WO1999056250A1 - Method of providing secure user access - Google Patents
Method of providing secure user access Download PDFInfo
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- WO1999056250A1 WO1999056250A1 PCT/CA1999/000370 CA9900370W WO9956250A1 WO 1999056250 A1 WO1999056250 A1 WO 1999056250A1 CA 9900370 W CA9900370 W CA 9900370W WO 9956250 A1 WO9956250 A1 WO 9956250A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- security level
- template
- individuals
- individual
- likelihood
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
- G07C9/37—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
Definitions
- This invention relates generally to identification of biometric data and more particularly relates to a method of identifying an individual from a predetermined group of individuals upon presentation of biometric information to the system.
- Password protection and/or combination type locks are employed for computer network security, automatic teller machines, telephone banking, calling cards, telephone answering services, houses, and safes. These systems generally require the knowledge of an entry code that has been selected by a user or has been configured in advance.
- Pre-set codes are often forgotten, as users have no reliable method of remembering them. Writing down the codes and storing them in close proximity to an access control device (i.e. a combination lock) results in a secure access control system with a very insecure code. Alternatively, the nuisance of trying several code variations renders the access control system more of a problem than a solution.
- an access control device i.e. a combination lock
- Password systems are known to suffer from other disadvantages. Usually, passwords are specified by a user. Most users, being unsophisticated users of security systems, choose passwords that are relatively insecure. As such, many password systems are easily accessed through a simple trial and error process.
- a most common building security system is a security guard.
- a security guard reviews identification cards and compares pictures thereon to a person carrying the card. The security guard provides access upon recognition or upon other criteria.
- Other building security systems use card access, password access, or another secure access
- a security access system that provides substantially secure access and does not require a password or access code is a biometric identification system.
- a biometric identification system accepts unique biometric information from a user and identifies the user by matching the information against information belonging to registered users of the system.
- One such biometric identification system is a fingerprint recognition system.
- a fingerprint input transducer or sensor In a fingerprint input transducer or sensor, the finger under investigation is usually pressed against a flat surface, such as a side of a glass plate; the ridge and valley pattern of the finger tip is sensed by a sensing means such as an interrogating light beam.
- a sensing means such as an interrogating light beam.
- Another method of identifying fingerprints is to capture images continuously and to analyse each image to determine the presence of biometric information such as a fingerprint. This method requires significant processing image transfer times and is therefore, not suited to many applications.
- Various optical devices which employ prisms upon which a finger whose print is to be identified is placed.
- the prism has a first surface upon which a finger is placed, a second surface disposed at an acute angle to the first surface through which the fingerprint is viewed and a third illumination surface through which light is directed into the prism.
- the illumination surface is at an acute angle to the first surface, as seen for example, in US Patents 5,187,482 and 5,187,748.
- the illumination surface is parallel to the first surface, as seen for example, in US Patents 5,109.427 and 5,233,404.
- Fingerprint identification devices of this nature are generally used to control the building-
- the described sensor has a two dimensional, row and column, array of capacitors, each comprising a pair of spaced electrodes, carried in a sensing member and covered by an insulating film.
- the sensors rely upon deformation to the sensing member caused by a finger being placed thereon so as to vary locally the spacing between capacitor electrodes, according to the ridge/trough pattern of the fingerprint, and hence, the capacitance of the capacitors.
- the capacitors of each column are connected in series with the columns of capacitors connected in parallel and a voltage is applied across the columns.
- a voltage is applied to each individual capacitor in the array. Sensing in the respective two arrangements is accomplished by detecting the change of voltage distribution in the series connected capacitors or by measuring the voltage values of the individual capacitances resulting from local deformation. To achieve this, an individual connection is required from the detection circuit to each capacitor.
