US20150245204A1 - Device authentication - Google Patents

Device authentication Download PDF

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Publication number
US20150245204A1
US20150245204A1 US14/316,404 US201414316404A US2015245204A1 US 20150245204 A1 US20150245204 A1 US 20150245204A1 US 201414316404 A US201414316404 A US 201414316404A US 2015245204 A1 US2015245204 A1 US 2015245204A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
message
wireless communications
communications protocol
authorisation code
value
Prior art date
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US14/316,404
Inventor
Robin Heydon
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Qualcomm Technologies International Ltd
Original Assignee
Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd
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Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from GB1403312.0A external-priority patent/GB2515853B/en
Priority claimed from GB1403314.6A external-priority patent/GB2512733B/en
Application filed by Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd filed Critical Cambridge Silicon Radio Ltd
Assigned to CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED reassignment CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HEYDON, ROBIN
Publication of US20150245204A1 publication Critical patent/US20150245204A1/en
Assigned to QUALCOMM TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, LTD. reassignment QUALCOMM TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, LTD. CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: CAMBRIDGE SILICON RADIO LIMITED
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
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    • G06F21/73—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
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    • G06F21/76—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in application-specific integrated circuits [ASIC] or field-programmable devices, e.g. field-programmable gate arrays [FPGA] or programmable logic devices [PLD]
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    • Y02A—TECHNOLOGIES FOR ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02A10/00—TECHNOLOGIES FOR ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE at coastal zones; at river basins
    • Y02A10/40—Controlling or monitoring, e.g. of flood or hurricane; Forecasting, e.g. risk assessment or mapping
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Definitions

