of the control section 20 interprets the command received from the R / W device 69, and
- the access control unit 25 controls access to the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50.
- the access control unit 25 is instructed to transfer a command to the IC unit 11, and when requesting authentication, control is performed.
- the authentication unit 23 is instructed to perform an authentication process.
- Access to the authentication area 52 is accepted only when authentication of the control authentication unit 23 for the terminal has been completed.
- the access control unit 25 refers to the address information recorded in the address information management area 54 of the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50 when controlling access to the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50.
- the terminal RZW device 69
- the specified address is determined from the record in the address information management area 54. It is determined which area of the memory 50 it belongs to, and the access request to the authentication area 52 is permitted only to the authenticated terminal.
- the IC command processing unit 13 of the IC unit 11 interprets the command transmitted from the control unit 20 and the processing request is
- the IC command processing unit 13 starts the application internally when the command requests the start of the application.
- the application is an interpretation form of the command received from the RZW device 69, and the command received by the IC command processing unit 13 from the R / W device 69 after the application is started is the command received from the R / W device 69.
- the interpretation decided between the two is performed by the IC command processing unit 13.
- the IC command processing unit 13 instructs the IC authentication unit 15 to perform authentication processing of the R / W device 69.
- the IC command processing unit 13 writes / reads data from / to the internal non-volatile to raw memory 41, which the command negotiated between the internally activated application and the R / W device 69, or On the other hand, if the command is a request for writing data to the secure area 51 and reading the data Z, the IC authentication section 15 checks whether the authentication processing has been completed.
- the request is permitted. If the request is a write request, the data to be written is sent to the memory management unit 16 with the information of the storage destination attached.
- the memory management unit 16 that manages the internal nonvolatile memory 41 and the secure area 51 encrypts the data to be written by the decryption circuit 17 (in this case, the encryption / decryption circuit 17 uses the internal nonvolatile memory 4 1 After performing encryption using the encryption key stored in the internal nonvolatile memory 41, the data to be written to the internal nonvolatile memory 41 is transferred to the internal nonvolatile memory I / F 8 8 via the internal nonvolatile memory. The data is written to the memory 41, and the information of the writing position is transmitted to the file management unit 14.
- data to be written to the secure area 51 is written to the secure area 51 of the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50 via the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 1 part 26, and information on the write position is written to the file management unit. Tell 1 to 4.
- the file management unit 14 manages the files stored in the internal nonvolatile memory 41 and the secure area 51 based on the information transmitted from the memory management unit 16.
- the IC command processing unit 13 asks the file management unit 14 for the file position of the data to be read, and requests the memory management unit 16 to read the file. .
- the memory management unit 16 When the memory management unit 16 reads the file from the internal nonvolatile memory 41 or the secure area 51, the memory management unit 16 decrypts the data with the B sound decoding circuit 17 (at this time, the encryption / decryption circuit 1 7 performs decryption using the key stored in the internal nonvolatile memory 41) and sends it to the IC command processing unit 13.
- the decrypted data is transmitted to the control unit 20 and transmitted from the data I / F unit 21 to the RZW device 69.
- the conditions for writing to the non-authentication area 53, the authentication area 52, the secure area 51, and the internal non-volatile memory 41 of the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50, and the internal nonvolatile memory 41 are as follows. .
- Non-authenticated area Unconditionally accessible. Data can be written / read with a normal command for accessing the non-authentication area 53.
- Internal nonvolatile memory exactly the same as the write / read conditions in the secure area. Note that the authentication for accessing the secure area and the authentication for accessing the internal nonvolatile memory may be different from each other.
- FIG. 8 shows the internal structure of the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50.
- the non-authentication area 53 is 0000 to (XXXX-1)
- the authentication area 52 is XXXX to (ZZZZ-1)
- the secure area 51 is Indicates the case of ZZZZ to (YYYY).
- the first address information indicating the boundary between the secure area 51 and the authentication area 52 is ZZZZ
- the second address information indicating the boundary between the authentication area 52 and the non-authentication area 53 is XXXX.
- the size of the non-authentication area 53 is XXXX
- the size of the authentication area 52 is ZZZZ-XXXX
- the size of the secure area 51 is YYYY-ZZZZ + 1.
- FIG. 9 shows a “logical-physical address conversion table” showing the correspondence between the physical address and the logical address of each area.
- the unauthenticated area 53 logical address is
- the logical address of the authentication area 52 is 0000 to (ZZZZ-XXX-1), and the logical address of the secure area 51 is 0000 to (YYYY-ZZZZ).