- fingerprint characterisation and identification Before the advent of computers and imaging devices, research was conducted into fingerprint characterisation and identification. Today, much of the research focus in biometrics has been directed toward improving the input transducer and the quality of the biometric input data. Fingerprint characterization is well known and can involve many aspects of fingerprint analysis. The analysis of fingerprints is discussed in the following references which are hereby incorporated by reference:
- biometric authentication systems have many known problems. For example, a user identification code, a PIN, is required to identify each individual in order to permit comparison of the biometric information and a single user's template.
- a PIN is inconvenient and the device needed to accept a PIN is subject to damage and failure. The device is also an additional expense in a doorway access system. Since a single processor can provide processing for several doors, for a multiple doorway system, the PIN entry unit forms a significant portion of the overall system cost.
- a security system is characterized as allowing 1 in 1,000 false acceptances or, alternatively, 1 in 1,000,000.
- a probability distribution curve establishes a cut off for a given registration to determine what false acceptance rate this reflects. Curves of this type are exponential in nature and, therefore for better false acceptance rates, provide only nominal improvements to false acceptance rate for significant changes to a threshold value.
- a low match score results in failure to authorize an individual.
- a method of using a biometric security system to perform one of authorising individuals and identifying individuals comprises the steps of: storing a system security level; determining an initial security level for a plurality of individuals, the initial security level determined such that the actual security level of the system is at least the stored system security level; storing a
- the method also includes the steps of: determining individuals who are consistently authorised or identified with a lower level of security than the current security level associated with said individuals; and lowering the current security level associated with the determined individuals such that the resulting actual system security level is at least the stored system security level.
- a method of identifying an individual from a plurality of enrolled individuals for use in a system comprising means for storing a plurality of biometric templates, each biometric template associated with an identity and a security level, some of the biometric templates associated with different security levels.
- the method comprises the steps of: receiving biometric information from the individual and providing biometric data based on the biometric information; comparing the biometric data to some templates from the plurality of biometric templates to determine a likelihood that a first template from the plurality of templates and the biometric data match; retrieving the associated security level associated with the first template; and when the likelihood is indicative of a match with a level of security at least the associated security level, identifying the individual.
- a method of authorising an individual from a plurality of enrolled individuals for use in a system comprising means for storing a plurality of biometric templates, each biometric template associated with a security level, some of the biometric templates associated with different security levels.
- the method includes the steps of receiving biometric information from the individual and providing biometric data based on the biometric information; comparing the biometric data to some templates from the plurality of biometric templates to determine a likelihood that a first template from the plurality of templates and the biometric data match: retrieving the associated security level associated with the first template; and when the likelihood is indicative of a match with a level of security at least the associated security level, authorising the individual.
- a system for performing one of authorising an individual and identifying an individual from a plurality of individuals upon presentation of biometric information of the individual comprises means for storing a plurality of biometric templates, each biometric template associated with a security level wherein some templates are associated with different security levels; means for receiving biometric information from the individual and providing biometric data based on the biometric information; means comparing the biometric data to some templates from the plurality of biometric templates to determine a likelihood that a first template from the plurality of templates and the biometric data match; means retrieving the associated security level associated with the first template; and means for performing at least one of identifying the individual and authorising the individual when the likelihood is indicative of a match with a level of security at least the associated security level.
- Fig. 1 is a flow diagram of a method of authorising an individual based on biometric information according to the prior art
- Fig. 2 is a flow diagram of a one to many search within a database of biometric information according to the prior art
- Fig. 3a is a table of data for use with the invention
- Fig. 3b is a table of data for use with the invention
- Fig. 4 is a simplified flow diagram of a method of adjusting individual security levels for verification of biometric information according to the invention
- Fig. 5 is a simplified diagram of a device according to the invention for accepting biometric information
- Fig. 6 is a simplified flow diagram of a method of providing building access according to the invention
- Fig. 7 is a simplified flow diagram of a method according to the invention for updating user biometric information templates
- Fig. 8 is a simplified flow diagram of a method of identifying an individual using two biometric information samples
- Fig. 9 is a simplified flow diagram of a further method of identifying an individual using two biometric information samples
- Fig. 10 is a two-dimensional false acceptance curve
- Fig. 11 is a three -dimensional false acceptance curve
- Fig. 12 is a simplified flow diagram for a biometric information actuated doorway access system according to the invention.
