US20110078765A1 - System and method for establishing historical usage-based hardware trust - Google Patents
System and method for establishing historical usage-based hardware trust Download PDFInfo
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- US20110078765A1 US20110078765A1 US12/960,326 US96032610A US2011078765A1 US 20110078765 A1 US20110078765 A1 US 20110078765A1 US 96032610 A US96032610 A US 96032610A US 2011078765 A1 US2011078765 A1 US 2011078765A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/316—User authentication by observing the pattern of computer usage, e.g. typical user behaviour
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/45—Structures or tools for the administration of authentication
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
- G06Q20/3672—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes initialising or reloading thereof
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/36—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes
- G06Q20/367—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes
- G06Q20/3674—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using electronic wallets or electronic money safes involving electronic purses or money safes involving authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0815—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities providing single-sign-on or federations
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1425—Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
Definitions
- the invention relates generally to the field of network security. More particularly the invention relates to a system and method for using the usage history of a particular piece of hardware to establish trust.
- the authentication can depend on what the user knows, for example, a password; what the user is, for example a fingerprint or a retinal pattern; or what the user has, for example, trusted hardware such as a keyed smart card or the like.
- a password for example, a password
- a fingerprint or a retinal pattern for example, a fingerprint or a retinal pattern
- trusted hardware such as a keyed smart card or the like.
- a conventional logon procedure in which the user provided a user name or logon and a password to gain access to network services, provided adequate authentication for most purposes. While such a level of security remains sufficient for many applications, the increasing availability of such services as financial services, retail shopping, and healthcare information services over publicly accessible networks dictates a need for a level of authentication that cannot be provided through the use of simple password-based logon procedures, without more.
- U.S. Pat. No. 5,721,780 (Feb. 24, 1998) describe a method and apparatus for implementing security in data and telecommunications networks that is independent of and transparent to users.
- the network control center When a user terminal connects to a network control center, the network control center generates an encrypted password based on the user terminal's network coupling identifier. The password is downloaded to the terminal and simultaneously saved by the network control center. Subsequently, when a user attempts to access the network, the network control center retrieves the password from the terminal and compares it with the stored copy. If there is a match, network access is granted. With each logon from the terminal, a new password is generated and downloaded to the user terminal.
- Ensor, et al. While the exchange of passwords described by Ensor, et al. allows a user terminal to be established as trusted on a session-by-session basis, the trust is based on a static designation that provides no information about the terminal's usage history. Furthermore, Ensor, et al. fail to contemplate combining the method described with other methods of authentication to provide superior quality authentication.
- Establishing trust according to historical usage of selected hardware includes: providing a usage history for a selected client device; and extending trust to a selected user at a level at least partially based on the user's history of use of the selected client device.
- the usage history is embodied as signed statements issued by a third party for example, or an authentication server.
- the issued statement is downloaded to the selected client device, and is provided by the client device when a user requests service and/or access from a network server.
- the issued statement is stored on an authentication server, and is checked after provision of a public key from a key pair by the selected client device.
- the usage history is updated every time a user is authenticated from the selected client device.
- the enhanced trust provided by logging on from a trusted client may eliminate the necessity of requiring secondary authentication for e-commerce and financial services transactions.
- the enhanced hardware-based trust facilitates password recovery and conflict resolution between the legitimate user logging on from the trusted hardware and the thief logging on from another client, and password recovery, when the thief has changed the password.
- FIG. 1 is a block schematic diagram of a user remote access scenario according to the invention
- FIG. 2 is a block schematic diagram of a multiple access point example according to the invention.
- FIG. 3 is a block schematic diagram of a task viewpoint of the invention according to the invention.
- FIG. 4 provides a generalized schematic diagram of a system for establishing historical usage-based hardware trust according to the invention
- FIG. 5 provide a schematic diagram of a first embodiment of the system of FIG. 4 according to the invention.
- FIG. 6 provides a schematic diagram of a second embodiment of the system of FIG. 4 according to the invention.
- the invention is embodied in an adaptive multi-tier authentication system in a computer environment.
- a system according to the invention automatically adapts to the user's login patterns.
- the invention provides a system that does not require additional hardware from the service provider by using a query-based security system.
