US20140073296A1 - Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier Download PDF

Info

Publication number
US20140073296A1
US20140073296A1 US14/085,353 US201314085353A US2014073296A1 US 20140073296 A1 US20140073296 A1 US 20140073296A1 US 201314085353 A US201314085353 A US 201314085353A US 2014073296 A1 US2014073296 A1 US 2014073296A1
Authority
US
United States
Prior art keywords
instance
cscf
urn
uuid
devid
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
US14/085,353
Inventor
Sean Kendall Schneyer
Fredrik Lindholm
Alf Heidermark
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Original Assignee
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB filed Critical Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Priority to US14/085,353 priority Critical patent/US20140073296A1/en
Publication of US20140073296A1 publication Critical patent/US20140073296A1/en
Assigned to TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL) reassignment TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL) ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HEIDERMARK, ALF, LINDHOLM, FREDRIK, SCHNEYER, SEAN KENDALL
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L61/00Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
    • H04L61/30Managing network names, e.g. use of aliases or nicknames
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066Session management
    • H04L65/1073Registration or de-registration
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066Session management
    • H04L65/1083In-session procedures
    • H04L65/1095Inter-network session transfer or sharing
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2101/00Indexing scheme associated with group H04L61/00
    • H04L2101/60Types of network addresses
    • H04L2101/604Address structures or formats
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/71Hardware identity