- the invention is described with respect to fingerprint registration.
- the method of this invention is applicable to other biometric information as is evident to those of skill in the art.
- a fingertip is pressed against a fingerprint imaging means in the form of an optical fingerprint imager or a capacitive fingerprint imager.
- the system accepts a signal provided by the imaging device as a fingerprint image.
- the image is characterised and, when biometric information is found, it is registered against that of a known person to identify an originator of the fingerprint. Once identified, appropriate action is taken.
- FIG. 1 a simplified flow diagram of a method of performing a one-to- many search on biometric information is shown.
- a personal identification number (PIN) is captured.
- Biometric information is then captured.
- Biometric data is determined from PIN.
- the biometric information by, for example, a characterisation process.
- fingerprint recognition this process often involves locating a fingerprint centre and then extracting features based on the fingerprint centre.
- the biometric data is then registered against a single biometric template stored in a database and associated with the PIN.
- more than one biometric template of a same individual is stored in association with the PIN.
- the registration is performed according to a known registration process and results in a value or values that are indicative of a likelihood of a correct match.
- a threshold likelihood is known and, when results of a registration, the likelihood, is above the threshold likelihood, the template and the biometric data are said to match.
- An identity associated with the template and the PIN is then determined.
- each biometric template is registered against one or a small number of biometric templates and the problems heretofore discussed relating to low security levels of one-to-many searching are avoided.
- Biometric information is captured.
- Biometric data is determined from the biometric information by, for example, a characterisation process. For example, in fingerprint recognition, this process involves locating a fingerprint centre and then extracting features based on the fingerprint centre.
- the biometric data is then registered against each biometric template in a database.
- the registration is performed according to known registration processes and results in a value or values that are indicative of a likelihood of a correct match.
- a threshold likelihood is known and, when the registration results in a single likelihood above this threshold, the template and the biometric data are said to match.
- An identification associated with the template is then determined.
- data structures or hashing are used to reduce an overall number of registrations required to identify an individual.
- Such a system is useful for very small groups of individuals with very good biometric information sources; however, when biometric information is less easily characterised or registered or when populations are large, such a system is inherently insecure.
- biometric information is less easily characterised or registered or when populations are large, such a system is inherently insecure.
- registering individuals with a likelihood of false acceptance of 1/1,000,000 when 1,000 biometric templates are stored in the database results in approximately 1/1,000 people being falsely accepted. This is often an insufficient level of security.
- some employees with poor quality biometric information sources will be unable to access the system or facility absent human intervention. Of course, for 5 employees, such a system can provide reasonable levels of security.
- a method of refining the search criteria using, for example, flexible verification as set out below or using a different biometric information sample alone is then used to identify the individual uniquely.
- Using a plurality of biometric information samples from different sources - index finger, thumb, voice, retina, etc. - also provides a method of reducing false acceptance rates for each user identification process and thereby reducing the overall false acceptance rate of the system.
- a table of data is shown for use with a method according to the invention.
- An individual is associated with a number of biometric information sources.
- a security level is stored in the form of a threshold registration value.
- a number of past biometric information samples are stored as well as associated past registration results. The information is used to maintain system security while providing significant flexibility.
- the threshold registration value is a non-linear likelihood that the registration is accurate. Higher registration values indicate a more secure registration. Alternatively, lower registration values indicate a more secure registration. More secure registrations indicate security levels above the threshold security level and registration values corresponding to a less secure registration are indicative of security levels below those registration values corresponding to a more secure registration.
- a table of data is shown for use with a method according to the invention.
- the table comprises system wide information.
- a Minimum System Security Level (MSSL) is provided, as is a Minimum Individual Security Level (S m , n ) and other system level information and preferences.
- MSSL Minimum System Security Level
- S m , n Minimum Individual Security Level
- FIG. 4 The application of the data in the tables of Figs. 3a and 3b is discussed below with reference to Fig. 4.