- FIG. 1 a simple user interface scenario is shown.
- the user 101 logs onto the server 102 .
- the server retrieves the user's stored use profile 103 .
- the location where the user 101 is accessing the server is checked against the user's profile to determine a trust level for the session.
- the server 102 determines if any additional security measures must be taken based on the trust level.
- a preferred embodiment of the invention analyzes the user's use of a service and typical access points to augment the trust level of each access point. If the user is always dialing in from home to access a service such as AOL, the invention observes the pattern and, after a while, determines that the trust level is high when the user accesses the service from home. At that point, the invention will allow immediate login into the service without asking for any additional information.
- the service may tell the user “We are surprised to see you dialing in from California. We just need to do a little extra background check on your identity. How many dogs did you tell us that you have? What are their names?”
- the user may be a salesperson and travels to different cities. This user's patterns may be random at best because his access points are all across the country 201 , 202 , 203 .
- the server 204 takes this into account and determines that this is the user's normal pattern.
- the server 204 records this fact in the user's profile 205 .
- the server 204 will immediately downgrade the trust level of the second location and ask more authentication questions. This also applies to the situation when a user logs in the United States, for example, and a similar login occurs in Japan five hours later.
- the invention knows that the time frame is improbable.
- the invention automates the process of tracking information such as IP addresses, where the user dialed in from, and the access times.
- a profile of the combination of data is used to as a basis to determine the level of trust.
- the invention uses the following criteria to adapt authentication for a system:
- the system adapts and learns new sites that the user logs in from, and then proceeds to use the minimal username/password from those sites only.
- Other techniques could be used to identify the logon environment as listed above (i.e., IP address or dial in line), but the creation of a unique mark (file, cookie, etc.) ensures verification of the environment.
- the user immediately knows when something is wrong when the invention suddenly asks for more information than usual. For example, if the user logs in from home, which is a normal situation, and the system asks for more information than normal, such as the user's dog's name. The unusual request would be an indicator to the user that something may be wrong, prompting the user to call into customer support to get more information.
- the User Access Control module 301 accepts user input such as login attempts and responses to the system's questions.
- the User Access Control module 301 has the responsibility to search and check for information such as IP address, originating phone number, or cookies on the user's machine.
- the Evaluate User Patterns module 302 takes the information obtained from the User Access Control module 301 and compares it to the usage information from the user/usage profile 303 for the specific user.
- the user/usage profile contains all of the user information that the user used to establish the account and also the usage profile detailing the user's access patterns.
- the trust level of the current user login location is calculated and the Evaluate User Patterns module 302 determines if any additional questions to the user are required. Questions are sent through the User Access Control module 301 to the user. The user's answers are relayed from the User Access Control module 301 back to the Evaluate User Patterns module 302 . The Evaluate User Patterns module 302 grants or denies access based on the trust level and answers for any questions that it asked. The Evaluate User Patterns module 302 updates the user/usage profile 303 for the user with the information just obtained.
- the fact that a typical user logs onto a server from a single machine time and again over an extended period suggests that when the user logs on, or tries to log on from the single machine, either less authentication should be required, or a higher trust level should be established.
- the higher trust level may be used to enable such things as financial transactions or even logging on or changing passwords without knowing the current password.
- FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a system for establishing historical usage based hardware trust according to the invention.
- the system includes a client 401 and a server 402 .
- the client device may be a desktop or laptop computer, a PDA (personal digital assistant) or information manager such as a PALM PILOT (PALM INC., MILPITAS Calif.), or a WAP (wireless access protocol) device such as a cellular telephone or a pager.
- PDA personal digital assistant
- PALM PILOT PALM PILOT
- MILPITAS Calif. MILPITAS Calif.
- WAP wireless access protocol
- a selected user of a selected client device logs onto the server 402 , or another server, from time to time, to request service and/or access.
- the server has been shown as a single machine. In actual practice, the server may constitute more than one server.
- the server 402 may be an authentication server for an online service such as AOL (AOL INCORPORATED, DULLES Va.). Following authentication, the user may be granted service/and or access for a web server, an application server or a database server, for example. In another embodiment of the invention, the server from which service and/or access is sought additionally authenticates the user.
- AOL AOL INCORPORATED, DULLES Va.