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to SIP based communication and data systems.
  • the abbreviations used herein shall have the following meanings:
  • CSCF Call Session Control Function
  • DevID Device Identifier
  • GRUU Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URIs
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • I-CSCF Interrogating CSCF
  • IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • MEID Mobile Equipment Identifier
  • MSC Mobile Switching Center
  • NSS Name Space Specific string
  • P-CSCF Proxy CSCF
  • S-CSCF Serving CSCF
  • SCC AS Service Centralization and Continuity Application Server
  • SIP Session Initiation Protocol
  • UE User Equipment
  • UUID Universally Unique Identifier
  • a software based client is not directly tied to a specific physical device and may execute on top of any suitable platform such as a personal computer or advanced mobile device. For example, when transferring a call, one may wish to target a specific device such as a user's mobile device.
  • a Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URN (GRUU) is assigned to the mobile device by the registrar (which is the S-CSCF in an IMS system).
  • the registrar In order to properly assign the GRUU, the registrar uses an Instance ID that is provided by the mobile device during registration.
  • IMS Centralized Services IMS Centralized Services
  • CS circuit-switched
  • an ICS device may also be able to register directly (in IMS) when it is using packet-switched (PS) access, it is desirable that the Instance ID that is used by the network be identical to the Instance ID that is used by the device when performing registration. This will ensure that the same GRUU is assigned to the device.
  • the current IMS specifications do not provide any specific guidance on how either the device or the network are to create the Instance ID.
  • the only guidance that is provided is that the Instance ID must match the format described in the IETF Outbound draft. Therefore, the current specifications do not ensure that the Instance ID used by the network will match the Instance ID used by the device.
  • the current IMS specifications do not provide any guidance on how the registrar shall generate the GRUU from the Instance ID. This can lead to the generation of different GRUUs depending on which S-CSCF is assigned during registration, if different S-CSCF vendors choose to generate the GRUU in different ways.
  • a possible Instance ID would be to use an already existing equipment identity from the terminal, such as the IMEI, as the Instance ID.
  • the S-CSCF were to simply use the Instance ID unchanged as the GRUU, as provided as an example in draft-ietf-sip-gruu-15, then this would expose the DevID to other users during session establishment. This could be considered a privacy violation and could be used to clone the equipment. Therefore, directly using an existing device identity such as the IMEI is not recommended from a privacy and security point of view.
  • the present invention is a method for creating Instance IDs that ensures that the Instance IDs are consistent whether they are created by the device or by the network.
  • the invention protects the user's privacy.
  • the creation of the Instance ID is based on the principle of using a unique identifier that belongs to the device but is also known to the network (referred to herein as a DevID).
  • the creation of the Instance ID or GRUU is based on the principles of using a hash to protect the DevID; and using a shared namespace that is used by both the network and the device when encoding the DevID into an Instance ID.
  • the Instance ID would not contain information about the DevID passed in the clear.
  • an alternative embodiment of the present invention describes an approach that can be used to provide some level of privacy even when the DevID is initially sent in the clear during registration.
  • the embodiments of the present invention have at least two approaches for addressing the privacy concerns: (1) Defining a mechanism for creating an Instance ID which does not reveal any information about the actual DevID—This allows the Instance ID to be directly used as the GRUU; and (2) Defining a mechanism where, if the Instance ID contains the DevID in the clear, that the registrar manipulates the Instance ID in order to generate the GRUU. This provides privacy for DevID in non-registration signaling from the UE.
  • FIG. 1 is a table illustrating a UUID String Representation
  • FIG. 2 is a table illustrating a Name space definition for IMEI or other device ID based UUID creation
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the elements of an IMEI structure
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the elements of an IMEISV structure
  • FIG. 5 illustrates the elements of an MEID structure
  • FIG. 6 is a messaging diagram illustrating device registration with protected DevID in Instance ID
  • FIG. 7 is a message header showing an example REGISTER with Instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 8 is a messaging diagram illustrating the messages/commands occurring during network registration on behalf of a CS UE with protected DevID in Instance ID;
  • FIG. 9 is a message header illustrating the example REGISTER with an Instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 10 illustrates device registration with an unprotected DevID in the Instance ID
  • FIG. 11 is a message header illustrating the example REGISTER with instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 12 is an example 200 (OK) with GRUU;
  • FIG. 13 illustrates the steps of a network registration on behalf of a CS UE with an unprotected DevID in Instance ID
  • FIG. 14 is an example REGISTER with instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 15 is an example 200 (OK) with GRUU;
  • FIG. 16 is a system implementing an embodiment of the present invention when the UE is connected via CS access;
  • FIG. 17 is a system implementing an embodiment of the present invention when the UE is connected via PS access;
  • FIG. 18 is a UE for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 19 is an MSC Server for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the embodiments described herein provide specific details for the creation of an Instance ID that ensures uniqueness of the ID, while ensuring the privacy of the existing equipment identities. Such embodiments also provide a mechanism to ensure that the network (e.g., an MSC Server) and the device create identical Instance IDs that are used in the creation of a GRUU.
  • the present invention makes use of the UUID format defined in RFC 4122.
  • the present invention provides a mechanism for the network to provide privacy for the DevID even when this ID is not protected in the Instance ID that is sent to the network during registration. This part of the invention uses the same techniques that are employed when the UE or MSC Server protects the DevID, however, these techniques are performed by the registrar (S-CSCF).
  • the device described with respect to an embodiment of the present invention is assumed to be a 3GPP mobile device that supports GRUU and the creation of an Instance ID.
  • the present invention is applicable to any device where the network and the device share knowledge of a device-specific identifier.
  • the DevID may be derived from the IMEI.
  • the DevID may be derived from the MEID or ESN.
  • the DevID is created based on the private user identity of the device.
  • a device may be represented by several private user identities towards the registrar such as one from the UE over the PS access, and one from the MSC Server registering on behalf of the user.
  • the UE and the network performing the registration select the DevID based on the private ID used by the network.
  • the name-based version of the UUID is used as described in RFC 4122.
  • Either version 3 or version 5 can be used; the only difference is the type of hashing that is used (MD5 and SHA-1, respectively).
  • the Instance ID is constructed as a UUID URI using the string representation of a UUID as described in RFC 4122.
  • Table 200 of FIG. 2 provides the definition of a name space that is used as an example in this embodiment.
  • the IMEI is composed of the following elements (each element shall consist of decimal digits only):
  • TAC Type Allocation Code
  • Serial Number is an individual serial number uniquely identifying each equipment within the TAC. Its length is 6 digits;
  • Spare digit (check digit): This digit is used as a Luhn checksum digit and is not transmitted with the IMEI.
  • the IMEI (14 digits) is complemented by a check digit.
  • the check digit is not part of the digits transmitted.
  • the IMEISV is composed of the following elements (each element shall consist of decimal digits only):
  • TAC Type Allocation Code
  • Serial Number is an individual serial number uniquely identifying each equipment within each TAC. Its length is 6 digits;
  • SSN Software Version Number identifies the software version number of the mobile equipment. Its length is 2 digits.
  • CD valid range 0.
  • F The Check Digit (CD) is not part of the MEID and is not transmitted when the MEID is transmitted.
  • Additional Identifier alternative can be generated for devices without unique device IDs.
  • Private ID solution access agnostic
  • a device specific ID such as an IMEI
  • the private identity can be used instead.
  • the private identity takes the form of a Network Access Identifier (NAI) as defined in RFC 4282.
  • NAI Network Access Identifier
  • An example private identity for IMS is: user1_private@home1.net.
  • the present invention is directed to protecting the DevID at the UE or MSC Server even during registration. Therefore, the DevID shall be encoded using the following steps in accordance with the method of the present invention:
  • MD5 hash algorithm
  • NOTE The network and the device must use the same hash algorithm.
  • the only criteria for the DevID is that it is unique to the device and is also known by the network.
  • This UUID URN is the Instance ID to be used for this device and by the network when registering on behalf of this device.
  • FIGS. 6 and 8 illustrate call flows using the method of the present invention. These example call flows show an IMS-based network architecture, however, the present invention also applies to non-IMS architectures as well.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a call flow 600 when the mobile device registers itself directly in IMS (towards the registrar) using PS access with the protected DevID in the Instance ID.
  • FIG. 6 the basic registration flow in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention is shown. As seen therein, the steps of the signaling flow are as follows:
  • Step 601 1. Construct Instance ID: UE A creates an Instance ID derived from its IMEI as described herein;
  • Step 602 2.
  • REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): (using a message header 700 as seen in FIG. 7 );
  • Step 603 3. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF;
  • Step 604 4.
  • Cx User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF;
  • Step 605 5.
  • REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF;
  • Step 606 6. 401 (Unauthorized) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF challenges the registration request;