  • This invention relates to a method for securely authenticating a device.
  • the objects in a room be capable of communicating with each other, and also potentially to be able to communicate with the internet or cloud.
  • the room may have a light, light switch, window and door. It may be desired that each of these objects be able to communicate with the others so that the home can be automated.
  • a communication device that can communicate with similar communication devices attached to other objects.
  • a large number of objects need to be able to communicate with each other.
  • the result can be a network of many communication devices, each associated with a respective object.
  • many of these objects will not have access to, or require, power themselves (for example, a window, door, packages sitting on a shelf, etc.)
  • it may be desirable for the devices that communicate on the objects' behalf to be battery-powered devices that consume only a small amount of power. It may also be desirable that these devices be able to communicate wirelessly with each other so that there is no need for cables running between them.
  • One suitable method of communication for such a network is to use a mesh networking protocol.
  • This permits a first device to send a message to a second device, which may be outside the communication range of the first device, by transmitting the message via one or more intermediate devices.
  • mesh networking protocols are typically designed around the concept of devices sending messages using complex routing tables. Such complex routing requires processing power which tends to increase power consumption of the devices.
  • Such mesh networking protocols also tend to operate according to proprietary protocols. This means devices may have to be manufactured specifically for the task of communicating according to a particular mesh network. This may be undesirable because it increases the cost of devices that might be installed in a multitude locations and/or attached to a multitude of different devices.
  • the mesh network may be especially vulnerable to attacks when new devices added to the network.
  • One possible type of attack is an “eavesdropper attack” where an attacker passively listens to messages exchanged between devices in the mesh network.
  • Another type of attack is a “man-in-the-middle attack” where an attacker intercepts messages between two devices FIG. 1 a shows how these types of attacks may be carried out when a new device is to be added to an existing mesh network.
  • a new device “B”, which may be a newly purchased light, is to join a mesh network that is configured by a configuring device “C”, which may be a smartphone belonging to the purchaser.
  • B may be required to be associated with the mesh network and C can perform that association.
  • An eavesdropper “E” can passively listen to messages exchanged between C and B.
  • a man-in-the-middle “M” can intercept messages and pretend to be C to B and pretend to be B to C and so all messages between B and C are passed through M.
  • the association process can involve C sending a network key, which allows access to the network, to B. As E and M can observe these messages, the security of the network may be compromised if E or M obtain the network key.
  • One method of preventing the eavesdropper attack by E is to encrypt messages between the B and C.
  • a single network key may be used. Because this single network key is critical to the security of the network, this network key should never be distributed to a device insecurely. Therefore, a key exchange mechanism (e.g. a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange) could be performed before the network key is distributed to a new device.
  • a key exchange mechanism e.g. a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange
  • the key exchange mechanism may not prevent a man-in-the middle attack.
  • M can intercept the messages and insert its own keys PK MB and PK MC , which are then sent to devices C and B respectively.
  • S MC S CM
  • S MB S BM
  • a method for authenticating a first device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the method comprising: at a second device, receiving a first message comprising an identifier for the first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device, the first message not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; at the second device, receiving a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; and authenticating the first device if the authorisation code received via the first message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.
  • the method may further comprise: at the second device and in response to authenticating the first device, sending an association message to the first device, the association message comprising an encrypted network key by means of which the first device can access a network comprising the second device.
  • the method may further comprise, at the second device: receiving a public key from the first device; and calculating an encryption key in dependence the received public key and a private key stored at the second device, the network key being encrypted using the encryption key.
  • the calculation may be in accordance with a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange.
  • the first message may be received via an analysis of an image.
  • the image may be a QR-Code, barcode or text representing the identifier and the authorisation code.
  • the method may further comprise, at the second device: scanning the image, the image representing a database identifier; sending, via the internet, a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer; and in response to the request, receiving, via the internet, the first message from the computer.
  • the first message may comprise one or more further identifiers and identification codes associated with respective one or more further devices.
  • the value may be dependent on an authorisation code stored at the first device.
  • the value may be different to the authorisation code.
  • the value may be calculated using the predetermined algorithm having as inputs: the authorisation code stored at the first device, a public key of the first device and a random number generated by the first device.
  • the authenticating step may comprise: receiving the random number from the first device; from the value, authorisation code and the public key, calculating a number according to the predetermined algorithm; and comparing said calculated number with the received random number and, if said numbers match, authenticating the first device.
  • the method may further comprise: at the first device, broadcasting the identifier for the first device in accordance with the communications protocol.
  • the second message may be received via a third device capable of operating according to the communications protocol.
  • the first device may be sited at a location that is out of range of transmission from the second device.
  • the second device may be capable of communicating in a mesh network.
  • the wireless communications protocol may be Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • the wireless communications protocol may define a broadcast packet type, said second message may be received via a packet of the broadcast packet type.
  • a wireless communications device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the wireless communications device comprising: an input configured to receive a first message comprising an identifier for a first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device, the first message not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; a transceiver capable of operating according to the wireless communications protocol and configured to receive a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; a controller configured to authenticate the first device if the authorisation code received via the first message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.
  • the transceiver may be further configured to, in response to authenticating the first device, send an association message to the first device, the association message comprising an encrypted network key configured to allow the first device access to a network comprising the wireless communications device.
  • the transceiver may be further configured to receive a public key from the first device, the controller being further configured to calculate an encryption key in dependence the received public key and a private key stored at the wireless communications device, the network key being encrypted using the encryption key.
  • the controller may be further configured to calculate the encryption key in accordance with a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange.
  • the input may be a camera or barcode reader configured to analyse an image.
  • the image may be a QR-Code, barcode or text representing the identifier and the authorisation code.
  • the wireless communications device may further comprise a camera or barcode reader configured to analyse an image representing a database identifier, the input being a network interface capable of communicating via the internet and configured to: send, via the internet, a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer; and in response to the request, receive, via the internet, the first message from the computer.
  • a camera or barcode reader configured to analyse an image representing a database identifier
  • the input being a network interface capable of communicating via the internet and configured to: send, via the internet, a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer; and in response to the request, receive, via the internet, the first message from the computer.
  • the first message may comprise one or more further identifiers and identification codes associated with respective one or more further devices.
  • the value may be dependent on an authorisation code stored at the first device.
  • the value may be different to the authorisation code.