- the system includes a usage history 403 for the client device.
- the usage history typically consists of one or more signed statements providing records of the client device's usage history. While the practitioner of ordinary skill will readily be able to discern parameters for the usage history, the usage history typically includes dates and times of use by the selected user. The usage history also includes information regarding significant events, such as password changes to user accounts that are made from the client.
- the signed statements embodying the usage history are issued by the server 402 , in which case, the usage history includes the client device's logon history to that particular server.
- the signed statements are issued by an independent credentialing authority, in which case, the usage history includes usage information for more than one target server.
- the statements may be signed by attaching a message authentication code, such as a keyed hash, rendering use of keys unnecessary.
- the invention is based on the recognition that a user often logs onto an online service from the same client time and again over an extended period.
- a usage history can be shown for a particular client, it merits tagging the client as a trusted machine.
- the client's status as a trusted machine indicates that when the selected user logs on, or attempts to log on from the trusted client, it is permissible to require less authentication, or that a higher trust level should be established.
- the hardware is being certified because it is being used.
- the current system and method are metaphors for the common real-world occurrence of extending a higher level of trust to a person based on familiarity. For example, a security guard is less likely to be suspicious of someone whom they see every day.
- the usage history is evaluated in connection with a conventional logon, during which the user provides a password, or some other secret. Additional security measures are possible. For example, the signed statements may be obscured and/or the password or other secret can be encrypted into the statement.
- FIG. 5 shows an embodiment of the invention, wherein the usage history 403 a is stored on the client 402 , and is transmitted from the client to the server 402 each time the user logs on. Following logon, the server updates the usage history by issuing a new signed statement 403 b, which is subsequently stored on the client 401 .
- FIG. 6 shows an embodiment of the invention in which the usage history 403 is stored on the server 402 .
- a key pair including public and private keys, for the client 401 is provided.
- the key pair is stored in key repositories, for example in the ROM (read only memory) of the selected client.
- the private key (not shown) functions to establish the identity of the client 401 , because the client, apart from the private key, otherwise contain little specific identifiable information.
- the public key 404 is pushed to the server 402 , which allows the server 402 to access the usage history 403 for the client stored at the server. Following logon, the usage history is updated.
- the invention is particularly advantageous in that it is a completely passive arrangement, relying on the fact that no one, other than the selected user, has physical access to the selected client. A hacker, attempting to circumvent the current system would need to have physical access to the client to pirate the key pair or the usage history.
- One of the most useful applications of the invention is in password recovery when a user has forgotten their password, or when a hacker has stolen it. IT professionals know that password recovery imposes a significant burden in lost man-hours and wasted computing resources and poses a great inconvenience to users.
- the server When a user, having forgotten their password, attempts to logon from the trusted client using an incorrect password, the server, after evaluating the usage history and seeing that the logon originates from a trusted machine, can allow the user to change the account password, based on the increased level of trust inferred from the fact that is it unlikely that anyone other than the selected user has physical access to the trusted client. Allowing the password to be changed easily spares the user considerable inconvenience and spares the expense and waste of resources on the administrative side.
- the user attempts to log on from the trusted machine with the original password.
- the server detecting that the logon from the original user originates from the trusted client can allow the original user to change the password, based on implied trust from the signed statements.
- the rightful user of the account may change the password, after which someone else attempts to change the password from another client device.
- the server seeing that the password was originally changed by a user logging on from a trusted client, resolves the conflict in favor of the user on the trusted client. Similarly, in the case of two users attempting to log on from different clients with the same password, the server resolves the conflict in favor of the user logging on from the trusted client.
- the invention also finds important application in the fields of e-commerce and network-based financial services. Many services require a second password or other credential to be provided when a higher level of authentication is needed. For example, Amazon.com requires no password to buy a product, but does require a password to change the address that the product is automatically shipped to (in a password-free purchase). AOL requires a second “shopping” password to perform an actual purchase, above and beyond the login password needed to access the email account and other services. In both cases, the signed statements (and implied trust in the hardware holding those statements) may be used in place of the secondary password. Thus, additional trust is deduced based on the signed statement.