  • Step 607 7. 401 (Unauthorized) (I-CSCF to P-CSCF): The I-CSCF forwards the response to the P-CSCF;
  • Step 608 8. 401 (Unauthorized) (P-CSCF to UE A): The P-CSCF forwards the response to UE A;
  • Step 609 9. REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): UE A resends the REGISTER request (referred to in Step 602 ), this time with authentication credentials;
  • Step 610 10. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF;
  • Step 611 User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF;
  • Step 612 12.
  • REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF;
  • Step 613 13.
  • Cx S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF;
  • Step 614 14.
  • Construct GRUU The S-CSCF (acting as the registrar) constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was created in Step 601 .
  • the GRUU is constructed as defined in draft-ietf-sip-gruu;
  • Step 615 15. 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful.
  • the 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step;
  • Step 616 16.
  • Step 617 17.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a call flow 800 when the network registers on behalf of a device that is using CS access with protected DevID in Instance ID.
  • the functionality of the present invention improves the flow described in 3GPP TS 24.292.
  • the steps of such call flow are as follows:
  • Step 801 1. CS attach (UE A to MSC);
  • Step 802 2. Authentication and Update Location (MSC/VLR to HLR/HSS);
  • Step 803 3. CS attach accept (MSC to UE A);
  • Step 804 The MSC Server evaluates whether it needs to perform registration with IMS. This can be based on subscriber data received from the HSS/HLR;
  • Step 805 The MSC Server derives a home network domain name.
  • the home network domain is used to perform DNS queries to locate the I-CSCF in the home network;
  • Step 806 6. Construct Instance ID: The MSC Server creates an Instance ID derived from the IMEI of UE A as described in this invention.
  • Step 807 7.
  • REGISTER request (MSC Server to I-CSCF): (using a message header 900 as seen in FIG. 9 ). The purpose of this request is to register a private user identity and a temporary public user identity derived for this subscriber on behalf of the user with a S-CSCF in the home network. This request is routed to the I-CSCF in the home network;
  • Step 808 8.
  • Cx User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF;
  • Step 809 9. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF;
  • Step 810 10.
  • Cx S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF;
  • Step 811 11.
  • Construct GRUU The S-CSCF, acting as the registrar, constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was created in Step 806 .
  • the GRUU is constructed as defined in draft-ietf-sip-gruu. Because this Instance ID used was the same that the device would have generated, the GRUU that is created will also be identical to one that would be returned to a device registering directly;
  • Step 812 12.
  • the 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step;
  • Step 813 13.
  • 200 (OK) (I-CSCF to MSC Server): The I-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to the MSC Server indicating that Registration was successful.
  • the DevID would be protected even during registration, however there may be circumstances where the DevID is sent in the clear as the Instance ID during registration.
  • the DevID is sent in the clear as the Instance ID during registration.
  • This additional embodiment of the present invention uses the same techniques that were described above for the creation of an Instance ID which protected the DevID. However, in this scenario the registrar (S-CSCF) will apply those techniques to the creation of the GRUU instead of the Instance ID.
  • any Instance ID must use a URN scheme.
  • an RFC 4122 based URN can be used when sending a protected DevID as the Instance ID.
  • RFC 4122 based URN can be used when sending a protected DevID as the Instance ID.
  • the final format of such a URN may not be identical to the examples presented herein, however the principles described should still apply to other formats that carry the same information.
  • the zero (0) at the end represents the spare digit which is always transmitted as zero (0).
  • the registrar uses the received URN format in the Instance ID (+sip.instance) to determine what handling to apply.
  • receipt of the urn:gsma:imei would be a trigger to apply the procedures outlined in the present invention.
  • the REGISTER message has arrived at the S-CSCF and the S-CSCF has identified that the Instance ID contains a DevID sent in the clear based on the URN scheme used in the Instance ID. (In the provided example that would be “urn:gsma:imei”.)
  • MD5 hash algorithm
  • SHA-1 hash algorithm
  • Extract the TAC and SNR from the IMEI The IMEI structure in the URN is shown in the example above.
  • the TAC and SNR are used and the spare digit is omitted for a total of 14 digits used. By omitting the spare digit, this technique is also applicable to the IMEISV where the SVN is omitted.
  • This UUID URN is the GRUU to be assigned based on the received Instance ID.
  • the only criteria is that the contents of the Instance ID be unique to the device and not change over time.
  • MD5 hash algorithm
  • SHA-1 hash algorithm
  • This hashed value is the GRUU to be assigned based on the received Instance ID.
  • FIG. 10 illustrates the steps when the mobile device registers itself directly in IMS, towards the registrar, using PS access. This provides the basic registration flow for a device implementing the present invention. As seen therein, the signaling flows are as follows:
  • Step 1001 1. Construct Instance ID: UE A creates an Instance ID using a URN format which transports the IMEI in clear text.
  • Step 1002 2.
  • REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): (using a message header 1100 as seen in FIG. 11 );
  • Step 1003 3. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF.
  • Step 1004 4.
  • Cx User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF.
  • Step 1005 5.
  • REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF.
  • Step 1006 6. 401 (Unauthorized) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF challenges the registration request.
  • Step 1007 7. 401 (Unauthorized) (I-CSCF to P-CSCF): The I-CSCF forwards the response to the P-CSCF.
  • Step 1008 8. 401 (Unauthorized) (P-CSCF to UE A): The P-CSCF forwards the response to UE A.
  • Step 1009 9. REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): UE A resends the REGISTER request (depicted in Step 1002 ), this time with authentication credentials.
  • Step 1010 10.
  • REGISTER request P-CSCF to I-CSCF: The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF.
  • Step 1011 11.
  • Cx User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF.
  • Step 1012 12.
  • REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF.
  • Step 1013 13.
  • Cx S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF.
  • Step 1014 14.
  • Construct GRUU The S-CSCF (acting as the registrar) constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was sent in Step 1001 above.
  • the GRUU shall be constructed as defined by the present invention (see Steps for GRUU creation by the registrar (S-CSCF) when the DevID is not protected during registration).
  • Step 1015 15. 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful.
  • the 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step (using a message header 1200 as seen in FIG. 12 );
  • Step 1016 16.
  • Step 1017 17.
  • FIG. 13 illustrates the second flow when the network registers on behalf of a device that is using CS access. This enhances a flow found in 3GPP TS 24.292 by adding the functionality provided by the present invention.
  • the steps of the signaling flows are as follows:
  • Step 1301 CS attach (UE A to MSC)
  • Step 1302 Authentication and Update Location (MSC/VLR to HLR/HSS)
  • Step 1303 CS attach accept (MSC to UE A)
  • IMS Registration evaluation The MSC Server evaluates whether it needs to perform registration with IMS. This can be based on subscriber data received from the HSS/HLR.
  • Step 1305 IMS address discovery: The MSC Server derives a home network domain name. The home network domain is used to perform DNS queries to locate the I-CSCF in the home network.
  • Step 1306 Construct Instance ID: The MSC Server creates an Instance ID using a URN format which transports the IMEI in clear text.
  • Step 1307 7 REGISTER request (MSC Server to I-CSCF): The purpose of this request is to register a private user identity and a temporary public user identity derived for this subscriber on behalf of the user with a S-CSCF in the home network. This request is routed to the I-CSCF in the home network.
  • Step 1308 8 User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF. (using a message header 1400 as seen in FIG. 14 );
  • Step 1309 REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF.
  • Step 1310 10 Cx: S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF.
  • Step 1311 Construct GRUU: The S-CSCF (acting as the registrar) constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was sent in Step 1306 above.
  • the GRUU shall be constructed as defined by this invention (see Steps for GRUU creation by the registrar (S-CSCF) when the DevID is not protected during registration).
  • Step 1312 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful.
  • the 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step (using a message header 1500 as seen in FIG. 15 );
  • Step 1313 200 (OK) (I-CSCF to MSC Server): The I-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to the MSC Server indicating that Registration was successful.
  • FIG. 16 is a system 1600 , implementing an embodiment of the present invention when a UE 1601 is connected via CS access 1602 and the network creates the ID in the MSC server 1603 .
  • FIG. 17 is a system 1700 implementing an embodiment of the present invention when a UE 1701 is connected via PS access 1702 and the UE 1701 creates the ID in the UE 1701 directly.
  • FIG. 18 is a UE 1800 for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the data used to create the ID can be e.g., the IMEI, MEID, or the Private ID.
  • the UE 1800 would also contain the shared namespace to create the ID.
  • FIG. 19 is an MSC server 1900 for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the data used to create the ID can be e.g., the IMEI, MEID, or the Private ID.
  • the MSC server 1900 would also contain the shared namespace to create the ID.
  • the present invention has numerous advantages. It ensures that any Instance ID created by a network will be identical to an Instance ID created by the device. This, in turn, results in the same GRUU being defined regardless of how the device was registered (directly or by the network).
  • the present invention provides specific steps to outline the creation of the Instance ID, particularly in the case of an IMS system. In this manner, it fills a gap in the existing 3GPP specifications. The present invention thus ensures consistent behavior for IMS-based services such as ICS. Further, the use of a hash to derive the Instance ID protects the device specific identifier, such as the IMEI and MEID, which in turn protects the integrity of this device specific identifier, thus enhancing security.