  • the controller may be configured to calculate the value using the predetermined algorithm having as inputs: the authorisation code stored at the first device, a public key of the first device and a random number generated by the first device.
  • the transceiver may be further configured to receive the random number from the first device; the controller may be further configured to: calculate, according to the predetermined algorithm, a number from the value, authorisation code and the public key, and compare said calculated number with the received random number and, if said numbers match, authenticate the first device.
  • the first device may be sited at a location that is out of range of transmission from the transceiver.
  • the transceiver may be capable of communicating in a mesh network.
  • the wireless communications protocol may be Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • the wireless communications protocol may define a broadcast packet type, said second message being received via a packet of the broadcast packet type.
  • a wireless communications device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the wireless communications device comprising: a transceiver configured to broadcast an identifier for the device in accordance with the communications protocol; a memory configured to store an authorisation code, the transceiver being further configured to: send a first message comprising a value, the value being related, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the authorisation code; and in response to sending the first message, receive a second message comprising an encrypted network key; and a controller configured to decrypt the encrypted network key by means of which the device can access a network.
  • the device may be configured to not send the authorisation code unencrypted.
  • FIG. 1 a shows devices in a scenario in which the security of a network may be compromised:
  • FIG. 1 b shows devices in a man-in-the-middle attack scenario
  • FIG. 2 shows a method of authorising a device
  • FIG. 3 shows a message exchange for another method of authorising a device
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a configuring device.
  • the identity of a new device must be verified before a configuring device in the network can trust the new device.
  • a new, unverified device may not be accessible or have any form of user interface, and may possibly be a long distance from the configuring device as it may be in a mesh network, the concepts typically used in, for example. Bluetooth to “pair” devices may not be suitable.
  • each device is provided with an “authorisation secret” that is only known by that device. To allow the configuring device to verify the new device, it needs to securely obtain the authorisation secret.
  • FIG. 2 shows one method for the configuring device 201 to obtain the authorisation secret of a new device 202 that is to be added to a mesh network comprising configuring device 201 .
  • Devices 201 and 202 and the mesh network may operate according to a wireless communications protocol such as Bluetooth Low Energy.
  • the authorisation code of the new device 202 could be made available to the configuring device 201 so that new device 202 can be authenticated.
  • transmitting the authorisation code over the network would allow an eavesdropper or a MITM attacker 203 to obtain the code.
  • device 202 should not transmit its authorisation code in accordance with the protocol over the network.
  • configuring device 201 would have to acquire the authorisation code by means other than via messages sent according to the wireless communications protocol used by the new device 202 and the mesh network.
  • device 201 should not receive (directly or indirectly via an intermediate device) the authorisation code for device 202 from a message originating from device 202 , wherein the message is sent by device 202 in accordance with the wireless communication protocol of the mesh network.
  • the authorisation code may instead be obtained by the configuring device 201 using another method such as via a QR-Code or a Short Code that might be printed on the new device 202 or the packaging of the device 202 .
  • the code could be presented as a one-dimensional or two-dimensional bar code, or in some other way that permits a device to reliably interpret the code using a sensor installed on the device. That sensor could be a camera, an audio sensor, a magnetic sensor and so on.
  • the authorisation code may be conveyed to the configuring device 201 via a QR-Code.
  • the QR-Code may have encoded thereon an authorisation code and an identifier for the device 202 .
  • the authorisation code and the identifier may be unique to each device.
  • Device 202 may also have a matching authorisation code and identifier stored in a memory on the device 202 .
  • the configuring device 201 For the configuring device 201 to verify that the new device 202 is that device and not a man-in-the-middle device 203 , the configuring device 201 is required to match the identifier and authorisation code obtained via means other than via the network (such as the QR-Code) and the authorisation code and identifier stored on the device 202 without that stored information being transmitted over the mesh network.
  • the predetermined algorithm may be known to both devices 201 and 202 .
  • Device 202 sends value CONFIRM B to device 201 .
  • Device 202 can then send value RANDOM B to device 201 so that device 201 can calculate, using the same predetermined algorithm, a confirmation value from RANDOM B and the authorisation code obtained via the OR-Code.
  • CONFIRM B and RANDOM B could be sent in the same message.
  • the confirmation value calculated by device 201 matches CONFIRM B , then device 202 is verified and is therefore trusted.
  • the MITM device 203 does not know the authorisation code and thus cannot generate the correct inputs to the predetermined algorithm and thus will not be able to generate the correct RANDOM B value that will allow device 201 to arrive at the correct confirmation value CONFIRM B .
  • Additional messages may be exchanged between devices 201 and 202 to further enhance the security of the verification procedure to allow device 202 to be associated with the mesh network. Such an enhanced procedure is described with reference to the sequence chart of FIG. 3 .
  • configuring device 201 scans a QR-Code to obtain an authorisation code and an identifier (ID) for new device 202 .
  • ID an identifier
  • This information can be obtained at any time, for example by taking a picture of the QR-Code on the box that the device 202 arrived in. It could also be obtained by typing in the authorisation code into a user interface at the configuring device 201 .
  • device 202 advertises its ID by broadcasting it in accordance with the wireless protocol used by the mesh network.
  • Configuring device 201 receives this information. This information may be received via an intermediate device within the mesh network if devices 201 and 202 are out of range from each other.
  • the configuring device 201 determines that new device 202 is to be added to the network and starts a verification procedure.
  • An eavesdropper or a MITM device 203 may also observe the broadcasted ID.
  • the configuring device 201 sends its public key PK a to new device 202 and, in response at step 304 , device 202 send its public key PK b to configuring device 201 .
  • An eavesdropper may be able to receive both of these messages.
  • a MITM device 203 could have placed itself between the two devices 201 and 202 and inserted its own public keys, PK ma and PK mb into the communications in an attempt to become a man-in-the-middle.
  • configuring device 201 and the new device 202 calculate a shared secret S from their respective private keys and the peer device's public key. This may be achieved using the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange method.
  • the eavesdropper cannot calculate the shared secret because it does not have knowledge of the private keys used.
  • the MITM 203 may be able to calculate two shared secrets, one that it could use when communicating with device 201 , S ma , when pretending to be new device 202 and one that it would use when communicating with device 202 , S mb , when pretending to be the configuring device 201 .
  • the configuring device 201 sends a confirmation value CONFIRM a to new device 202 .
  • the confirmation value can be determined based on a random number RANDOM a
  • the public key of device 201 and the authorisation code obtained via the QR-Code CONFIRM a may be calculated using a predetermined algorithm.
  • new device 202 sends its confirmation value CONFIRM b to device 201 .
  • CONFIRM b can be determined based on a random number RANDOM b , the public key of device 202 and the authorisation code stored at the device 202 .
  • CONFIRM b may be calculated using the same predetermined algorithm.
  • the eavesdropper can receive the confirmation values.
  • the values do not reveal any useful information as they appear to be random numbers to the eavesdropper.
  • the MITM 203 does not know the authorisation code and therefore whilst it can generate the appropriate messages, it cannot calculate the inputs required to obtain the confirmation values.
  • the configuring device 201 sends the random number RANDOM a to new device 202 .
  • new device 202 sends random number RANDOM b to device 201 .
  • Both devices 201 and 202 can then confirm, using the predetermined algorithm, that the received random numbers, the authorisation code available to each device and the peer's public key generate the same confirmation value that was previously received.
  • the configuring device 201 has determined that the messages from the new device 202 are authentic and so new device 202 is a trusted device.
  • the eavesdropper can receive these random number messages, however it does not have the authorisation code.
  • the MITM 203 cannot generate two random numbers that, when sent, would match the confirmation values that were previously sent.
  • devices 201 and 202 are able to verify that they are communicating with each other and not a MITM device 203 .