- the invention is also advantageously deployed in deterring hackers. For example, hackers often launch brute force attacks, using software applications that automate the process of systematically trying different alphanumeric combinations to find the correct password.
- the server recognizing that a login originates from a trusted client, can authenticate the password promptly. When the login originates from a non-trusted client, the server can extend the time period required for authenticating the password. The increased time can be long enough to encourage those attempting to hack into the account to abandon the effort.
- the invention can also be used to implement security policies. For example, changes to the account, such as changing passwords or preferences, or creating new sub-accounts may only be allowed when the user logs in from the trusted machine.
Abstract
Description
- This application is a Continuation of U.S. Ser. No. 11/615,858, filed 22 Dec. 2006, which is a Continuation of U.S. Ser. No. 10/465,163, filed 18 Jun. 2003, which was issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,174,454 on 6 Feb. 2007, which is a Continuation-in-Part of U.S. Ser. No. 10/276,842, filed 19 Nov. 2002, which was issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,216,361 on 8 May 2007, which is a National Stage Entry and claims priority to PCT Application No. PCT/US00/13890, filed 19 May 2000, each of which is incorporated herein in its entirety by this reference thereto.
- This Application is also related to U.S. Ser. No. 11/737,666, filed 19 Apr. 2007, which is a Continuation of 10/276,842, filed 19 Nov. 2002, which was issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,216,361 on 8 May 2007, which is a National Stage Entry and claims priority to PCT Application No. PCT/US00/13890, filed 19 May 2000.
- 1. Field of the Invention
- The invention relates generally to the field of network security. More particularly the invention relates to a system and method for using the usage history of a particular piece of hardware to establish trust.
- 2. Technical Background
- In the field of authentication, there are generally three possible ways for a user to authenticate. The authentication can depend on what the user knows, for example, a password; what the user is, for example a fingerprint or a retinal pattern; or what the user has, for example, trusted hardware such as a keyed smart card or the like. As telecommunication and data networks continue to proliferate, the issue of network security becomes more and more important. Any one of the above alternatives is conventionally thought to provide good authentication.
- At one time, a conventional logon procedure, in which the user provided a user name or logon and a password to gain access to network services, provided adequate authentication for most purposes. While such a level of security remains sufficient for many applications, the increasing availability of such services as financial services, retail shopping, and healthcare information services over publicly accessible networks dictates a need for a level of authentication that cannot be provided through the use of simple password-based logon procedures, without more.
- Confounding the issue is the fact that passwords are easily compromised. Passwords can be compromised in a number of ways. Users often keep their passwords written on easily found Post-It® notes or scraps of paper, instead of committing them to memory. Users may disclose their passwords to friends and co-workers. What's more, users are often unwilling to keep track of multiple passwords for different applications, so they end up using a single default password, although security experts strongly recommend use of a unique password for each application. Hackers can use computer programs capable of systematically trying various alphanumeric combinations to launch brute force attacks on systems they are trying to access until a combination is found that grants them access to the targeted system.
- Establishing trust between a client and a server machine through the mere provision of a password is insufficient for transactions involving highly sensitive information. As such transactions become commonplace, the need for a relatively uncomplicated way of establishing higher levels of trust between becomes more acute. One way of providing increased trust is through the combination of at least two of the three alternatives described above. It is generally thought that combining two methods of authentication provides an excellent level of trust.
- The art provides examples of various schemes for establishing higher levels of trust. For example, M. Ensor, T. Kowalski, A. Primatic, User-transparent Security method and apparatus for authenticating user terminal access to a network, U.S. Pat. No. 5,721,780 (Feb. 24, 1998) describe a method and apparatus for implementing security in data and telecommunications networks that is independent of and transparent to users. When a user terminal connects to a network control center, the network control center generates an encrypted password based on the user terminal's network coupling identifier. The password is downloaded to the terminal and simultaneously saved by the network control center. Subsequently, when a user attempts to access the network, the network control center retrieves the password from the terminal and compares it with the stored copy. If there is a match, network access is granted. With each logon from the terminal, a new password is generated and downloaded to the user terminal.
- While the exchange of passwords described by Ensor, et al. allows a user terminal to be established as trusted on a session-by-session basis, the trust is based on a static designation that provides no information about the terminal's usage history. Furthermore, Ensor, et al. fail to contemplate combining the method described with other methods of authentication to provide superior quality authentication.