Abstract

A method and apparatus for use in a communications network whereby an Instance Identifier (ID) is created to uniquely identify a device such as a mobile device or User Equipment (UE) in the communications network.

Description

    CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
  • This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/426,429 filed on Apr. 20, 2009, which is a divisional of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/211,607 filed Sep. 16, 2008, U.S. Pat. No. 8,135,386, and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/079,293 filed Jun. 9, 2008 and U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/103,134 filed Oct. 6, 2008, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.
  • STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT: NOT APPLICABLE REFERENCE TO SEQUENCE LISTING, A TABLE, OR A COMPUTER PROGRAM LISTING COMPACT DISC APPENDIX: NOT APPLICABLE BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
  • The present invention relates to SIP based communication and data systems. The abbreviations used herein shall have the following meanings:
  • CS: Circuit Switched
  • CSCF: Call Session Control Function
  • DevID: Device Identifier
  • ESN: Electronic Serial Number
  • GRUU: Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URIs
  • HSS: Home Subscriber Server
  • I-CSCF: Interrogating CSCF
  • ICS: IMS Centralized Services
  • ID: Identifier
  • IMEI: International Mobile Equipment Identity
  • IMEISV: IMEI Software Version
  • IMS: IP Multimedia Subsystem
  • IP: Internet Protocol
  • MEID: Mobile Equipment Identifier
  • MSC: Mobile Switching Center
  • NAI: Network Access Identifier
  • NSS: Name Space Specific string
  • P-CSCF: Proxy CSCF
  • PS: Packet Switched
  • S-CSCF: Serving CSCF
  • SCC AS: Service Centralization and Continuity Application Server
  • SIP: Session Initiation Protocol
  • SNR: Serial Number
  • TAC: Type Allocation Code
  • UA: User Agent
  • UE: User Equipment
  • URI: Uniform Resource Identifiers
  • URN: Uniform Resource Name
  • UUID: Universally Unique Identifier
  • In SIP-based systems, such as IMS, it would be advantageous to be able to target a request to a specific device, such as a mobile device, fixed line device, or an instance of a software based client. A software based client is not directly tied to a specific physical device and may execute on top of any suitable platform such as a personal computer or advanced mobile device. For example, when transferring a call, one may wish to target a specific device such as a user's mobile device.
  • In order to achieve this objective, a Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URN (GRUU) is assigned to the mobile device by the registrar (which is the S-CSCF in an IMS system). In order to properly assign the GRUU, the registrar uses an Instance ID that is provided by the mobile device during registration.
  • Current specifications assume that the device being targeted with the GRUU will always be the one that is performing the registration. However, with the introduction of IMS Centralized Services (ICS), it is possible that the network will register (in IMS) on behalf of the device when the device is using circuit-switched (CS) access. In the case of ICS, the MSC Server is the network entity that registers on behalf of the CS subscriber.
  • Since an ICS device may also be able to register directly (in IMS) when it is using packet-switched (PS) access, it is desirable that the Instance ID that is used by the network be identical to the Instance ID that is used by the device when performing registration. This will ensure that the same GRUU is assigned to the device.
  • The current IMS specifications (such as 24.229) do not provide any specific guidance on how either the device or the network are to create the Instance ID. The only guidance that is provided is that the Instance ID must match the format described in the IETF Outbound draft. Therefore, the current specifications do not ensure that the Instance ID used by the network will match the Instance ID used by the device.
  • Additionally, the current IMS specifications do not provide any guidance on how the registrar shall generate the GRUU from the Instance ID. This can lead to the generation of different GRUUs depending on which S-CSCF is assigned during registration, if different S-CSCF vendors choose to generate the GRUU in different ways.
  • A possible Instance ID would be to use an already existing equipment identity from the terminal, such as the IMEI, as the Instance ID. In the case that the S-CSCF were to simply use the Instance ID unchanged as the GRUU, as provided as an example in draft-ietf-sip-gruu-15, then this would expose the DevID to other users during session establishment. This could be considered a privacy violation and could be used to clone the equipment. Therefore, directly using an existing device identity such as the IMEI is not recommended from a privacy and security point of view.
  • It would be advantageous to have a method and apparatus for an instance ID based on a unique device identifier that overcomes the disadvantages of the prior art. The present invention provides such a method and apparatus.
  • BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • In one embodiment, the present invention is a method for creating Instance IDs that ensures that the Instance IDs are consistent whether they are created by the device or by the network. At the same time, the invention protects the user's privacy. To ensure consistency, the creation of the Instance ID is based on the principle of using a unique identifier that belongs to the device but is also known to the network (referred to herein as a DevID). To ensure privacy, the creation of the Instance ID or GRUU is based on the principles of using a hash to protect the DevID; and using a shared namespace that is used by both the network and the device when encoding the DevID into an Instance ID. Optimally, the Instance ID would not contain information about the DevID passed in the clear. However, because it may not be possible to mandate that the UE protect the Instance ID as described in an embodiment of the present invention, it is necessary to also describe procedures for the registrar to provide some level of protection. As such, an alternative embodiment of the present invention describes an approach that can be used to provide some level of privacy even when the DevID is initially sent in the clear during registration.
  • Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention have at least two approaches for addressing the privacy concerns: (1) Defining a mechanism for creating an Instance ID which does not reveal any information about the actual DevID—This allows the Instance ID to be directly used as the GRUU; and (2) Defining a mechanism where, if the Instance ID contains the DevID in the clear, that the registrar manipulates the Instance ID in order to generate the GRUU. This provides privacy for DevID in non-registration signaling from the UE.
  • BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS
  • In the following section, the invention will be described with reference to exemplary embodiments illustrated in the figures, in which:
  • FIG. 1 is a table illustrating a UUID String Representation;
  • FIG. 2 is a table illustrating a Name space definition for IMEI or other device ID based UUID creation;
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the elements of an IMEI structure;
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the elements of an IMEISV structure;
  • FIG. 5 illustrates the elements of an MEID structure;
  • FIG. 6 is a messaging diagram illustrating device registration with protected DevID in Instance ID;
  • FIG. 7 is a message header showing an example REGISTER with Instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 8 is a messaging diagram illustrating the messages/commands occurring during network registration on behalf of a CS UE with protected DevID in Instance ID;
  • FIG. 9 is a message header illustrating the example REGISTER with an Instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 10 illustrates device registration with an unprotected DevID in the Instance ID;
  • FIG. 11 is a message header illustrating the example REGISTER with instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 12 is an example 200 (OK) with GRUU;
  • FIG. 13 illustrates the steps of a network registration on behalf of a CS UE with an unprotected DevID in Instance ID;
  • FIG. 14 is an example REGISTER with instance ID (sip.instance);
  • FIG. 15 is an example 200 (OK) with GRUU;
  • FIG. 16 is a system implementing an embodiment of the present invention when the UE is connected via CS access;
  • FIG. 17 is a system implementing an embodiment of the present invention when the UE is connected via PS access;
  • FIG. 18 is a UE for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention; and
  • FIG. 19 is an MSC Server for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention.
  • DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
  • The embodiments described herein provide specific details for the creation of an Instance ID that ensures uniqueness of the ID, while ensuring the privacy of the existing equipment identities. Such embodiments also provide a mechanism to ensure that the network (e.g., an MSC Server) and the device create identical Instance IDs that are used in the creation of a GRUU. In one embodiment, the present invention makes use of the UUID format defined in RFC 4122. Additionally, the present invention provides a mechanism for the network to provide privacy for the DevID even when this ID is not protected in the Instance ID that is sent to the network during registration. This part of the invention uses the same techniques that are employed when the UE or MSC Server protects the DevID, however, these techniques are performed by the registrar (S-CSCF).
  • The device described with respect to an embodiment of the present invention is assumed to be a 3GPP mobile device that supports GRUU and the creation of an Instance ID. However the present invention is applicable to any device where the network and the device share knowledge of a device-specific identifier. In the case of a 3GPP compliant mobile device, the DevID may be derived from the IMEI. For a 3GPP2 compliant device, the DevID may be derived from the MEID or ESN.
  • For soft clients, and clients not fully conforming to the mobile standards, the IMEI (or equivalent) might not be available. Hence, in another embodiment of the invention, the DevID is created based on the private user identity of the device. In such a scenario, a device may be represented by several private user identities towards the registrar such as one from the UE over the PS access, and one from the MSC Server registering on behalf of the user. To ensure a consistent behavior, both the UE and the network performing the registration, select the DevID based on the private ID used by the network. An advantage of using the private ID from the network as the DevID is that it becomes agnostic to the type of CS access used.