  • the configuring device 201 sends an encrypted network key to new device 201 .
  • the network key may be encrypted using S and a concatenation of RANDOM a and RANDOM b .
  • the configuring device 201 may also send an encrypted allocated ID to new device 202 which will be its allocated ID for use within the mesh network. The eavesdropper cannot decrypt this message as it does not have knowledge of S.
  • the MITM 203 is no longer trusted by either device 201 or 202 as the MITM 203 could not generate the correct random numbers and therefore any messages from MITM 204 message will be ignored.
  • the secret key S could be used to encrypt the messages sent in any of steps 306 to 309 .
  • the new device 202 is then able to securely join the mesh network and securely send and receive messages, which may be encrypted using the network key.
  • the messages in steps 302 to 310 may be sent in accordance with the wireless communications protocol of the mesh network.
  • Devices 201 and 202 may communicate directly with each other if they are in communications range. If they are out of direct communications range with each other, then the messages may be sent via one or more intermediate devices within the mesh network which can forward the messages so that they can reach device 201 or 202 .
  • the authorisation code and device ID for a device may be assigned at manufacture and stored in the memory of the device.
  • the authorisation code and ID may be static for the lifetime of the device.
  • the authorisation code and the ID information may also be made available to a purchaser of the device so that the device can securely be added to their network.
  • the authorisation code and ID information can be made available by number of different means such as encoding the information into a QR-Code or a ShortCode and displaying it, for example, on the device or the packaging of the device.
  • the QR-Code or ShortCode may contain a URL that can provide a link to the device manufacturer's database which contains the authorisation code for the device.
  • the authorisation code and ID for the device may be received in a message sent over the internet.
  • a purchaser buys a large number of grouped devices, e.g. a group of lights, that are to be connected to a mesh network, it may be time consuming to scan the QR-Code for each individual light.
  • the purchaser can scan in the QR-Code, which contains a group identifier and links to the manufacturer's database, e.g. via the internet, to allow a configuring device 201 to communicate with the database and extract all the authorisation codes and associated IDs for each light in that group.
  • the received authorisation codes and ID can then be used to verify each device as described above.
  • FIG. 4 shows an example schematic of a configuring device 201 .
  • the configuring device 201 may comprise a transceiver 401 , a scanner 402 , a network interface 403 and a controller 404 .
  • the configuring device 201 may be a smartphone, tablet, laptop, a computer, etc.
  • the transceiver 401 may be configured to operate according to a wireless communication protocol such as Bluetooth low energy and is able to wirelessly send and receive messages over the mesh network.
  • a wireless communication protocol such as Bluetooth low energy
  • the scanner 402 may be any suitable device that is capable reading an image such as a OR-Code or barcode or text.
  • the scanner 202 may be a camera that can capture an image of a QR-Code or barcode or text.
  • the image may be analysed by, for example, the controller 404 to decode and retrieve the information in the QR-Code or barcode. If the captured image is of text, the controller 404 may perform character recognition on the image to extract the information in the text.
  • the scanner 402 is capable of receiving a message coded in the image which may contain an authorisation code and ID of a device.
  • the scanner 402 may be a barcode reader which is capable of scanning and decoding QR-Code and/or barcodes and providing the decoded information to the controller 404 .
  • the information could be stored on a short-range NFC device or RFID tag on the new device 202 or the packaging of the new device.
  • the scanner 402 may then be a NFC or RFID reader which is capable of reading and extracting the information stored on the NFC device or RFID tag.
  • the message coded in the image may be a link to a database containing the authorisation code and ID of a device.
  • the controller 404 may access the database via the network interface 403 .
  • the network interface 403 may be, for example, a WiFi or mobile data interface which allows connection to the internet.
  • the controller 404 may request, via the internet, one or more authorisation codes and associated IDs based on the information retrieved using the scanner 402 .
  • the database may send the configuring device 201 , via the internet, the one or more of the requested authorisation codes and associated ID and is received via the network interface 403 .
  • the controller 404 can control the transceiver 401 , scanner 402 and network interface 403 to carry out the verification procedure described above.
  • the controller 404 can be configured to cause the configuring device 201 to carry out the verification and messaging procedures described above.
  • the controller 404 may be configured to carry out the processing described above such as calculating the confirmation values and encryption keys, generating random numbers, comparing the values, etc.
  • the new device 202 may be used with appliances such as light switches, lights, sensors, fire alarms, sensors, thermostats, etc.
  • the new device 202 may comprise a transceiver configured to operate according to a wireless communication protocol such as Bluetooth low energy.
  • the new device 202 may also comprise a memory configured to store data such as the authentication code and device ID, network key, allocated ID, etc.
  • the new device 202 may also comprise a controller that is configured to cause the new device 202 to carry out the verification and messaging procedures described above.
  • the controller and/or transceiver can be configured to cause the new device 202 to not send the authorisation code via transceiver, unless it is encrypted.
  • Devices 201 and 202 may be wireless communication devices that operate according to the same wireless communication protocol.
  • the wireless communication protocol could be a relatively short-range protocol.
  • the effective range of each device could be less than 25 m. That characteristic can permit the devices to use less power for transmitting and/or receiving than would be expected in a longer range protocol.
  • the devices could operate according to the Bluetooth protocol, specifically the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol.
  • BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • the devices could use other protocols, for instance IEEE 802.11.
  • the devices described above could form a mesh network with other wireless communication devices.
  • the devices could be configured to forward some or all messages they receive.
  • the messages could be sent and received via a broadcast packet type defined in the wireless communication protocol. All the devices in the network could be peers in that they have identical roles at a network level.
  • Devices 201 and 202 could operate according to two different wireless communications protocols, e.g. BLE and IEEE 802.11.
  • Devices 201 and 202 may be connected via an IEEE 802.11 network, which can allow secure communication between the two devices.
  • New device 202 may then wish to join a mesh network (that comprises device 201 ) that is operating according to the BLE protocol.
  • Device 202 may securely transmit a message comprising its authentication code and ID via IEEE 802.11 to device 201 .
  • Device 201 can trust this message as it is sent over a secure IEEE 802.11 channel and can use the authentication code received via IEEE 802.11 (instead of via the QR-Code, for example) in the authentication procedure described above for adding the new device 202 to the BLE mesh network.
  • the devices configured in accordance with the examples described herein could be embodied in hardware, software or any suitable combination of hardware and software.
  • the receiving device of the examples described herein could comprise, for example, software for execution at one or more processors (such as at a CPU and/or GPU), and/or one or more dedicated processors (such as ASICs), and/or one or more programmable processors (such as FPGAs) suitably programmed so as to provide functionalities of the data processing system, and/or heterogeneous processors comprising one or more dedicated, programmable and general purpose processing functionalities.
  • the devices comprise one or more processors and one or more memories having program code stored thereon, the data processors and the memories being such as to, in combination, provide the claimed data processing systems and/or perform the claimed methods.
  • Data processing units described herein need not be provided as discrete units and represent functionalities that could (a) be combined in any manner, and (b) themselves comprise one or more data processing entities.
  • Data processing units could be provided by any suitable hardware or software functionalities, or combinations of hardware and software functionalities.
  • Any one of more of the methods described herein could be performed by one or more physical processing units executing program code that causes the unit(s) to perform the data processing methods.
  • Each physical processing unit could be any suitable processor, such as a CPU or GPU (or a core thereof), or fixed function or programmable hardware.
  • the program code could be stored in non-transitory form at a machine readable medium such as an integrated circuit memory, or optical or magnetic storage.
  • a machine readable medium might comprise several memories, such as on-chip memories, computer working memories, and non-volatile storage devices.