- K. Seamons, W. Winsborough, Trust negotiation in a client/server data processing network using automatic incremental credential disclosure, U.S. Pat. No. 6,349,338 (Feb. 19, 2002) describe a system in which trust is negotiated between two unfamiliar data processing apparatus by incrementally exchanging credentials. Providing multiple opportunities for exchange of credentials makes it possible to negotiate a high level of trust between two machines previously unfamiliar with each other than a single exchange of credentials. The approach provided by Seamons, et al. involves the iterative exchange of credentials and credential access policies, wherein the credentials are primarily issued by various third parties and describe the holder of the credential. The approach does not contemplate establishing a machine as a trusted machine based on historical usage of the machine that doesn't involve multiple exchanges of third party credentials. There is also no teaching of combining the approach with other approaches to provide an even higher level of trust.
- K. Shin, K. Kobayashi, T. Aratani, Device and method for authenticating access rights to resources, U.S. Pat. No. 5,987,134 (Nov. 16, 1999) provides an approach that requires several different components including challenging data, user identifying information and an access ticket. Shin, et al. are primarily concerned with authenticating a user, rather than establishing a particular piece of hardware as trusted. They do not contemplate using historical usage information in combination with other means of authentication as a means of negotiating a high level of trust.
- It would advance the art significantly to provide a means of establishing a particular piece of hardware, such as a client machine, as trusted hardware. It would be desirable to provide a method of establishing a trusted machine based on the machine's history of use, eliminating the necessity of exchanging credentials issued by third parties such as certification authorities. Furthermore, it would be a great advantage to provide a way of negotiating increased trust by combining historical usage information from a trusted machine with other authentication methods, such as user passwords.
- Establishing trust according to historical usage of selected hardware includes: providing a usage history for a selected client device; and extending trust to a selected user at a level at least partially based on the user's history of use of the selected client device. The usage history is embodied as signed statements issued by a third party for example, or an authentication server. In one embodiment of the invention, the issued statement is downloaded to the selected client device, and is provided by the client device when a user requests service and/or access from a network server. In another embodiment, the issued statement is stored on an authentication server, and is checked after provision of a public key from a key pair by the selected client device. The usage history is updated every time a user is authenticated from the selected client device. By combining the usage history with a conventional user authentication, a greater level of trust may be established than through user authentication alone in a very simple manner. The enhanced trust provided by logging on from a trusted client may eliminate the necessity of requiring secondary authentication for e-commerce and financial services transactions. In the case of lost or stolen passwords, the enhanced hardware-based trust facilitates password recovery and conflict resolution between the legitimate user logging on from the trusted hardware and the thief logging on from another client, and password recovery, when the thief has changed the password.
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FIG. 1 is a block schematic diagram of a user remote access scenario according to the invention; -
FIG. 2 is a block schematic diagram of a multiple access point example according to the invention; -
FIG. 3 is a block schematic diagram of a task viewpoint of the invention according to the invention; -
FIG. 4 provides a generalized schematic diagram of a system for establishing historical usage-based hardware trust according to the invention; -
FIG. 5 provide a schematic diagram of a first embodiment of the system ofFIG. 4 according to the invention; and -
FIG. 6 provides a schematic diagram of a second embodiment of the system ofFIG. 4 according to the invention. - I.
- The invention is embodied in an adaptive multi-tier authentication system in a computer environment. A system according to the invention automatically adapts to the user's login patterns. In addition, the invention provides a system that does not require additional hardware from the service provider by using a query-based security system.
- Users commonly have their passwords compromised (lost or stolen). Attackers can typically use the stolen username/password to impersonate a user from a remote site. This compromises the service that the attackers infiltrate, which is costly to the service providers. The invention makes this type of impersonation more difficult by providing secondary tiers of authentication which are used ONLY when the user attempts a connection from a new environment (i.e., from a new computer, kiosk, etc.).