- each individual is assigned a security level S 0 equal to the greater of the minimum individual security level, S mm, and S eq , where
- N Minimum System Security Level (MSSL).
- a system security level is set at MSSL, while values of Si of the individual users are adjusted. After a while, the value of Sj for each user has already been a minimum value for that user and each is maintained or increased. This results from experience in using the system and from individual learning curves. When each value of Si is increased or maintained constant, the system security level SSL is often above the MSSL.
- a system according to the invention therefore provides an automatic and dynamic method of adapting system security to provide a high level of security in a flexible environment.
- One of the key aspects to achieving this result is providing each individual with a value of Sj where some individuals have different values of Si.
- a minimum individual security level of 1/10,000 and a MSSL of 1/10,000 S 0 is approximately 1/100,000 (1-99,999 10 /100,000 10 is approximately 1/10,000). If 5 of the users register with a likelihood above 1/1,000,000 - an order of magnitude better - then the resulting system security level is 1/1,000,000 5 1/100,000 5 , which is significantly better than 1/10.000; it is actually close to 1/18,182.
- the overall security level is readjusted toward MSSL by lowering the security level of the other individuals. For example, each could have their Si reduced to 1/60,000.
- a doorway entry device comprising a biometric information capture device 1 in the form of a fingerprint imager and a plurality of LEDs.
- the top row of three LEDs 3 indicates that registration is in progress (LED 3 a), an individual is identified (LED 3b), and an individual in not identified (LED 3c), respectively.
- the row of 5 LEDs 5 indicates a fingertip from the five available fingertips on a hand to provide to the fingerprint-imaging device for use in re-authorising an individual in order to update their template and for use with flexible verification as described below.
- LED 5a indicates the right thumb
- LED 5b indicates the right index finger
- LED 5 c indicates the right middle finger
- LED 5d indicates the right ring finger
- LED 5e indicates the right pinkie.
- the LEDs are overlaid on an image of a hand.
- other biometric information is also indicated such as the fingertips of the left hand, palm prints, voice, retinal scans, facial features, and so forth.
- FIG. 6 a simplified flow diagram of another method according to the invention is shown.
- a database is maintained of persons within a facility or actively using a system. Those individuals are denied further access until they have properly exited. In this way, the security level is further improved or, alternatively, is modified to reflect the MSSL.
- a secure space includes within its definition a physical space having security to enter the space and an electronic environment having security to use the environment or some aspect thereof.
- past biometric samples are stored associated with each identity.
- a new template is generated.
- the new template is generated automatically.
- the new template is generated upon user authorisation. Further alternatively, an indication of the template consistency is provided to someone who is then able to initiate generation of a new template.
- templates generation is performed according to a known template generating technique. For example, 3 previous biometric information samples are combined to form a template.
- a prompt is provided to the user requesting authorisation information in the form of another biometric information sample from a different biometric information source, for example, registration of another fingerprint or a facial recognition is performed when the user is authorised using further biometric information.
- the biometric template is updated to reflect consistent biometric information input, the security level for that user is increased to reflect that consistency. Since most users of biometric security systems enrol when they begin using the systems and, as such, provide biometric information for a first time, it is very sensible to re-enrol these individuals once their biometric information becomes more consistent. Further, this allows for an increased security level Si associated with that same individual.
- One of the problems with a fingerprint biometric is that a segment of the population can have temporary or permanent skin conditions which cause poor image quality on the scanning device which in turn causes them to experience high false rejection rates.
- lower thresholds for authentication are combined in a way which confirms identities yet does not compromise the level of false acceptances for the system.
- Thresholds from a set of distinct fingerprints from a candidate that would usually be rejected for being too insecure are combined according to this method to allow acceptance in dependence upon a plurality of biometric information samples.
- biometric information in the form of fingerprints is provided to a processor.