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Abstract

A method for authenticating a first device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the method comprising: at a second device, receiving a first message comprising an identifier for the first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device, the first message not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; at the second device, receiving a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; and authenticating the first device if the authorisation code received via the first message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.

Description

    TECHNICAL FIELD
  • This invention relates to a method for securely authenticating a device.
    • BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • There is an increasing need for a variety of objects to be equipped with the ability to send and receive messages. In the case of a home, for example, it may be desirable that the objects in a room be capable of communicating with each other, and also potentially to be able to communicate with the internet or cloud. For example, the room may have a light, light switch, window and door. It may be desired that each of these objects be able to communicate with the others so that the home can be automated.
  • To enable objects to communicate, they may be equipped with a communication device that can communicate with similar communication devices attached to other objects. For this architecture to be of greatest use, a large number of objects need to be able to communicate with each other. The result can be a network of many communication devices, each associated with a respective object. As many of these objects will not have access to, or require, power themselves (for example, a window, door, packages sitting on a shelf, etc.), it may be desirable for the devices that communicate on the objects' behalf to be battery-powered devices that consume only a small amount of power. It may also be desirable that these devices be able to communicate wirelessly with each other so that there is no need for cables running between them.
  • One suitable method of communication for such a network is to use a mesh networking protocol. This permits a first device to send a message to a second device, which may be outside the communication range of the first device, by transmitting the message via one or more intermediate devices. Historically, mesh networking protocols are typically designed around the concept of devices sending messages using complex routing tables. Such complex routing requires processing power which tends to increase power consumption of the devices. Such mesh networking protocols also tend to operate according to proprietary protocols. This means devices may have to be manufactured specifically for the task of communicating according to a particular mesh network. This may be undesirable because it increases the cost of devices that might be installed in a multitude locations and/or attached to a multitude of different devices.
  • Another consideration is to provide adequate security to the mesh network against potential attackers. The mesh network may be especially vulnerable to attacks when new devices added to the network. One possible type of attack is an “eavesdropper attack” where an attacker passively listens to messages exchanged between devices in the mesh network. Another type of attack is a “man-in-the-middle attack” where an attacker intercepts messages between two devices FIG. 1 a shows how these types of attacks may be carried out when a new device is to be added to an existing mesh network.
  • A new device “B”, which may be a newly purchased light, is to join a mesh network that is configured by a configuring device “C”, which may be a smartphone belonging to the purchaser. B may be required to be associated with the mesh network and C can perform that association. An eavesdropper “E” can passively listen to messages exchanged between C and B. Also, a man-in-the-middle “M” can intercept messages and pretend to be C to B and pretend to be B to C and so all messages between B and C are passed through M. The association process can involve C sending a network key, which allows access to the network, to B. As E and M can observe these messages, the security of the network may be compromised if E or M obtain the network key.
  • One method of preventing the eavesdropper attack by E is to encrypt messages between the B and C. To allow any device within the network to send and receive messages from any other device in the network, a single network key may be used. Because this single network key is critical to the security of the network, this network key should never be distributed to a device insecurely. Therefore, a key exchange mechanism (e.g. a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange) could be performed before the network key is distributed to a new device.
  • However, the key exchange mechanism may not prevent a man-in-the middle attack. As shown in FIG. 1 b, when devices B and C send their public keys PKB and PKC respectively, M can intercept the messages and insert its own keys PKMB and PKMC, which are then sent to devices C and B respectively. Device M can then calculate two sets of secret keys SMC=SCM and SMB=SBM that would be used for communication between devices C and B through device M. Thus the security of the network may still be compromised using known key exchange mechanisms.
  • There is therefore a need for improving the security of a mesh network.
    • SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • According to a first aspect there is provided a method for authenticating a first device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the method comprising: at a second device, receiving a first message comprising an identifier for the first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device, the first message not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; at the second device, receiving a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; and authenticating the first device if the authorisation code received via the first message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.
  • The method may further comprise: at the second device and in response to authenticating the first device, sending an association message to the first device, the association message comprising an encrypted network key by means of which the first device can access a network comprising the second device.
  • The method may further comprise, at the second device: receiving a public key from the first device; and calculating an encryption key in dependence the received public key and a private key stored at the second device, the network key being encrypted using the encryption key.
  • The calculation may be in accordance with a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange.
  • The first message may be received via an analysis of an image.
  • The image may be a QR-Code, barcode or text representing the identifier and the authorisation code.
  • The method may further comprise, at the second device: scanning the image, the image representing a database identifier; sending, via the internet, a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer; and in response to the request, receiving, via the internet, the first message from the computer.
  • The first message may comprise one or more further identifiers and identification codes associated with respective one or more further devices.
  • The value may be dependent on an authorisation code stored at the first device.
  • The value may be different to the authorisation code.
  • The value may be calculated using the predetermined algorithm having as inputs: the authorisation code stored at the first device, a public key of the first device and a random number generated by the first device.
  • The authenticating step may comprise: receiving the random number from the first device; from the value, authorisation code and the public key, calculating a number according to the predetermined algorithm; and comparing said calculated number with the received random number and, if said numbers match, authenticating the first device.
  • The method may further comprise: at the first device, broadcasting the identifier for the first device in accordance with the communications protocol.
  • The second message may be received via a third device capable of operating according to the communications protocol.
  • The first device may be sited at a location that is out of range of transmission from the second device.
  • The second device may be capable of communicating in a mesh network.
  • The wireless communications protocol may be Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • The wireless communications protocol may define a broadcast packet type, said second message may be received via a packet of the broadcast packet type.
  • According to a second aspect there is provided a wireless communications device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the wireless communications device comprising: an input configured to receive a first message comprising an identifier for a first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device, the first message not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; a transceiver capable of operating according to the wireless communications protocol and configured to receive a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; a controller configured to authenticate the first device if the authorisation code received via the first message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.
  • The transceiver may be further configured to, in response to authenticating the first device, send an association message to the first device, the association message comprising an encrypted network key configured to allow the first device access to a network comprising the wireless communications device.
  • The transceiver may be further configured to receive a public key from the first device, the controller being further configured to calculate an encryption key in dependence the received public key and a private key stored at the wireless communications device, the network key being encrypted using the encryption key.
  • The controller may be further configured to calculate the encryption key in accordance with a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange.
  • The input may be a camera or barcode reader configured to analyse an image.
  • The image may be a QR-Code, barcode or text representing the identifier and the authorisation code.
  • The wireless communications device may further comprise a camera or barcode reader configured to analyse an image representing a database identifier, the input being a network interface capable of communicating via the internet and configured to: send, via the internet, a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer; and in response to the request, receive, via the internet, the first message from the computer.
  • The first message may comprise one or more further identifiers and identification codes associated with respective one or more further devices.
  • The value may be dependent on an authorisation code stored at the first device.
  • The value may be different to the authorisation code.