- the address information management area 54 holds first address information, second address information, and a logical-physical address conversion table for each area. For any of the non-authentication area 53, the authentication area 52, and the secure area 51, the logical address cannot be specified beyond the boundary of the assigned logical address, but the boundary of each area must be moved. Each area can be expanded or reduced.
- the extension Z reduction of the secure area 51 can be realized by changing the first address information.
- the order of the logical addresses in the non-authentication area 53 and the authentication area 52 is set to the normal order of the physical addresses
- the order of the logical addresses in the secure area 51 is set to the physical addresses. Since the order is reversed, when the boundary between the authentication area 52 and the secure area 51 is changed, it suffices to modify only the address at the end of the logical block. The burden is reduced and high-speed processing becomes possible.
- Figures 5 and 6 show that a terminal equipped with a secure memory card requests content distribution from a distribution server, performs payment processing, and stores the electronic receipt in the secure area and the encrypted content in the non-authentication area. Also, it shows the procedure up to storing the decryption key of the content in the authentication area.
- the terminal requests the distribution server to purchase the content (1).
- the distribution server requests settlement of the content price (2).
- the terminal sends a command requesting activation of the payment application to the IC section 11 of the secure memory card 10 (3).
- the control command processing section 24 of the control section 20 recognizes this command as a command for the IC section, and transmits it to the IC section 11 (4). 1 0 part 1
- the terminal starts the payment application, starts the IC authentication section 15, and returns a response to the terminal (5), (6).
- the terminal sends an authentication request command to the secure memory card 10 (7), and the control command processing section 24 of the control section 20 recognizes this command as a command for the IC section and sends the command to the IC section 11.
- IC authentication department 15 authenticates the terminal (or distribution server) and responds with the authentication result (9), (10).
- the authenticated terminal indicates the payment amount on the secure memory card 10 and sends a payment request command (11).
- the control command processing unit 24 of the control unit 20 recognizes this command as a command for the IC unit, and transmits it to the IC 11 (12).
- the IC authentication unit 15 determines that the data is data to be written to the internal nonvolatile memory 41 by a command of “payment request”, and rewrites the balance recorded in the internal nonvolatile memory 41 to an amount obtained by subtracting the payment amount. (13), (14) (Note that the settlement request in the state where the terminal has not been authenticated in (9) is rejected).
- the terminal returns a response to the distribution server (15).
- the distribution server sends the electronic receipt to the terminal (16).
- the terminal sends an electronic receipt storage request command to the secure memory card 10 (17).
- the control command processing unit 24 of the control unit 20 recognizes this command as a command for the IC unit, and transmits the command to the IC unit 11.
- the IC authentication unit 15 determines that the data is to be stored in the secure area 51 by a command of “electronic receipt storage request”, decrypts the electronic receipt with the encryption / decryption circuit 17, and then stores the data in the secure area 51. Yes (18) (Note that an electronic account storage request is rejected when the terminal has not completed the authentication in (9)).
- the authentication for permitting the “payment request” and the authentication for permitting the “electronic receipt storage request” may be performed separately (that is, , Requires authentication with a different key, and so on).
- the terminal when the stored response of the electronic receipt is sent from the IC unit 11 to the terminal (19) (20), the terminal requests the distribution server to transmit the content.
- the distribution server transmits to the terminal the content that has been decoded and a content key for decrypting the content (22).
- the terminal determines that the data received from the distribution server includes the content key to be written in the authentication area 52, and requests authentication to the control unit 20 of the secure memory card 10 (23).
- the control command processing unit 24 of the control unit 20 interprets this command and authenticates the terminal to the control authentication unit 2
- the authentication result is returned in step 3 (24).
- the terminal communicates with the authentication area 52 A key write request is issued (25). Since the terminal has been authenticated, the access control unit 25 of the control unit 20 permits access to the authentication area 52, and the content key is written in the authentication area 52. If there is a response to the end of writing (26), the terminal judges that the encrypted content should be written to the non-authentication area 53, and stores the content to the non-authentication area 53 in the secure memory card 10. Request writing (27). When the encrypted content is written in the non-authentication area 53 and the response is returned to the terminal (28), the terminal transmits a completion notification to the distribution server (29).
- the electronic receipt is encrypted and the content key is written in the secure area 51, the content key is written in the authentication area 52, and the encrypted content is written in the non-authentication area 53.