  • Implementation Aspects Common to 3GPP and 3GPP2 Embodiments
  • In both 3GPP and 3GPP2 embodiments, the name-based version of the UUID is used as described in RFC 4122. Either version 3 or version 5 can be used; the only difference is the type of hashing that is used (MD5 and SHA-1, respectively).
  • As seen in Table 100 of FIG. 1, the Instance ID is constructed as a UUID URI using the string representation of a UUID as described in RFC 4122.
  • In order to create the final Instance ID, a name space ID is required. Table 200 of FIG. 2 provides the definition of a name space that is used as an example in this embodiment.
  • Unique Device Identifiers Based on the Various Standardization Fora
  • In 3GPP, the IMEI is composed of the following elements (each element shall consist of decimal digits only):
  • Type Allocation Code (TAC). Its length is 8 digits;
  • Serial Number (SNR) is an individual serial number uniquely identifying each equipment within the TAC. Its length is 6 digits; and
  • Spare digit (check digit): This digit is used as a Luhn checksum digit and is not transmitted with the IMEI.
  • The IMEI (14 digits) is complemented by a check digit. The check digit is not part of the digits transmitted.
  • An example DevID derivation is as follows:
  • 3GPP IMEI:
  • TAC: 35196500
  • SNR: 718917
  • Check Digit: 7
  • DevID=TAC+SNR=35196500718917
  • The IMEISV is composed of the following elements (each element shall consist of decimal digits only):
  • Type Allocation Code (TAC). Its length is 8 digits;
  • Serial Number (SNR) is an individual serial number uniquely identifying each equipment within each TAC. Its length is 6 digits;
  • Software Version Number (SVN) identifies the software version number of the mobile equipment. Its length is 2 digits.
  • An example DevID derivation is as follows:
  • 3GPP EMEISV:
  • TAC: 35196500
  • SNR: 718917
  • SVN: 04
  • DevID=TAC+SNR=35196500718917
  • In 3GPP2, for the MEID, all of these fields are defined as hexadecimal values with the following valid range.
  • NN—valid range A0-FF—globally administered
  • TTTTTT—valid range 000000-FFFFFF
  • ZZZZZZ—valid range 000000-FFFFFF
  • CD—valid range 0. F—The Check Digit (CD) is not part of the MEID and is not transmitted when the MEID is transmitted.
  • An example DevID derivation is as follows:
  • 3GPP2 MEID:
  • TAC: A1000000
  • SNR: 3F0D50
  • CD:
  • DevID=TAC+SNR=A10000003F0D50
  • Additional Identifier alternative can be generated for devices without unique device IDs.
  • Non-3GPP and Non-3GPP2 Implementation
  • In an embodiment of a Private ID solution (access agnostic), there may not be a device specific ID, such as an IMEI, available to the client. This would be the case when using a soft client, for example. In this case, the private identity can be used instead.
  • The private identity takes the form of a Network Access Identifier (NAI) as defined in RFC 4282. An example private identity for IMS is: user1_private@home1.net.
  • An example DevID derivation is as follows:
  • Private ID:
  • Private ID: user1_private@home1.net
  • DevID=Private ID=user1_private@home1.net
  • Instance ID Creation when Providing DevID Protection in the UE or Network (MSC Server)
  • The following describes the Instance ID creation when providing DevID protection in the UE or network (MSC Server). As previously described, the present invention is directed to protecting the DevID at the UE or MSC Server even during registration. Therefore, the DevID shall be encoded using the following steps in accordance with the method of the present invention:
  • Steps for creation of Instance ID at the UE or network (MSC Server) using a device specific ID, in this example using the IMEI as defined in 3GPP:
  • Choose a hash algorithm (MD5 or SHA-1). The following example uses MD5. (NOTE: The network and the device must use the same hash algorithm.)
  • Create a DevID by extracting the TAC and SNR from the IMEI (the IMEI structure is shown in FIG. 1). The TAC and SNR are used and the spare digit shall be omitted for a total of 14 digits used. By omitting the spare digit, this technique is also applicable to the IMEISV where the SVN shall be omitted as seen in FIG. 2.
  • In the case of non-3GPP devices where something other than IMEI is used, the only criteria for the DevID is that it is unique to the device and is also known by the network.
  • Place the name space ID (see name space ID defined in Table 2) and DevID in network byte order.
  • Concatenate the Name Space ID and DevID
  • Compute the hash of the concatenated string using the preselected hash algorithm.
  • Set the UUID fields as specified in RFC 4122 subclause 4.3 using the hash as computed above and create the string representation as show in clause 3 of the RFC.
  • Place the string representation in urn form by prepending “urn:uuid” to the above string. Example: urn:uuid:3647f493-4948-abe2-6599-7c295ab29804
  • This UUID URN is the Instance ID to be used for this device and by the network when registering on behalf of this device.
  • Example Call Flows Providing DevID Protection in the UE or Network (MSC Server)
  • FIGS. 6 and 8 illustrate call flows using the method of the present invention. These example call flows show an IMS-based network architecture, however, the present invention also applies to non-IMS architectures as well.
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a call flow 600 when the mobile device registers itself directly in IMS (towards the registrar) using PS access with the protected DevID in the Instance ID. Referring now to FIG. 6, the basic registration flow in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention is shown. As seen therein, the steps of the signaling flow are as follows:
  • Step 601: 1. Construct Instance ID: UE A creates an Instance ID derived from its IMEI as described herein;
  • Step 602: 2. REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): (using a message header 700 as seen in FIG. 7);
  • Step 603: 3. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF;
  • Step 604: 4. Cx: User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF;
  • Step 605: 5. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF;
  • Step 606: 6. 401 (Unauthorized) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF challenges the registration request;
  • Step 607: 7. 401 (Unauthorized) (I-CSCF to P-CSCF): The I-CSCF forwards the response to the P-CSCF;
  • Step 608: 8. 401 (Unauthorized) (P-CSCF to UE A): The P-CSCF forwards the response to UE A;
  • Step 609: 9. REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): UE A resends the REGISTER request (referred to in Step 602), this time with authentication credentials;
  • Step 610: 10. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF;
  • Step 611: 11. Cx: User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF;
  • Step 612: 12. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF;
  • Step 613: 13. Cx: S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF;
  • Step 614: 14. Construct GRUU: The S-CSCF (acting as the registrar) constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was created in Step 601. The GRUU is constructed as defined in draft-ietf-sip-gruu;
  • Step 615: 15. 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful. The 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step;
  • Step 616: 16. 200 (OK) (I-CSCF to P-CSCF): The I-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to the P-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful; and
  • Step 617: 17. 200 (OK) (P-CSCF to UE A): The P-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to UE A indicating that Registration was successful.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a call flow 800 when the network registers on behalf of a device that is using CS access with protected DevID in Instance ID. The functionality of the present invention improves the flow described in 3GPP TS 24.292. The steps of such call flow are as follows:
  • Step 801: 1. CS attach (UE A to MSC);
  • Step 802: 2. Authentication and Update Location (MSC/VLR to HLR/HSS);
  • Step 803: 3. CS attach accept (MSC to UE A);
  • Step 804: 4. IMS Registration evaluation: The MSC Server evaluates whether it needs to perform registration with IMS. This can be based on subscriber data received from the HSS/HLR;
  • Step 805: 5. IMS address discovery: The MSC Server derives a home network domain name. The home network domain is used to perform DNS queries to locate the I-CSCF in the home network;
  • Step 806: 6. Construct Instance ID: The MSC Server creates an Instance ID derived from the IMEI of UE A as described in this invention;
  • Step 807: 7. REGISTER request (MSC Server to I-CSCF): (using a message header 900 as seen in FIG. 9). The purpose of this request is to register a private user identity and a temporary public user identity derived for this subscriber on behalf of the user with a S-CSCF in the home network. This request is routed to the I-CSCF in the home network;
  • Step 808: 8. Cx: User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF;
  • Step 809: 9. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF;
  • Step 810: 10. Cx: S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF;
  • Step 811: 11. Construct GRUU: The S-CSCF, acting as the registrar, constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was created in Step 806. The GRUU is constructed as defined in draft-ietf-sip-gruu. Because this Instance ID used was the same that the device would have generated, the GRUU that is created will also be identical to one that would be returned to a device registering directly;
  • Step 812: 12. 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful. The 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step; and
  • Step 813: 13. 200 (OK) (I-CSCF to MSC Server): The I-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to the MSC Server indicating that Registration was successful.
  • GRUU Creation by the Registrar (S-CSCF) when the DevID is Not Protected During Registration
  • Optimally, the DevID would be protected even during registration, however there may be circumstances where the DevID is sent in the clear as the Instance ID during registration. In order to provide some level of privacy protection for the user it is necessary to define procedures in the network for constructing the GRUU based on this Instance ID in a way that does not reveal the DevID.
  • This additional embodiment of the present invention uses the same techniques that were described above for the creation of an Instance ID which protected the DevID. However, in this scenario the registrar (S-CSCF) will apply those techniques to the creation of the GRUU instead of the Instance ID.
  • DevID Format when Transported in the Clear in an Instance ID