  • The controller may be configured to calculate the value using the predetermined algorithm having as inputs: the authorisation code stored at the first device, a public key of the first device and a random number generated by the first device.
  • The transceiver may be further configured to receive the random number from the first device; the controller may be further configured to: calculate, according to the predetermined algorithm, a number from the value, authorisation code and the public key, and compare said calculated number with the received random number and, if said numbers match, authenticate the first device.
  • The first device may be sited at a location that is out of range of transmission from the transceiver.
  • The transceiver may be capable of communicating in a mesh network.
  • The wireless communications protocol may be Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
  • The wireless communications protocol may define a broadcast packet type, said second message being received via a packet of the broadcast packet type.
  • According to a third aspect there is provided a wireless communications device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the wireless communications device comprising: a transceiver configured to broadcast an identifier for the device in accordance with the communications protocol; a memory configured to store an authorisation code, the transceiver being further configured to: send a first message comprising a value, the value being related, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the authorisation code; and in response to sending the first message, receive a second message comprising an encrypted network key; and a controller configured to decrypt the encrypted network key by means of which the device can access a network.
  • The device may be configured to not send the authorisation code unencrypted.
    • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
  • The present invention will now be described by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the drawings:
  • FIG. 1 a shows devices in a scenario in which the security of a network may be compromised:
  • FIG. 1 b shows devices in a man-in-the-middle attack scenario;
  • FIG. 2 shows a method of authorising a device;
  • FIG. 3 shows a message exchange for another method of authorising a device; and
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a configuring device.
    •  DETAILED DESCRIPTION
  • The following description is presented to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use the invention, and is provided in the context of a particular application. Various modifications to the disclosed embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art.
  • The general principles defined herein may be applied to other embodiments and applications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and features disclosed herein.
  • To protect against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, the identity of a new device must be verified before a configuring device in the network can trust the new device. Given that a new, unverified device may not be accessible or have any form of user interface, and may possibly be a long distance from the configuring device as it may be in a mesh network, the concepts typically used in, for example. Bluetooth to “pair” devices may not be suitable. To verify the identity of new devices, each device is provided with an “authorisation secret” that is only known by that device. To allow the configuring device to verify the new device, it needs to securely obtain the authorisation secret.
  • FIG. 2 shows one method for the configuring device 201 to obtain the authorisation secret of a new device 202 that is to be added to a mesh network comprising configuring device 201. Devices 201 and 202 and the mesh network may operate according to a wireless communications protocol such as Bluetooth Low Energy. The authorisation code of the new device 202 could be made available to the configuring device 201 so that new device 202 can be authenticated. However, transmitting the authorisation code over the network would allow an eavesdropper or a MITM attacker 203 to obtain the code. Thus, in order to protect against an attack, device 202 should not transmit its authorisation code in accordance with the protocol over the network. In other words, configuring device 201 would have to acquire the authorisation code by means other than via messages sent according to the wireless communications protocol used by the new device 202 and the mesh network. Thus, device 201 should not receive (directly or indirectly via an intermediate device) the authorisation code for device 202 from a message originating from device 202, wherein the message is sent by device 202 in accordance with the wireless communication protocol of the mesh network.
  • The authorisation code may instead be obtained by the configuring device 201 using another method such as via a QR-Code or a Short Code that might be printed on the new device 202 or the packaging of the device 202. The code could be presented as a one-dimensional or two-dimensional bar code, or in some other way that permits a device to reliably interpret the code using a sensor installed on the device. That sensor could be a camera, an audio sensor, a magnetic sensor and so on. As shown in the example of FIG. 2, the authorisation code may be conveyed to the configuring device 201 via a QR-Code. The QR-Code may have encoded thereon an authorisation code and an identifier for the device 202. The authorisation code and the identifier may be unique to each device. Device 202 may also have a matching authorisation code and identifier stored in a memory on the device 202. For the configuring device 201 to verify that the new device 202 is that device and not a man-in-the-middle device 203, the configuring device 201 is required to match the identifier and authorisation code obtained via means other than via the network (such as the QR-Code) and the authorisation code and identifier stored on the device 202 without that stored information being transmitted over the mesh network.
  • Device 202 can generate a random number RANDOMB and calculate a confirmation value CONFIRMB by having RANDOMB and the authorisation code as inputs to a predetermined algorithm, which may be, for example, a cryptographic hash function such as HMAC-SHA256 (e.g. CONFIRMB=HMAC (RANDOMB, authorisation code)). The predetermined algorithm may be known to both devices 201 and 202. Device 202 sends value CONFIRMB to device 201. Device 202 can then send value RANDOMB to device 201 so that device 201 can calculate, using the same predetermined algorithm, a confirmation value from RANDOMB and the authorisation code obtained via the OR-Code. CONFIRMB and RANDOMB could be sent in the same message. If the confirmation value calculated by device 201 matches CONFIRMB, then device 202 is verified and is therefore trusted. The MITM device 203 does not know the authorisation code and thus cannot generate the correct inputs to the predetermined algorithm and thus will not be able to generate the correct RANDOMB value that will allow device 201 to arrive at the correct confirmation value CONFIRMB.
  • Additional messages may be exchanged between devices 201 and 202 to further enhance the security of the verification procedure to allow device 202 to be associated with the mesh network. Such an enhanced procedure is described with reference to the sequence chart of FIG. 3.
  • At step 301, configuring device 201 scans a QR-Code to obtain an authorisation code and an identifier (ID) for new device 202. This information can be obtained at any time, for example by taking a picture of the QR-Code on the box that the device 202 arrived in. It could also be obtained by typing in the authorisation code into a user interface at the configuring device 201.
  • At step 302, device 202 advertises its ID by broadcasting it in accordance with the wireless protocol used by the mesh network. Configuring device 201 receives this information. This information may be received via an intermediate device within the mesh network if devices 201 and 202 are out of range from each other. The configuring device 201 determines that new device 202 is to be added to the network and starts a verification procedure. An eavesdropper or a MITM device 203 may also observe the broadcasted ID.
  • At step 303, the configuring device 201 sends its public key PKa to new device 202 and, in response at step 304, device 202 send its public key PKb to configuring device 201. An eavesdropper may be able to receive both of these messages. A MITM device 203 could have placed itself between the two devices 201 and 202 and inserted its own public keys, PKma and PKmb into the communications in an attempt to become a man-in-the-middle.
  • At step 305, configuring device 201 and the new device 202 calculate a shared secret S from their respective private keys and the peer device's public key. This may be achieved using the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange method. The eavesdropper cannot calculate the shared secret because it does not have knowledge of the private keys used. The MITM 203 may be able to calculate two shared secrets, one that it could use when communicating with device 201, Sma, when pretending to be new device 202 and one that it would use when communicating with device 202, Smb, when pretending to be the configuring device 201.
  • At step 306, the configuring device 201 sends a confirmation value CONFIRMa to new device 202. The confirmation value can be determined based on a random number RANDOMa, the public key of device 201 and the authorisation code obtained via the QR-Code CONFIRMa may be calculated using a predetermined algorithm. For example, the predetermined algorithm could be a cryptographic hash function such as HMAC-SHA256 with RANDOMa and a concatenation of the public key for device 201 and the authorisation code as inputs (e.g. CONFIRMa=HMAC (RANDOMa, Public key for 201 ∥ authorisation code)).
  • In response, at step 307, new device 202 sends its confirmation value CONFIRMb to device 201. CONFIRMb can be determined based on a random number RANDOMb, the public key of device 202 and the authorisation code stored at the device 202. CONFIRMb may be calculated using the same predetermined algorithm. As in the example above, the predetermined algorithm could be HMAC-SHA256 with RANDOMb and a concatenation of the public key for device 202 and the stored authorisation code as inputs (e.g. CONFIRMb=HMAC (RANDOMb, Public key for 202 ∥ authorisation code)). The eavesdropper can receive the confirmation values. However, the values do not reveal any useful information as they appear to be random numbers to the eavesdropper. The MITM 203 does not know the authorisation code and therefore whilst it can generate the appropriate messages, it cannot calculate the inputs required to obtain the confirmation values.
  • At step 308, the configuring device 201 sends the random number RANDOMa to new device 202. In response, at step 309, new device 202 sends random number RANDOMb to device 201. Both devices 201 and 202 can then confirm, using the predetermined algorithm, that the received random numbers, the authorisation code available to each device and the peer's public key generate the same confirmation value that was previously received. Thus the configuring device 201 has determined that the messages from the new device 202 are authentic and so new device 202 is a trusted device. The eavesdropper can receive these random number messages, however it does not have the authorisation code. The MITM 203 cannot generate two random numbers that, when sent, would match the confirmation values that were previously sent. Thus devices 201 and 202 are able to verify that they are communicating with each other and not a MITM device 203.