- the password may be verified to confirm the user.
- This boundary change is performed by a request from a terminal having the secure memory card 10 mounted thereon.
- the terminal requests the secure memory card 10 to start the boundary change application, and the IC unit 11 of the secure memory card 10 that has started the application changes the IC command processing unit 13 and the IC Start up authentication department 15
- the terminal requests authentication to the IC unit 11, and the IC authentication unit 15 authenticates the terminal. This authentication is different from the authentication required to access the internal non-volatile memory 41 and the secure area 51, and only a part of specific terminals expands / contracts the secure area 51. You may be able to do it.
- the authenticated terminal notifies the IC section application (IC command processing section 13) of the changed first address information (new ZZZZ).
- the IC command processing unit 13 transmits the new ZZZZ to the memory management unit 16 and instructs the memory management unit 16 to change the boundary of the secure area 51.
- the memory management unit 16 modifies the logical-physical address conversion table of the secure area 51 and the authentication area 52 so as to correspond to the ZZZZ value, and corrects the new ZZZZ value in the address information management area 54. Stores a logical-to-physical address conversion table. At this time, only the end address of the logical block is modified on the secure area and authentication area tables in Fig. 9.
- the memory management unit 16 erases the data in the newly secured area, and when the secure area 51 is reduced, the memory management unit 16 newly creates the authentication area 52. Erase the data in the no longer part. At this time, all data in the secure area and Z or the authentication area may be deleted.
- the IC command processing unit 13 notifies the terminal of the completion of the boundary change.
- control unit 20 of the secure memory card 10 may perform the boundary change processing based on the request of the IC unit.
- the procedure in this case is as follows.
- the terminal is authenticated by the IC authentication unit 15.
- the terminal requests authentication to the control unit 20 of the secure memory card 10, and the control authentication unit 23 performs authentication for permitting the change of the size of the authentication area in accordance with an instruction from the control command processing unit 24. .
- the terminal notifies the IC command processing unit 13 of the changed first address information (new ZZZZ).
- the IC command processing unit 13 requests the control unit command processing unit 24 to change the boundary address via the access control unit 25.
- the control unit command processing unit 24 stores the ZZZZ value in the address information management area 54, and furthermore, a logical-physical address conversion table between the secure area and the authentication area so as to correspond to the ZZZZ value. To correct. (However, (1, If not, reject the change of the boundary address and notify the Ic command processing unit 13 of the rejection.)
- the control unit command processing unit 24 erases the data of the newly secured area when the secure area is expanded, and newly re-authenticates the area when the secure area is reduced. Erase the data in the part that was Also, all data in the secure area and / or the authentication area may be deleted.
- the control unit command processing unit 24 informs the IC command processing unit 13 of the completion of the boundary change, and the IC command processing unit 13 notifies the terminal of the completion of the boundary change (however,
- extension Z reduction of the authentication area is performed by changing the second address information of the boundary between the authentication area and the non-authentication area.
- the procedure in this case is as follows.
- the terminal requests the control unit 2 of the secure memory card 10 to perform authentication, and in accordance with an instruction from the control command processing unit 24, the control authentication unit 23 allows the control authentication unit 23 to change the size of the authentication area. Perform authentication.
- the authenticated terminal notifies the control unit 20 of the changed second address information (new XXXX).
- the control unit command processing unit 24 stores the value of XXXX in the address information management area 54, and at the same time, converts the logical one physical address between the non-authentication area and the authentication area so as to correspond to the value of XXXX. Modify the table (however, if the authentication in (1) has not been performed, reject the change of the boundary address and notify the terminal of the rejection).
- the control unit command processing unit 24 erases the data of the newly authenticated area when the authentication area is expanded, and newly replaces the unauthenticated area when the authentication area is reduced. Erase the data in the no longer part. Further, all data in the non-authentication area and / or the authentication area may be deleted.
- the control unit command processing unit 24 notifies the terminal of the completion of the boundary change.
- the order of the logical addresses in the non-authentication area 53 of the logical-to-physical address conversion table is the normal order of the physical addresses, and the order of the logical addresses in the authentication area 52. Is the reverse of the physical address order It is sufficient to modify only the tail address of the logical block when changing the boundary, so that the burden of rewriting the table due to the boundary change is reduced, and high-speed processing becomes possible.
- the extension Z reduction of the non-authentication area can be realized by the extension Z reduction processing of the authentication area.