- a plurality of samples from at least two biometric information sources are provided. These samples are in the form of fingerprints, palm prints, voice samples, retinal scans, or other biometric information samples.
- Requiring an individual to enter biometric information samples from at least two biometric information sources allows for improved registration results and reduced false acceptance.
- some individuals are known to be commonly falsely accepted or accepted.
- the false acceptance often is a result of similarities between biometric information samples from a biometric information source of a registered individual and from a biometric information source of another individual. These similarities are often only present for a specific similar biometric information source such as a left index finger or a right thumb.
- the provision and registration of two biometric information samples reduces likelihood of similarity because, where before similarity of a single biometric information source resulted in false acceptance, now similarity in two different sources is unlikely. Therefore, requiring a minimum of two biometric information sources reduces any likelihood of false acceptance.
- the use of a plurality of varied biometric information sources in the form of retinal scans, voice prints, finger prints, palm prints, toe prints, etc. further reduces probability of false registration; it is unlikely that the varied biometric information from two individuals is similar.
- Each biometric information sample is associated with a biometric information source in the form of a fingertip, a retina, a voice, a palm. etc.
- the association allows for comparison between the biometric information sample and a template associated with the biometric information source.
- the biometric information sample is only compared to a single template associated with the biometric information source. Alternatively, the biometric information sample is compared against a plurality of templates. Comparing biometric information samples is often referred to as registering the biometric information samples. Many methods are known for performing the registration. Commonly, the biometric information sample is characterized according to a method specific to the template. The template and the characterized biometric information sample are compared to determine a registration value. The registration value is then used to determine identification; to provide access to a system or structure; to log access; to monitor use; for billing; or for other purposes.
- a biometric input means in the form of a live fingerprint scanning device is used to collect the biometric information in the form of images of fingerprints of the individual which are entered in a predetermined order due to prompting. Each biometric information sample is identified. When the individual is prompted for a biometric information sample, the processor labels the samples.
- the authentication procedure determines an independent sequence of comparison scores from the input provided by the candidate. This sequence is considered to be a point, hereinafter referred to as P, in n-dimensional vector space, R n .
- 17 are equivalence classes that partition the set of input images into sets of images that belong to a same finger tip. There are n of these classes where 1 ⁇ n ⁇ N.
- the set I R I is then a set of images of the distinct input fingerprints that achieve the highest scores. Alternatively, multiple samples of a same fingerprint are considered.
- a graphical distribution of identifications is achievable in n-dimensions.
- the biometric information samples are provided to a processor. Registration is conducted against known templates in dependence upon the selected parameters. Once registration is complete, a single point is determined having coordinates equal to each of at least some of the registration results. Alternatively, the point has coordinates determined in dependence upon the registration results but not equal thereto. Plotting the point results in a point plotted in n-dimensional space.
- the processor determines a probability distribution for the selected parameters. Alternatively, this is performed prior to the registration process for biometric information samples. Further alternatively, the probability distributions are determined or approximated in advance and stored in non-volatile memory.
- n-dimensional plot defined by a boundary function and a single point
- a comparison determines whether or not the point falls below or above the function and optionally within or outside other known ranges. Stated differently, the point is analysed to determine whether it falls within a suitable region wherein region is defined as an n-
- a simplified flow diagram of a method according to the invention is shown.
- a plurality of biometric information samples from an individual is provided to a processor.
- the processor characterises the biometric information samples and registers them against templates. Registration of the biometric information samples is performed against a plurality of associated templates producing registration values.
- the registration values define a point in an n-dimensional space. In dependence upon this point and a region within the n-dimensional space, the region representing a security level Si associated with the same individual, determining when the likelihood is within predetermined limits for an acceptable likelihood and providing an identification. When the point falls outside the region representing a security level Si identification is not provided and a next set of templates is selected. Optionally, once all sets of templates are exhausted, an indication of failure to identify is provided.
- a biometric information sample from an individual is provided to a processor.