  • At step 310, the configuring device 201 sends an encrypted network key to new device 201. The network key may be encrypted using S and a concatenation of RANDOMa and RANDOMb. The configuring device 201 may also send an encrypted allocated ID to new device 202 which will be its allocated ID for use within the mesh network. The eavesdropper cannot decrypt this message as it does not have knowledge of S. The MITM 203 is no longer trusted by either device 201 or 202 as the MITM 203 could not generate the correct random numbers and therefore any messages from MITM 204 message will be ignored.
  • As well as in step 310, the secret key S could be used to encrypt the messages sent in any of steps 306 to 309.
  • Using the network key, the new device 202 is then able to securely join the mesh network and securely send and receive messages, which may be encrypted using the network key.
  • The messages in steps 302 to 310 may be sent in accordance with the wireless communications protocol of the mesh network. Devices 201 and 202 may communicate directly with each other if they are in communications range. If they are out of direct communications range with each other, then the messages may be sent via one or more intermediate devices within the mesh network which can forward the messages so that they can reach device 201 or 202.
  • The authorisation code and device ID for a device may be assigned at manufacture and stored in the memory of the device. The authorisation code and ID may be static for the lifetime of the device. The authorisation code and the ID information may also be made available to a purchaser of the device so that the device can securely be added to their network. The authorisation code and ID information can be made available by number of different means such as encoding the information into a QR-Code or a ShortCode and displaying it, for example, on the device or the packaging of the device.
  • The QR-Code or ShortCode may contain a URL that can provide a link to the device manufacturer's database which contains the authorisation code for the device. Thus the authorisation code and ID for the device may be received in a message sent over the internet. In a situation where a purchaser buys a large number of grouped devices, e.g. a group of lights, that are to be connected to a mesh network, it may be time consuming to scan the QR-Code for each individual light. Thus, there may be a single QR-Code that is associated with that group which links to a manufacturer's database. The purchaser can scan in the QR-Code, which contains a group identifier and links to the manufacturer's database, e.g. via the internet, to allow a configuring device 201 to communicate with the database and extract all the authorisation codes and associated IDs for each light in that group. The received authorisation codes and ID can then be used to verify each device as described above.
  • FIG. 4 shows an example schematic of a configuring device 201. The configuring device 201 may comprise a transceiver 401, a scanner 402, a network interface 403 and a controller 404. The configuring device 201 may be a smartphone, tablet, laptop, a computer, etc.
  • The transceiver 401 may be configured to operate according to a wireless communication protocol such as Bluetooth low energy and is able to wirelessly send and receive messages over the mesh network.
  • The scanner 402 may be any suitable device that is capable reading an image such as a OR-Code or barcode or text. For example, the scanner 202 may be a camera that can capture an image of a QR-Code or barcode or text. The image may be analysed by, for example, the controller 404 to decode and retrieve the information in the QR-Code or barcode. If the captured image is of text, the controller 404 may perform character recognition on the image to extract the information in the text. Thus the scanner 402 is capable of receiving a message coded in the image which may contain an authorisation code and ID of a device. Alternatively, the scanner 402 may be a barcode reader which is capable of scanning and decoding QR-Code and/or barcodes and providing the decoded information to the controller 404.
  • In another example, instead of encoding the authorisation code and ID information on an image, the information could be stored on a short-range NFC device or RFID tag on the new device 202 or the packaging of the new device. The scanner 402 may then be a NFC or RFID reader which is capable of reading and extracting the information stored on the NFC device or RFID tag.
  • As mentioned above, the message coded in the image may be a link to a database containing the authorisation code and ID of a device. The controller 404 may access the database via the network interface 403. The network interface 403 may be, for example, a WiFi or mobile data interface which allows connection to the internet. The controller 404 may request, via the internet, one or more authorisation codes and associated IDs based on the information retrieved using the scanner 402. In response to the request, the database may send the configuring device 201, via the internet, the one or more of the requested authorisation codes and associated ID and is received via the network interface 403.
  • The controller 404 can control the transceiver 401, scanner 402 and network interface 403 to carry out the verification procedure described above. The controller 404 can be configured to cause the configuring device 201 to carry out the verification and messaging procedures described above. The controller 404 may be configured to carry out the processing described above such as calculating the confirmation values and encryption keys, generating random numbers, comparing the values, etc.
  • The new device 202 may be used with appliances such as light switches, lights, sensors, lire alarms, sensors, thermostats, etc. The new device 202 may comprise a transceiver configured to operate according to a wireless communication protocol such as Bluetooth low energy. The new device 202 may also comprise a memory configured to store data such as the authentication code and device ID, network key, allocated ID, etc. The new device 202 may also comprise a controller that is configured to cause the new device 202 to carry out the verification and messaging procedures described above. The controller and/or transceiver can be configured to cause the new device 202 to not send the authorisation code via transceiver, unless it is encrypted.
  • Devices 201 and 202 may be wireless communication devices that operate according to the same wireless communication protocol. The wireless communication protocol could be a relatively short-range protocol. For example the effective range of each device could be less than 25 m. That characteristic can permit the devices to use less power for transmitting and/or receiving than would be expected in a longer range protocol. In one example, the devices could operate according to the Bluetooth protocol, specifically the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol. The devices could use other protocols, for instance IEEE 802.11.
  • The devices described above could form a mesh network with other wireless communication devices. The devices could be configured to forward some or all messages they receive. The messages could be sent and received via a broadcast packet type defined in the wireless communication protocol. All the devices in the network could be peers in that they have identical roles at a network level.
  • Devices 201 and 202 could operate according to two different wireless communications protocols, e.g. BLE and IEEE 802.11. Devices 201 and 202 may be connected via an IEEE 802.11 network, which can allow secure communication between the two devices. New device 202 may then wish to join a mesh network (that comprises device 201) that is operating according to the BLE protocol. Device 202 may securely transmit a message comprising its authentication code and ID via IEEE 802.11 to device 201. Device 201 can trust this message as it is sent over a secure IEEE 802.11 channel and can use the authentication code received via IEEE 802.11 (instead of via the QR-Code, for example) in the authentication procedure described above for adding the new device 202 to the BLE mesh network.
  • The devices configured in accordance with the examples described herein could be embodied in hardware, software or any suitable combination of hardware and software. The receiving device of the examples described herein could comprise, for example, software for execution at one or more processors (such as at a CPU and/or GPU), and/or one or more dedicated processors (such as ASICs), and/or one or more programmable processors (such as FPGAs) suitably programmed so as to provide functionalities of the data processing system, and/or heterogeneous processors comprising one or more dedicated, programmable and general purpose processing functionalities. In the examples described herein, the devices comprise one or more processors and one or more memories having program code stored thereon, the data processors and the memories being such as to, in combination, provide the claimed data processing systems and/or perform the claimed methods.
  • Data processing units described herein (e.g. controller 404) need not be provided as discrete units and represent functionalities that could (a) be combined in any manner, and (b) themselves comprise one or more data processing entities. Data processing units could be provided by any suitable hardware or software functionalities, or combinations of hardware and software functionalities.
  • Any one of more of the methods described herein could be performed by one or more physical processing units executing program code that causes the unit(s) to perform the data processing methods. Each physical processing unit could be any suitable processor, such as a CPU or GPU (or a core thereof), or fixed function or programmable hardware. The program code could be stored in non-transitory form at a machine readable medium such as an integrated circuit memory, or optical or magnetic storage. A machine readable medium might comprise several memories, such as on-chip memories, computer working memories, and non-volatile storage devices.
  • The applicant hereby discloses in isolation each individual feature described herein and any combination of two or more such features, to the extent that such features or combinations are capable of being carried out based on the present specification as a whole in the light of the common general knowledge of a person skilled in the art, irrespective of whether such features or combinations of features solve any problems disclosed herein, and without limitation to the scope of the claims. The applicant indicates that aspects of the present invention may consist of any such individual feature or combination of features. In view of the foregoing description it will be evident to a person skilled in the art that various modifications may be made within the scope of the invention.