- each area may be arranged in the order of the secure area 51, the non-authentication area 53, and the authentication area 52.
- FIG. 12 shows an example of the logical-physical address conversion table at this time.
- a "terminal deemed address" different from the address may be provided.
- the secure area is omitted, the non-authenticated area 53 has only a physical address of 0000 (actually XXXX '), and the non-authenticated area 53 has a physical address of no boundary between the authenticated area 52 and the authenticated area 52.
- Is ZZZZ '' (actually ZZZZ '), and the physical address without the end of the authentication area is YYYY' '(actually YYYY').
- the terminal recognizes the boundary address as ⁇ ', and requests a change of ⁇ ' '' when requesting expansion or contraction of the area.
- the control command processing unit communicates with ZZZZ 'and ZZZZ'. Recognize the relationship and replace it with the actual physical address ZZZZ 'to change the boundary.
- the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50 described in the case where three areas of a non-authentication area, an authentication area, and a secure area are provided as storage areas in the large-capacity nonvolatile memory 50 is as follows.
- the secure area only one of the non-authentication area and the authentication area may be provided as the normal area.
- the hash value of the write data is calculated, stored in the internal non-volatile memory of the IC unit, and an electronic signature is generated for the hash value.
- the hash value is calculated again and compared with the hash value stored in the internal non-volatile memory of the IC unit at the time of writing, so that data loss or tampering can be prevented. Detect.
- this secure memory card can be used when making payments, and can also be used when digitally signing some data.
- the R / W device using this secure memory card, an application for a digital content distribution service was installed, and a settlement function and a function of downloading content and storing it on a memory card were described.
- the R / W device is required to have the following functions.
- 'Can generate an IC command to request processing from the IC section of the secure memory card.
- the secure memory card has a non-authentication area and an authentication area as normal areas, in addition to this,
- the RZW device electronic device
- the electronic device holds the authentication key in a ROM or the like, obtain the authentication key from there. If the electronic device does not hold the authentication key, it receives it from an external device (server, removable media, etc.).
- the secure memory card 10 of the present invention does not need to be detachable from the electronic device, and is fixedly connected to the electronic device, for example, as an integrated device in which an IC chip is embedded in the electronic device. It may be. Also, it does not need to be in the shape of a card / chip, and may be in the form of a disk or tape.
- the electronic device (60, 61, 69) of the present invention may be any device that can be connected to a memory device, such as a fixed installation terminal, a mobile terminal, and a mobile phone.
- the memory device of the present invention has a security level equivalent to that of an IC card, and can have a memory area much larger in storage capacity than an IC card.
- this memory device is provided with memory areas of a plurality of security levels, and one device can support various services such as digital cash and music distribution. Also, the size of the plurality of memory areas can be changed as needed.
- the electronic device (R / W device) of the present invention can realize various services by utilizing the memory device.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP03780744A EP1577780A1 (en) | 2002-12-16 | 2003-12-12 | Memory device and electronic device using the same |
US10/539,164 US20060126422A1 (en) | 2002-12-16 | 2003-12-12 | Memory device and electronic device using the same |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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JP2002-363597 | 2002-12-16 | ||
JP2002363597A JP2004199138A (ja) | 2002-12-16 | 2002-12-16 | メモリデバイスとそれを使用する電子機器 |
Publications (1)
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WO2004055680A1 true WO2004055680A1 (ja) | 2004-07-01 |
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ID=32588209
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PCT/JP2003/016000 WO2004055680A1 (ja) | 2002-12-16 | 2003-12-12 | メモリデバイスとそれを使用する電子機器 |
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Country | Link |
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US (1) | US20060126422A1 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1577780A1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP2004199138A (ja) |
KR (1) | KR20050088121A (ja) |
CN (1) | CN1726478A (ja) |
TW (1) | TW200422833A (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2004055680A1 (ja) |
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CN100447764C (zh) * | 2004-08-20 | 2008-12-31 | 三菱电机株式会社 | 存储卡、数据交换系统和数据交换方法 |
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CN100447764C (zh) * | 2004-08-20 | 2008-12-31 | 三菱电机株式会社 | 存储卡、数据交换系统和数据交换方法 |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1577780A1 (en) | 2005-09-21 |
KR20050088121A (ko) | 2005-09-01 |
TW200422833A (en) | 2004-11-01 |
US20060126422A1 (en) | 2006-06-15 |
JP2004199138A (ja) | 2004-07-15 |
CN1726478A (zh) | 2006-01-25 |
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