- the processor characterises the biometric information samples and registers them against templates. Registration of the biometric information samples is performed against a plurality of associated templates producing registration values. In dependence upon these values a likelihood of accurate user identification is determined. The likelihood is indicative of a security level that is then compared to Si associated with the same individual. When the likelihood is within predetermined limits for an acceptable likelihood, identification is provided. When the value falls outside the predetermined limits identification is not provided and a next set of templates is selected. Optionally, once all sets of templates are exhausted, an indication of failure to identify is provided.
- a two dimensional probability distribution is shown.
- the total area below the distribution curve is 1 unit area.
- false acceptance or false registration is described.
- Most biometric information samples are easily characterised.
- the high initial point on the probability curve and the steep decent to an asymptotic curve approaching 0 shows this.
- the line t marks the cut-off for registration effectiveness. This is determined in dependence upon an algorithm chosen and upon system limitations such as processor speed, memory, and security requirements.
- the shaded region bounded by Y 0, X > t, and the probability curve represents false acceptances.
- a truncated two-dimensional probability distribution curve is shown. Now, false acceptance is represented by a region of three-dimensional space having a volume of 1 unit or less.
- IfS ⁇ x
- x score(T a , Tb), where T a and Tb are characterisations of distinct fingerprints ⁇ , then / is 0 outside of S, and
- n-dimensional probability density function, g for a sequence of non-match scores is constructed by:
- n g(P) Ylf( x forP _R"
- an n-dimensional probability density function, g is derived as follows:
- G(P) gives the probability that the n independent scores, ⁇ xi ⁇ of non-matching finger prints occur in a particular sequence. (Note that g(P) does not give a probability at any specific point since the measure, and hence the integral, over a single point is zero).
- the first condition simply defines a false acceptance rate as a probability.
- the second condition indicates that regions are bounded below by a threshold function where C ⁇ , C ⁇ are non-negative constants.
- the third condition states that when a point is a member of a false acceptance region with a lower probability, it also belongs to a false acceptance region associated with a higher probability.
- the last condition attempts to ensure that points along or proximate the region boundaries retain substantially level contours on the n-dimensional probability density function. This reduces uneven boundaries "favouring" certain combinations of match scores.
- n-dimensional false rejection rates are calculated assuming that an analogous n-dimensional probability density function, g is constructed from the probability density function of fingerprint match scores.
- the corresponding false rejection rate for an n-dimensional false rejection rate ⁇ is given by:
- the method is employed with retinal scanned biometric information. Further Alternatively, the method is employed with palm prints. Further Alternatively, the method is employed with non-image biometric data such as voice prints.
- a method of using a multiple biometric information input system as shown in Fig. 4 is disclosed.
- a user presents biometric information to the biometric input device.
- the information is characterised and the characterised information is matched against a template.
- user identification is made and the process is complete.
- the user is prompted for another biometric information sample.
- the system prompts for each biometric information source a plurality of consecutive times.
- a user presents their index fmger to a fingerprint scanner; registration fails and access is denied.
- the user again presents their index finger to the fingerprint scanner; registration fails and access is denied.
- the user again presents their index finger to the fingerprint scanner; registration fails and access is denied.
- the user is prompted to present their middle finger to the fingerprint scanner.
- the registration of the middle finger is performed according to the invention and therefore is not a same registration process as when the middle fmger is the first finger presented to the scanner.
- the registration relies on the best registration value from the index fingerprints and, with the registration results from the middle finger, determines whether identification should proceed.
- unsuccessful registration occurs, the middle finger is presented two more times. When registration is still unsuccessful, another biometric information sample is requested.
- user identification fails when registration results fall below a predetermined threshold.
- user identification fails when known biometric information sources of the user are exhausted.
- a resulting registration value considered with previous registration values according to the invention results in a sufficiently accurate identification, the user is identified.
- a data structure indicating a next biometric information source to request is produced from all biometric information.
- the requested information is determined based on the known biometric information and registration values associated therewith. For example, biometric information is provided from a first biometric information source. Registration is performed and is inconclusive. It is determined that a particular biometric information source comprises information most likely to result in identification or failure thereby being determinative; that biometric information source is polled.