Claims (20)

1. A method for authenticating a first device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the method comprising:
at a second device, receiving a database identifier and sending a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer, the database identifier not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol;
at the second device, receiving a response message from the computer comprising an identifier for the first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device;
at the second device, receiving a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; and
authenticating the first device if the authorisation code received via the response message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.
2. A method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising: at the second device and in response to authenticating the first device, sending an association message to the first device, the association message comprising an encrypted network key by means of which the first device can access a network comprising the second device.
3. A method as claimed in claim 2, further comprising, at the second device:
receiving a public key from the first device; and
calculating an encryption key in dependence the received public key and a private key stored at the second device, the network key being encrypted using the encryption key.
4. A method as claimed in claim 3, said calculation being in accordance with a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange.
5. A method as claimed in claim 1, the database identifier being received via an analysis of an image.
6. A method as claimed in claim 5, the image being a QR-Code, barcode or text representing the database identifier.
7. A method as claimed in claim 5 further comprising, at the second device:
scanning the image, the image representing the database identifier,
sending the request message, via the internet; and
in response to the request, receiving the response message, via the internet.
8. A method as claimed in claim 7, the response message comprising one or more further identifiers and identification codes associated with respective one or more further devices.
9. A method as claimed in claim 1, the value being dependent on an authorisation code stored at the first device.
10. A method as claimed in claim 1, the value being different to the authorisation code.
11. A method as claimed in claim 1, the value being calculated using the predetermined algorithm having as inputs: the authorisation code stored at the first device, a public key of the first device and a random number generated by the first device.
12. A method as claimed in claim 11, said authenticating step comprising:
receiving the random number from the first device;
from the value, authorisation code and the public key, calculating a number according to the predetermined algorithm; and
comparing said calculated number with the received random number and, if said numbers match, authenticating the first device.
13. A method as claimed in claim 1, further comprising: at the first device, broadcasting the identifier for the first device in accordance with the communications protocol.
14. A method as claimed in claim 1, the second message being received via a third device capable of operating according to the communications protocol.
15. A method as claimed in claim 1, the second device being capable of communicating in a mesh network.
16. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the wireless communications protocol is Bluetooth Low Energy protocol.
17. A method as claimed in claim 1, the wireless communications protocol defining a broadcast packet type, said second message being received via a packet of the broadcast packet type.
18. A wireless communications device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the wireless communications device comprising:
an input configured to receive a database identifier, the database identifier not being received from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol;
an interface configured to send a request message comprising the database identifier to a computer and to receive a response message from the computer comprising an identifier for a first device and an authorisation code associated with the first device;
a transceiver capable of operating according to the wireless communications protocol and configured to receive a second message comprising a value, the second message being sent from the first device in accordance with the wireless communications protocol; and
a controller configured to authenticate the first device if the authorisation code received via the response message relates, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the received value.
19. A wireless communications device as claimed in claim 18, the input being a camera or barcode reader configured to analyse an image.
20. A wireless communications device capable of operating according to a wireless communications protocol, the wireless communications device comprising:
a transceiver configured to broadcast an identifier for the device in accordance with the communications protocol, wherein the identifier is associated with a database identifier;
a memory configured to store an authorisation code,
the transceiver being further configured to:
send a first message comprising a value, the value being related, according to a predetermined algorithm, to the authorisation code; and
in response to sending the first message, receive a second message comprising an encrypted network key; and
a controller configured to decrypt the encrypted network key by means of which the device can access a network, wherein the device is configured to not send and not display the authorisation code unencrypted.
US14/316,404 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Device authentication Abandoned US20150245204A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB1403312.0A GB2515853B (en) 2014-02-25 2014-02-25 Latency mitigation
GB1403314.6A GB2512733B (en) 2014-02-25 2014-02-25 Broadcast retransmission
GB1403312.0 2014-02-25
GB1403314.6 2014-02-25
GB1405789.7A GB2512502B (en) 2014-02-25 2014-03-31 Device authentication
GB1405789.7 2014-03-31

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US20150245204A1 true US20150245204A1 (en) 2015-08-27

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Family Applications (14)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US14/270,961 Active 2035-05-12 US10055570B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Mesh relay
US14/270,884 Abandoned US20150244648A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Auto-configuration of a mesh relay's tx/rx schedule
US14/297,324 Active 2034-12-08 US9489506B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-05 Linking ad hoc networks
US14/298,177 Abandoned US20150245203A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-06 Packet identification
US14/316,404 Abandoned US20150245204A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Device authentication
US14/316,529 Abandoned US20150244828A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Thwarting traffic analysis
US14/505,443 Active 2035-06-01 US9754096B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Update management
US14/505,458 Active US9672346B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Object tracking by establishing a mesh network and transmitting packets
US14/505,399 Active 2035-04-03 US9910976B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Processing mesh communications
US14/505,437 Abandoned US20150245369A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Communicating data over a mesh network
US14/505,465 Abandoned US20150244565A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Network configuration
US14/505,418 Abandoned US20150242614A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Provisioning of security credentials
US14/505,466 Abandoned US20150244623A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Mesh profiling
US14/505,454 Expired - Fee Related US9842202B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Device proximity

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US14/270,884 Abandoned US20150244648A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-05-06 Auto-configuration of a mesh relay's tx/rx schedule
US14/297,324 Active 2034-12-08 US9489506B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-05 Linking ad hoc networks
US14/298,177 Abandoned US20150245203A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-06 Packet identification

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US14/316,529 Abandoned US20150244828A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-06-26 Thwarting traffic analysis
US14/505,443 Active 2035-06-01 US9754096B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Update management
US14/505,458 Active US9672346B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Object tracking by establishing a mesh network and transmitting packets
US14/505,399 Active 2035-04-03 US9910976B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Processing mesh communications
US14/505,437 Abandoned US20150245369A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Communicating data over a mesh network
US14/505,465 Abandoned US20150244565A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Network configuration
US14/505,418 Abandoned US20150242614A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Provisioning of security credentials
US14/505,466 Abandoned US20150244623A1 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Mesh profiling
US14/505,454 Expired - Fee Related US9842202B2 (en) 2014-02-25 2014-10-02 Device proximity

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GB2523444A (en) 2015-08-26
GB201405789D0 (en) 2014-05-14
GB201412716D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2513265A (en) 2014-10-22
GB2512256A (en) 2014-09-24
GB2515923A (en) 2015-01-07
GB2512749A (en) 2014-10-08
GB2512781B (en) 2015-08-05
GB201415178D0 (en) 2014-10-08
GB2513048A (en) 2014-10-15
US20150245296A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201405791D0 (en) 2014-05-14
US9842202B2 (en) 2017-12-12
GB2512502B (en) 2015-03-11
DE102014012379B4 (en) 2016-05-12
US20150244828A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2515923A8 (en) 2015-06-17
GB2513048B (en) 2015-08-26
US20150245412A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150245369A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2518120B (en) 2015-09-30
DE102014012518A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150244623A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102015101697A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201412714D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB201412722D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2517844A (en) 2015-03-04
GB2512256B8 (en) 2015-07-01
US9672346B2 (en) 2017-06-06
GB201405790D0 (en) 2014-05-14
GB201412719D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2523444B (en) 2016-05-18
GB201412718D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2512256A8 (en) 2015-07-01
US20150245182A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102015101620A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2512256B (en) 2015-04-15
GB2512501A (en) 2014-10-01
US10055570B2 (en) 2018-08-21
GB2512543B (en) 2015-02-11
DE102014012258A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102015101699B4 (en) 2019-12-24
GB2512749B (en) 2015-04-01
GB201415177D0 (en) 2014-10-08
GB201412717D0 (en) 2014-09-03
GB2515923B (en) 2015-06-03
DE102014012257B4 (en) 2015-12-03
GB2512747A (en) 2014-10-08
DE102015101698A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2513265B (en) 2016-10-26
DE102014012252A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2517844B (en) 2015-09-09
GB2512748A (en) 2014-10-08
GB2518120A (en) 2015-03-11
GB2512502A (en) 2014-10-01
US20150244648A1 (en) 2015-08-27
DE102014013471A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201501075D0 (en) 2015-03-11
US20150244565A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201405785D0 (en) 2014-05-14
DE102014012379A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150245220A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB201405797D0 (en) 2014-05-14
DE102014012257A1 (en) 2015-08-27
US20150242614A1 (en) 2015-08-27
GB2512748B (en) 2015-02-18
GB201405786D0 (en) 2014-05-14

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