- Referring to
FIG. 1 , a simple user interface scenario is shown. Theuser 101 logs onto theserver 102. The server retrieves the user's storeduse profile 103. The location where theuser 101 is accessing the server is checked against the user's profile to determine a trust level for the session. Theserver 102 determines if any additional security measures must be taken based on the trust level. - A preferred embodiment of the invention analyzes the user's use of a service and typical access points to augment the trust level of each access point. If the user is always dialing in from home to access a service such as AOL, the invention observes the pattern and, after a while, determines that the trust level is high when the user accesses the service from home. At that point, the invention will allow immediate login into the service without asking for any additional information.
- When the user suddenly goes travelling and accesses the service on the road, then the user's trust level is downgraded and more authentication questions are asked before allowing access. For example, the service may tell the user “We are surprised to see you dialing in from California. We just need to do a little extra background check on your identity. How many dogs did you tell us that you have? What are their names?”
- With respect to
FIG. 2 , the user may be a salesperson and travels to different cities. This user's patterns may be random at best because his access points are all across thecountry server 204 takes this into account and determines that this is the user's normal pattern. Theserver 204 records this fact in the user'sprofile 205. - However, if the user logs in to the
server 204 at onelocation 201 and then another user logs in using the same identity at anotherlocation 203, theserver 204 will immediately downgrade the trust level of the second location and ask more authentication questions. This also applies to the situation when a user logs in the United States, for example, and a similar login occurs in Japan five hours later. The invention knows that the time frame is improbable. - The invention automates the process of tracking information such as IP addresses, where the user dialed in from, and the access times. A profile of the combination of data is used to as a basis to determine the level of trust. For example, the invention uses the following criteria to adapt authentication for a system:
-
- Where the user is dialing in from (e.g., phone number).
- Type of machine being used (e.g., Mac or PC).
- Operating system on the machine.
- Cookies/tags that are on the machine.
- IP address (e.g., same IP address or same subnet).
- When a user logs on, some distinct aspect of the computer is recorded. In the typical case, a random token is written into memory, or onto the disk of the client computer. Logon proceeds as usual ONLY if the existing token is located on the computer used for the login (e.g., an identifying cookie would be used on a per-computer basis for HTTP transactions). When the element that is used to identify the computer does not match the user's “standard list of computers used” then some secondary questions are asked as described above (e.g., “What is your birthday?”, “What is your home phone number?”) before completing the authentication.
- The system adapts and learns new sites that the user logs in from, and then proceeds to use the minimal username/password from those sites only. Other techniques could be used to identify the logon environment as listed above (i.e., IP address or dial in line), but the creation of a unique mark (file, cookie, etc.) ensures verification of the environment.
- The user is not burdened with having to carry anything with him that could to be lost or stolen (e.g., smart cards). This approach is analogous to traditional human identification systems, where, when the user is known, then additional proof of ID is not requested.
- The user immediately knows when something is wrong when the invention suddenly asks for more information than usual. For example, if the user logs in from home, which is a normal situation, and the system asks for more information than normal, such as the user's dog's name. The unusual request would be an indicator to the user that something may be wrong, prompting the user to call into customer support to get more information.
- Referring to
FIG. 3 , the UserAccess Control module 301 accepts user input such as login attempts and responses to the system's questions. The UserAccess Control module 301 has the responsibility to search and check for information such as IP address, originating phone number, or cookies on the user's machine. The EvaluateUser Patterns module 302 takes the information obtained from the UserAccess Control module 301 and compares it to the usage information from the user/usage profile 303 for the specific user. The user/usage profile contains all of the user information that the user used to establish the account and also the usage profile detailing the user's access patterns. - The trust level of the current user login location is calculated and the Evaluate
User Patterns module 302 determines if any additional questions to the user are required. Questions are sent through the UserAccess Control module 301 to the user. The user's answers are relayed from the UserAccess Control module 301 back to the EvaluateUser Patterns module 302. The EvaluateUser Patterns module 302 grants or denies access based on the trust level and answers for any questions that it asked. The EvaluateUser Patterns module 302 updates the user/usage profile 303 for the user with the information just obtained. - II.
- The fact that a typical user logs onto a server from a single machine time and again over an extended period suggests that when the user logs on, or tries to log on from the single machine, either less authentication should be required, or a higher trust level should be established. The higher trust level may be used to enable such things as financial transactions or even logging on or changing passwords without knowing the current password.