  • As specified in a draft-ietf-sip-outbound, any Instance ID must use a URN scheme. Hereinabove is described how an RFC 4122 based URN can be used when sending a protected DevID as the Instance ID. However, when sending a DevID format in the clear, there is currently no finalized RFC to refer. Therefore it is only possible to give examples of what a URN for the DevID might look like. The final format of such a URN may not be identical to the examples presented herein, however the principles described should still apply to other formats that carry the same information.
  • One potential format for an IMEI based DevID is described in draft-montemurro-gsma-imei-urn. Here is an example Instance ID based on that draft:
  • 3GPP IMEI:
  • TAC: 35196500
  • SNR: 718917
  • Check Digit: 7
  • +sip.instance=“<urn:gsma:imei:35196500-718917-0>”
  • The zero (0) at the end represents the spare digit which is always transmitted as zero (0).
  • The registrar uses the received URN format in the Instance ID (+sip.instance) to determine what handling to apply. In this example, receipt of the urn:gsma:imei would be a trigger to apply the procedures outlined in the present invention.
  • Steps for GRUU Creation by the Registrar (S-CSCF) when the DevID is Not Protected During Registration
  • Steps for creation of the GRUU by the registrar (S-CSCF) based on an unprotected DevID in the Instance ID:
  • Prerequisite: The REGISTER message has arrived at the S-CSCF and the S-CSCF has identified that the Instance ID contains a DevID sent in the clear based on the URN scheme used in the Instance ID. (In the provided example that would be “urn:gsma:imei”.)
  • Choose a hash algorithm (MD5 or SHA-1). In this example, MD5 is used. The network and the device must use the same hash algorithm.
  • Extract the TAC and SNR from the IMEI. The IMEI structure in the URN is shown in the example above. The TAC and SNR are used and the spare digit is omitted for a total of 14 digits used. By omitting the spare digit, this technique is also applicable to the IMEISV where the SVN is omitted.
  • Place the name space ID (see name space ID defined in Table 2), TAC and SNR in network byte order.
  • Concatenate the name space ID, TAC and SNR
  • Compute the hash of the concatenated string using the preselected hash algorithm.
  • Set the UUID fields as specified in RFC 4122, subclause 4.3 using the hash as computed above and create the string representation as show in clause 3 of the specified RFC.
  • Place the string representation in urn form by prepending “urn:uuid” to the above string. Example: urn:uuid:3647f493-4948-abe2-6599-7c295ab29804
  • This UUID URN is the GRUU to be assigned based on the received Instance ID.
  • In the case of non-3GPP devices where an identifier other than IMEI is used, the only criteria is that the contents of the Instance ID be unique to the device and not change over time.
  • An alternative approach can be used by the registrar in case that it doesn't recognize the URN format or in the case of non-3GPP devices which may not have an IMEI equivalent. In these cases the registrar could use the following steps:
  • Choose a hash algorithm (MD5 or SHA-1). In this example, MD5 is used. The network and the device must use the same hash algorithm.
  • Extract the name space specific (NSS) string from the URN (defined in RFC 2141) from the Instance ID (+sip.instance)
  • Place the NSS in network byte order
  • Compute the hash of the NSS
  • This hashed value is the GRUU to be assigned based on the received Instance ID.
  • Example Call Flows Providing DevID Protection in the Registrar
  • Basic call flows using embodiments of the present invention are now shown. These example call flows illustrate an IMS-based network architecture, however, the present invention also applies to non-IMS architectures as well.
  • FIG. 10 illustrates the steps when the mobile device registers itself directly in IMS, towards the registrar, using PS access. This provides the basic registration flow for a device implementing the present invention. As seen therein, the signaling flows are as follows:
  • Step 1001: 1. Construct Instance ID: UE A creates an Instance ID using a URN format which transports the IMEI in clear text.
  • Step 1002: 2. REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): (using a message header 1100 as seen in FIG. 11);
  • Step 1003: 3. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF.
  • Step 1004: 4. Cx: User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF.
  • Step 1005: 5. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF.
  • Step 1006: 6. 401 (Unauthorized) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF challenges the registration request.
  • Step 1007: 7. 401 (Unauthorized) (I-CSCF to P-CSCF): The I-CSCF forwards the response to the P-CSCF.
  • Step 1008: 8. 401 (Unauthorized) (P-CSCF to UE A): The P-CSCF forwards the response to UE A.
  • Step 1009: 9. REGISTER request (UE A to P-CSCF): UE A resends the REGISTER request (depicted in Step 1002), this time with authentication credentials.
  • Step 1010: 10. REGISTER request (P-CSCF to I-CSCF): The P-CSCF forwards the request to the I-CSCF.
  • Step 1011: 11. Cx: User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF.
  • Step 1012: 12. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF.
  • Step 1013: 13. Cx: S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF.
  • Step 1014: 14. Construct GRUU: The S-CSCF (acting as the registrar) constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was sent in Step 1001 above. The GRUU shall be constructed as defined by the present invention (see Steps for GRUU creation by the registrar (S-CSCF) when the DevID is not protected during registration).
  • Step 1015: 15. 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful. The 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step (using a message header 1200 as seen in FIG. 12);
  • Step 1016: 16. 200 (OK) (I-CSCF to P-CSCF): The I-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to the P-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful.
  • Step 1017: 17. 200 (OK) (P-CSCF to UE A): The P-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to UE A indicating that Registration was successful.
  • FIG. 13 illustrates the second flow when the network registers on behalf of a device that is using CS access. This enhances a flow found in 3GPP TS 24.292 by adding the functionality provided by the present invention. The steps of the signaling flows are as follows:
  • Step 1301 1. CS attach (UE A to MSC)
  • Step 1302 2. Authentication and Update Location (MSC/VLR to HLR/HSS)
  • Step 1303 3. CS attach accept (MSC to UE A)
  • Step 1304 4. IMS Registration evaluation: The MSC Server evaluates whether it needs to perform registration with IMS. This can be based on subscriber data received from the HSS/HLR.
  • Step 1305 5. IMS address discovery: The MSC Server derives a home network domain name. The home network domain is used to perform DNS queries to locate the I-CSCF in the home network.
  • Step 1306 6. Construct Instance ID: The MSC Server creates an Instance ID using a URN format which transports the IMEI in clear text.
  • Step 1307 7. REGISTER request (MSC Server to I-CSCF): The purpose of this request is to register a private user identity and a temporary public user identity derived for this subscriber on behalf of the user with a S-CSCF in the home network. This request is routed to the I-CSCF in the home network.
  • Step 1308 8. Cx: User registration status query procedure: The I-CSCF makes a request for information related to the Subscriber registration status by sending the private user identity, public user identity and visited domain name to the HSS. The HSS returns the S-CSCF required capabilities and the I-CSCF uses this information to select a suitable S-CSCF. (using a message header 1400 as seen in FIG. 14);
  • Step 1309 9. REGISTER request (I-CSCF to S-CSCF): I-CSCF forwards the REGISTER request to the selected S-CSCF.
  • Step 1310 10. Cx: S-CSCF Registration Notification: The S-CSCF informs the HSS that the user has been registered. Upon being requested by the S-CSCF, the HSS will also include the user profile in the response sent to the S-CSCF.
  • Step 1311 11. Construct GRUU: The S-CSCF (acting as the registrar) constructs a GRUU based on the Instance ID that was sent in Step 1306 above. The GRUU shall be constructed as defined by this invention (see Steps for GRUU creation by the registrar (S-CSCF) when the DevID is not protected during registration).
  • Step 1312 12. 200 (OK) (S-CSCF to I-CSCF): The S-CSCF sends a 200 (OK) response to the I-CSCF indicating that Registration was successful. The 200 (OK) response includes the GRUU that was created in the previous step (using a message header 1500 as seen in FIG. 15);
  • Step 1313 13. 200 (OK) (I-CSCF to MSC Server): The I-CSCF forwards the 200 (OK) response to the MSC Server indicating that Registration was successful.
  • FIG. 16 is a system 1600, implementing an embodiment of the present invention when a UE 1601 is connected via CS access 1602 and the network creates the ID in the MSC server 1603.
  • FIG. 17 is a system 1700 implementing an embodiment of the present invention when a UE 1701 is connected via PS access 1702 and the UE 1701 creates the ID in the UE 1701 directly.
  • FIG. 18 is a UE 1800 for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention. The data used to create the ID can be e.g., the IMEI, MEID, or the Private ID. the UE 1800 would also contain the shared namespace to create the ID.
  • FIG. 19 is an MSC server 1900 for creating an ID, as used in an embodiment of the present invention. The data used to create the ID can be e.g., the IMEI, MEID, or the Private ID. the MSC server 1900 would also contain the shared namespace to create the ID.
  • The present invention has numerous advantages. It ensures that any Instance ID created by a network will be identical to an Instance ID created by the device. This, in turn, results in the same GRUU being defined regardless of how the device was registered (directly or by the network). The present invention provides specific steps to outline the creation of the Instance ID, particularly in the case of an IMS system. In this manner, it fills a gap in the existing 3GPP specifications. The present invention thus ensures consistent behavior for IMS-based services such as ICS. Further, the use of a hash to derive the Instance ID protects the device specific identifier, such as the IMEI and MEID, which in turn protects the integrity of this device specific identifier, thus enhancing security.
  • As will be recognized by those skilled in the art, the innovative concepts described in the present application can be modified and varied over a wide range of applications. Accordingly, the scope of patented subject matter should not be limited to any of the specific exemplary teachings discussed above, but is instead defined by the following claims.