- biometric information is provided from a right thumb. Registration is performed and is inconclusive determining that the right thumb is likely that of John, Susan, or Peter but may also be that of Jeremy, Gail, Brenda, or Joe.
- a next biometric information source is selected such that clear discrimination between the individuals results and a likely identification will occur.
- the next biometric information source is one that easily eliminates a large number of the potential individuals. In this example, the
- 26 right ring finger is selected because Susan and Peter have very distinctive ring fingers. Biometric information from the right ring finger is provided and registered with templates in the database. Though the right ring finger is most likely that of Jim or Susan, it is evident that Susan, appearing in both lists, is the front runner. Also, the registration result for Peter is sufficiently low that it is unlikely that Peter is the individual. Though neither registration value would identify Susan on its own with the desired level of security, when the two registrations are taken together, Susan is indeed identified. Alternatively, when the resulting list is still not conclusive - two or more people identified or noone identified with sufficient certainty, further biometric information from another biometric information source is requested.
- the data is arranged such that in dependence upon previous registration results a next biometric information source is polled. Using such a system, searching large databases for accurate registration is facilitated and reliability is greatly increased.
- the database is precompiled to enhance performance during the identification process.
- security levels are adjusted to make the system most convenient for a majority of users.
- security levels are adjusted to make it more convenient for specific users.
- system security levels, Si are adjusted to provide each user with reasonable access through such a system. For example, using a normal distribution, 50 percent of the individuals are selected to gain access with provision of a single biometric information sample. 40 percent of the individuals require provision of two biometric information samples. The remaining ten percent require three or more biometric information samples.
- Such a system allows for individual users of the system to experience a reasonable level of security with a minimum of inconvenience.
- the system when several templates are determined to be possible matches with provided biometric information, the system is trained to distinguish therebetween. Often, a first individual will be identified as another individual, but the other individual is not misidentified. When this happens, one of the individuals is
- the security level is adjusted to fall between typical likelihoods for identification such that the individual correctly identified is identified with a likelihood indicative of a security level above the security level and the other individual is identified with a likelihood indicative of a security level below the security level.
- the template is replaced until adjustment of the associated security level allows for a clear distinction between the individuals.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP99916737A EP1074005A1 (en) | 1998-04-24 | 1999-04-23 | Method of providing secure user access |
AU35142/99A AU3514299A (en) | 1998-04-24 | 1999-04-23 | Method of providing secure user access |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US09/065,523 | 1998-04-24 | ||
US09/065,523 US6160903A (en) | 1998-04-24 | 1998-04-24 | Method of providing secure user access |
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WO1999056250A1 true WO1999056250A1 (en) | 1999-11-04 |
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PCT/CA1999/000370 WO1999056250A1 (en) | 1998-04-24 | 1999-04-23 | Method of providing secure user access |
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US (2) | US6160903A (en) |
EP (1) | EP1074005A1 (en) |
AU (1) | AU3514299A (en) |
WO (1) | WO1999056250A1 (en) |
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WO2000038096A1 (en) * | 1998-12-22 | 2000-06-29 | Siemens Ag Österreich | Fingerprint input device |
WO2001009846A1 (en) * | 1999-07-30 | 2001-02-08 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method, device and system for biometrically authenticating a person |
EP1202228A1 (en) * | 2000-10-17 | 2002-05-02 | Varette Limited | A user authentication system and process |
WO2003044744A2 (en) * | 2001-11-23 | 2003-05-30 | Koninklijke Kpn N.V. | Security method and system |
US7204425B2 (en) | 2002-03-18 | 2007-04-17 | Precision Dynamics Corporation | Enhanced identification appliance |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US6160903A (en) | 2000-12-12 |
EP1074005A1 (en) | 2001-02-07 |
AU3514299A (en) | 1999-11-16 |
US6434259B1 (en) | 2002-08-13 |
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