Claims (17)

What is claimed:
1. A method for use by a device in a network, the device adapted to support the creation of a Globally Routable User Agent (GRUU) and an Instance identifier (ID), comprising the step of:
creating an Instance ID to uniquely identify the device in the network while ensuring the privacy of the device ID.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein a Mobile Switching Center (MSC) in the network and the device create identical Instance IDs in the creation of the GRUU.
3. The method of claim 2, further comprising the step of constructing the Instance ID as a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) Uniform Resource Name (URN) using the string representation of a UUID.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the device is 3GPP compliant and the unique device identification (DevID) known to the network is derived from the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) or IMEI Software Version (IMEISV).
5. The method of claim 4, wherein constructing the Instance ID as a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) Uniform Resource Name (URN) using the string representation of a UUID, further comprises the steps of:
pre-selecting a hash algorithm;
creating a DevID by extracting a Type Allocation Code (TAC) and a Serial Number (SNR) from the IMEI or IMEISV;
when using the TAC and SNR, omitting the spare digit for a total of 14 digits;
placing a name space ID and DevID in network byte order;
concatenating the name space ID and DevID;
computing the hash of the concatenated string using the pre-selected hash algorithm;
setting the UUID fields using the hash and creating a string representation;
placing the string representation in urn form by pre-pending “urn:uuid” to the string.
6. The method of claim 3, wherein the device is compliant with the Third Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2) standards.
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the unique ID that belongs to the device and is known to the network (DevID) is derived from the Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) or Electronic Serial Number (ESN).
8. The method of claim 7, wherein constructing the Instance ID as a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) Uniform Resource Name (URN) using the string representation of a UUID, further comprises the steps of:
pre-selecting a hash algorithm;
creating a DevID by extracting a Type Allocation Code (TAC) and a Serial Number (SNR) from the MEID or ESN;
when using the Type Allocation Code (TAC) and Serial Number (SNR), omitting the spare digit for a total of 14 digits;
placing a name space ID and DevID in network byte order;
concatenating the name space ID and DevID;
computing the hash of the concatenated string using the pre-selected hash algorithm;
setting the UUID fields using the hash and creating a string representation;
placing the string representation in urn form by pre-pending “urn:uuid” to the string Mobile Equipment Identifier
9. The method of claim 1, for use in a non-3GPP compliant and non-3GPP2 compliant device, and wherein the DevID uses a private identity to create the Instance ID.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the private identity is a Network Access Identifier (NAI).
11. The method of claim 10, wherein constructing the Instance ID as a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) Uniform Resource Name (URN) (UUID URN) using the string representation of a UUID, further comprises the steps of:
pre-selecting a hash algorithm;
creating a DevID by extracting a Type Allocation Code (TAC) and a Serial Number (SNR) from the NAI;
when using the TAC and SNR, omitting the spare digit for a total of 14 digits;
placing a name space ID and DevID in network byte order;
concatenating the name space ID and DevID;
computing the hash of the concatenated string using the pre-selected hash algorithm;
setting the UUID fields using the hash and creating a string representation;
placing the string representation in urn form by pre-pending “urn:uuid” to the string Mobile Equipment Identifier
12. A method of providing a level of privacy protection to a device identification (DevID) when sent in the clear during device registration with a network, comprising the step of defining procedures in the network for constructing a Globally Routable User Agent (UA) URis (GRUU) based on an Instance ID in a way that does not reveal the DeviD.
13. The method claim 12, wherein a registrar, such as a Serving-Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF) creates the GRUU.
14. The method of claim 13, further comprising the steps of:
receiving, at the S-CSCF, a REGISTER message;
identifying, by the S-CSCF that the Instance ID contains a DevID sent in the clear based on the URN scheme used in the Instance ID;
choosing a hash algorithm;
extracting a Type Allocation Code (TAC) and Serial Number (SNR);
placing the name space ID, TAC and SNR in network byte order;
concatenating the name space ID, TAC and SNR;
computing the hash of the concatenated string using the selected hash algorithm;
setting the UUID fields using the computed hash;
creating and placing a string representation in urn form by prepending “urn:uuid” to the string (UUID URN); and
assigning the UUID URN as the GRUU based on the received Instance ID.
15. The method of claim 14, wherein the TAC and SNR comprise one selected from the group of and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI); a IMEI Software Version (IMEISY); a Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID); and an Electronic Serial Number (ESN).
16. The method of claim 14, further comprising the steps of:
receiving, at the S-CSCF, a REGISTER message;
identifying, by the S-CSCF that the Instance ID contains a DevID sent in the clear based on the URN scheme used in the Instance ID;
choosing a hash algorithm;
extracting a Type Allocation Code (TAC) and Serial Number (SNR);
placing the name space ID, TAC and SNR in network byte order;
concatenating the name space ID, TAC and SNR;
computing the hash of the concatenated string using the selected hash algorithm;
setting the UUID fields using the computed hash;
creating a Universally Unique Identifier Uniform Resource Name (UUID URN) by
placing the concatenated string representation in urn form by prepending “urn:uuid” to the string; and
assigning the UUID URN as the GRUU based on the received Instance ID.
17. A method of providing a level of privacy protection to a device identification (DevID) when sent in the clear during device registration with a network, comprising the steps of:
selecting a has algorithm;
extract the name space specific (NSS) string from a Uniform Resource Name (URN) from an Instance ID;
placing the NSS in network byte order;
computing the hash of the NSS; and
assigning the hashed value as the GRUU based on the received Instance ID.
US14/085,353 2008-07-09 2013-11-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier Abandoned US20140073296A1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US14/085,353 US20140073296A1 (en) 2008-07-09 2013-11-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US7929308P 2008-07-09 2008-07-09
US12/211,607 US8135386B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2008-09-16 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US12/426,429 US8619626B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2009-04-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US14/085,353 US20140073296A1 (en) 2008-07-09 2013-11-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/426,429 Continuation US8619626B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2009-04-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
US20140073296A1 true US20140073296A1 (en) 2014-03-13

Family

ID=41505598

Family Applications (3)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/211,607 Active 2030-01-08 US8135386B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2008-09-16 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US12/426,429 Active 2029-11-20 US8619626B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2009-04-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US14/085,353 Abandoned US20140073296A1 (en) 2008-07-09 2013-11-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier

Family Applications Before (2)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US12/211,607 Active 2030-01-08 US8135386B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2008-09-16 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US12/426,429 Active 2029-11-20 US8619626B2 (en) 2008-07-09 2009-04-20 Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier

Country Status (9)

Country Link
US (3) US8135386B2 (en)
EP (1) EP2311242B1 (en)
JP (1) JP5378515B2 (en)
CN (2) CN102150412B (en)
CA (1) CA2729926C (en)
CL (1) CL2009001561A1 (en)
ES (1) ES2701433T3 (en)
WO (1) WO2010004411A2 (en)
ZA (2) ZA201100786B (en)

Families Citing this family (36)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5589482A (en) * 1994-12-14 1996-12-31 Pfizer Inc. Benzo-thiophene estrogen agonists to treat prostatic hyperplasia
US8503971B2 (en) * 2005-08-20 2013-08-06 Brightpoint, Inc. System and method for processing MEID data
US7852801B2 (en) * 2005-09-28 2010-12-14 Qualcomm Incorporated Reducing collision probability for VoIP packets
ATE556547T1 (en) * 2005-10-28 2012-05-15 Ericsson Telefon Ab L M METHOD AND DEVICE FOR PUSH-TO-TALK SERVICE
DE602007009104D1 (en) * 2007-09-12 2010-10-21 Nokia Siemens Networks Oy Providing services in the event of call diversion in a communication system
US8135386B2 (en) * 2008-07-09 2012-03-13 Telefoanktebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US20100037045A1 (en) * 2008-08-07 2010-02-11 Sean Kendall Schneyer Method and apparatus for creating an instance id based on a unique device identifier
US20100034168A1 (en) * 2008-08-08 2010-02-11 Kaniz Mahdi System and Method for Enabling SR-VCC with Shared IMPU
NZ590744A (en) * 2008-08-28 2013-08-30 Ericsson Telefon Ab L M Method and apparatuses for maintaining service continuity to a centralization and continuity application server
US8923854B2 (en) * 2008-12-23 2014-12-30 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method of and equipment for subscriber mobility registration update in a home location register of a mobile communications network
WO2011025876A1 (en) * 2009-08-27 2011-03-03 Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc. Method and apparatus for solving limited addressing space in machine-to-machine (m2m) environments
KR20110036301A (en) * 2009-10-01 2011-04-07 삼성전자주식회사 Method and apparatus for generating temporary gruu in ims system
US9125132B1 (en) * 2009-12-22 2015-09-01 Sprint Communications Company L.P. Efficiently responding to mobile-device requests in a wireless environment
US9204290B2 (en) * 2010-11-03 2015-12-01 Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method and system for constructing a domain name for a radio network node in a cellular communication system
US10534931B2 (en) 2011-03-17 2020-01-14 Attachmate Corporation Systems, devices and methods for automatic detection and masking of private data
CN102298716B (en) * 2011-09-02 2014-05-07 北京地拓科技发展有限公司 Identifier generation method and device and application method of identifier
US8942698B2 (en) * 2011-11-02 2015-01-27 Qualcomm Incorporated Methods and devices for facilitating access terminal registration with a registration server
US9173184B2 (en) * 2011-12-23 2015-10-27 Kt Corporation Mobile communication system supporting service centralization and continuity and method thereof
WO2013116056A1 (en) * 2012-01-24 2013-08-08 Bunn-O-Matic Corporation Brewer
US20150026330A1 (en) * 2013-07-16 2015-01-22 Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless Generating unique identifiers for mobile devices
US9215256B2 (en) * 2013-08-21 2015-12-15 Qualcomm Incorporated Updating contact information for client devices registered to the same user for an internet protocol multimedia subsystem service
EP3706364B1 (en) 2013-09-23 2021-04-21 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Security management method and security management device in home network system
US9603019B1 (en) 2014-03-28 2017-03-21 Confia Systems, Inc. Secure and anonymized authentication
US20150341241A1 (en) * 2014-05-23 2015-11-26 Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. Method and apparatus for specifying machine identifiers for machine-to-machine platform support
US9712623B2 (en) * 2014-05-30 2017-07-18 Apple Inc. Answering a call with client through a host
CN105260365B (en) * 2014-06-04 2018-12-04 中国移动通信集团宁夏有限公司 The treating method and apparatus of end message
KR102264992B1 (en) 2014-12-31 2021-06-15 삼성전자 주식회사 Method and Device for allocating a server in wireless communication system
DK3258901T3 (en) * 2015-02-16 2020-08-17 Mobility 2000 (Australia) Ltd STEPPING ACCESSORIES FOR A WHEELCHAIR
US10484359B2 (en) 2015-07-25 2019-11-19 Confia Systems, Inc. Device-level authentication with unique device identifiers
US9602292B2 (en) 2015-07-25 2017-03-21 Confia Systems, Inc. Device-level authentication with unique device identifiers
US9819703B2 (en) * 2015-09-23 2017-11-14 T-Mobile Usa, Inc. SIP server with multiple identifiers
EP3584696B1 (en) * 2016-01-15 2024-01-03 Google LLC Managing delivery of code and dependent data using application containers
ITUA20163456A1 (en) * 2016-05-16 2017-11-16 Achille Pievani METHOD FOR DIGITALIZATION AND ACQUISITION OF SENSITIVE DATA ON MOBILE DEVICES THAT GUARANTEES THE SAFETY AND INTEGRITY OF THE DATA.
US10356039B1 (en) 2016-09-30 2019-07-16 Amdocs Development Limited Apparatus, computer program, and method for utilizing a data structure to access fully qualified domain name information
CN107592217A (en) * 2017-09-01 2018-01-16 北京奇虎科技有限公司 A kind of user identification method and device
CN113326007B (en) * 2021-06-30 2022-07-29 广东电网有限责任公司 Unstructured data federation storage method, device, terminal and storage medium

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6996087B2 (en) * 2001-07-31 2006-02-07 Lucent Technologies Inc. Communication system including an interworking mobile switching center for call termination
US20080194223A1 (en) * 2005-08-20 2008-08-14 Cellstar, Ltd. System and Method for Processing MEID Data
US7746836B2 (en) * 2006-10-16 2010-06-29 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for re-registration of connections for service continuity in an agnostic access internet protocol multimedia communication system
US7796570B1 (en) * 2002-07-12 2010-09-14 Meshnetworks, Inc. Method for sparse table accounting and dissemination from a mobile subscriber device in a wireless mobile ad-hoc network
US8331355B2 (en) * 2008-06-24 2012-12-11 Research In Motion Limited Method for a network component to route a communication session

Family Cites Families (18)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2000028763A1 (en) * 1998-11-09 2000-05-18 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Reservation multiple access in a cdma communications system
US7870196B2 (en) * 2000-11-08 2011-01-11 Nokia Corporation System and methods for using an application layer control protocol transporting spatial location information pertaining to devices connected to wired and wireless internet protocol networks
EP1233570A1 (en) * 2001-02-16 2002-08-21 TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET L M ERICSSON (publ) Method and system for establishing a wireless communications link
US7145997B2 (en) * 2001-12-07 2006-12-05 Nokia Corporation Method and system for callback in case of an emergency session
US7624266B2 (en) * 2002-03-22 2009-11-24 Nokia Corporation System and method using temporary identity for authentication with session initiation protocol
US7701974B2 (en) * 2003-10-21 2010-04-20 Nokia Corporation Routing information processing for network hiding scheme
KR101061373B1 (en) * 2005-04-11 2011-09-02 삼성전자주식회사 Method of performing media storage service in push-to-talk over cellular network, PC server and PC client
US8401002B2 (en) * 2005-06-22 2013-03-19 Research In Motion Limited Exchange and use of globally unique device identifiers for circuit-switched and packet switched integration
US7796589B2 (en) * 2005-08-01 2010-09-14 American Power Conversion Corporation Communication protocol
US8478300B2 (en) 2005-12-20 2013-07-02 Microsoft Corporation Proximity service discovery in wireless networks
CN102694813B (en) * 2006-01-10 2015-07-01 黑莓有限公司 System and method for routing an incoming call to a proper domain in a network environment including ims
EP1995934B1 (en) 2006-02-06 2012-04-25 Research In Motion Limited Method and system for routing a SIP call in a network environment including a circuit-switched network and an IP Multimedia Subsystem IMS
CN100551168C (en) * 2006-03-20 2009-10-14 华为技术有限公司 The method of connecting multimedia subsystem of circuit field terminal and implement device thereof
US7760712B2 (en) * 2006-08-11 2010-07-20 Research In Motion Limited System and method for managing call continuity in IMS network environment
US8276197B1 (en) * 2006-09-29 2012-09-25 Sprint Communications Company L.P. Cascading network login
CN100566460C (en) * 2007-07-13 2009-12-02 北京工业大学 Utilize authentication and cryptographic key negotiation method between the mobile entity that short message realizes
US8135386B2 (en) * 2008-07-09 2012-03-13 Telefoanktebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
US7715324B1 (en) * 2009-03-26 2010-05-11 Limelight Networks, Inc. Conditional protocol control

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6996087B2 (en) * 2001-07-31 2006-02-07 Lucent Technologies Inc. Communication system including an interworking mobile switching center for call termination
US7796570B1 (en) * 2002-07-12 2010-09-14 Meshnetworks, Inc. Method for sparse table accounting and dissemination from a mobile subscriber device in a wireless mobile ad-hoc network
US20080194223A1 (en) * 2005-08-20 2008-08-14 Cellstar, Ltd. System and Method for Processing MEID Data
US7746836B2 (en) * 2006-10-16 2010-06-29 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for re-registration of connections for service continuity in an agnostic access internet protocol multimedia communication system
US8331355B2 (en) * 2008-06-24 2012-12-11 Research In Motion Limited Method for a network component to route a communication session

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CL2009001561A1 (en) 2011-02-18
EP2311242A2 (en) 2011-04-20
ZA201100786B (en) 2012-09-26
ES2701433T3 (en) 2019-02-22
WO2010004411A3 (en) 2010-03-25
WO2010004411A2 (en) 2010-01-14
CN103701947B (en) 2018-11-16
CA2729926A1 (en) 2010-01-14
CN103701947A (en) 2014-04-02
JP5378515B2 (en) 2013-12-25
US20100009681A1 (en) 2010-01-14
US8619626B2 (en) 2013-12-31
ZA201203846B (en) 2013-01-30
CN102150412B (en) 2014-01-29
CN102150412A (en) 2011-08-10
JP2011527545A (en) 2011-10-27
US8135386B2 (en) 2012-03-13
US20100008254A1 (en) 2010-01-14
CA2729926C (en) 2017-02-14
EP2311242B1 (en) 2018-09-12

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US8619626B2 (en) Method and apparatus for instance identifier based on a unique device identifier
EP2321947B1 (en) Method and apparatus for creating an instance id based on a unique device identifier
JP5249952B2 (en) Group access to IP multimedia subsystem services
KR100909533B1 (en) User identities
US9032201B2 (en) Hiding a device identity
JP2011527545A5 (en)
US20070055874A1 (en) Bundled subscriber authentication in next generation communication networks
US8600031B2 (en) Method for connecting calls between an IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) domain and a circuit switched (CS) domain
US8782743B2 (en) Methods and apparatus for use in a generic bootstrapping architecture
CA2586993A1 (en) Apparatus, and associated method, for generating and transmitting an anonymous routing identifier to identify user agent
US11283773B2 (en) Protecting user&#39;s anonymity when visiting foreign networks
EP3149910B1 (en) Ims restoration support for temporary gruu

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
AS Assignment

Owner name: TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL), SWEDEN

Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:SCHNEYER, SEAN KENDALL;LINDHOLM, FREDRIK;HEIDERMARK, ALF;SIGNING DATES FROM 20081017 TO 20081021;REEL/FRAME:035996/0676

STCB Information on status: application discontinuation

Free format text: ABANDONED -- FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICE ACTION