-
FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of a system for establishing historical usage based hardware trust according to the invention. Typically, the system includes aclient 401 and aserver 402. The client device may be a desktop or laptop computer, a PDA (personal digital assistant) or information manager such as a PALM PILOT (PALM INC., MILPITAS Calif.), or a WAP (wireless access protocol) device such as a cellular telephone or a pager. A selected user of a selected client device logs onto theserver 402, or another server, from time to time, to request service and/or access. For the sake of description, the server has been shown as a single machine. In actual practice, the server may constitute more than one server. In an exemplary embodiment of the invention, theserver 402 may be an authentication server for an online service such as AOL (AOL INCORPORATED, DULLES Va.). Following authentication, the user may be granted service/and or access for a web server, an application server or a database server, for example. In another embodiment of the invention, the server from which service and/or access is sought additionally authenticates the user. - In addition to the
client device 401 and theserver 402, the system includes ausage history 403 for the client device. The usage history typically consists of one or more signed statements providing records of the client device's usage history. While the practitioner of ordinary skill will readily be able to discern parameters for the usage history, the usage history typically includes dates and times of use by the selected user. The usage history also includes information regarding significant events, such as password changes to user accounts that are made from the client. In one embodiment of the invention, the signed statements embodying the usage history are issued by theserver 402, in which case, the usage history includes the client device's logon history to that particular server. In another embodiment of the invention, the signed statements are issued by an independent credentialing authority, in which case, the usage history includes usage information for more than one target server. The statements may be signed by attaching a message authentication code, such as a keyed hash, rendering use of keys unnecessary. When the user logs on from the selectedclient 401, theserver 403 evaluates theusage history 403. - As indicated above, the invention is based on the recognition that a user often logs onto an online service from the same client time and again over an extended period. When such a usage history can be shown for a particular client, it merits tagging the client as a trusted machine. The client's status as a trusted machine indicates that when the selected user logs on, or attempts to log on from the trusted client, it is permissible to require less authentication, or that a higher trust level should be established. Thus, the hardware is being certified because it is being used. The current system and method are metaphors for the common real-world occurrence of extending a higher level of trust to a person based on familiarity. For example, a security guard is less likely to be suspicious of someone whom they see every day. Typically, the usage history is evaluated in connection with a conventional logon, during which the user provides a password, or some other secret. Additional security measures are possible. For example, the signed statements may be obscured and/or the password or other secret can be encrypted into the statement.
-
FIG. 5 shows an embodiment of the invention, wherein theusage history 403 a is stored on theclient 402, and is transmitted from the client to theserver 402 each time the user logs on. Following logon, the server updates the usage history by issuing a new signedstatement 403 b, which is subsequently stored on theclient 401. - It should be noted that it is an object of the invention to provide a level of security acceptable to most users in as simple and convenient a manner as possible. The conventional wisdom in the world of computer security is that more security is almost always better. However, in actual practice, users generally are willing to sacrifice some security for convenience and expediency, as shown by the fact that most users use the same password over and over, rather than taking the trouble to formulate and remember separate passwords for each individual need, as they are often advised to do. Thus, the invention provides an acceptable level of increased security over single mode authentication as conveniently and unobtrusively as possible.
-
FIG. 6 shows an embodiment of the invention in which theusage history 403 is stored on theserver 402. In this embodiment of the invention, a key pair, including public and private keys, for theclient 401 is provided. Typically, the key pair is stored in key repositories, for example in the ROM (read only memory) of the selected client. The private key (not shown) functions to establish the identity of theclient 401, because the client, apart from the private key, otherwise contain little specific identifiable information. During logon, thepublic key 404 is pushed to theserver 402, which allows theserver 402 to access theusage history 403 for the client stored at the server. Following logon, the usage history is updated. - The invention is particularly advantageous in that it is a completely passive arrangement, relying on the fact that no one, other than the selected user, has physical access to the selected client. A hacker, attempting to circumvent the current system would need to have physical access to the client to pirate the key pair or the usage history.
- One of the most useful applications of the invention is in password recovery when a user has forgotten their password, or when a hacker has stolen it. IT professionals know that password recovery imposes a significant burden in lost man-hours and wasted computing resources and poses a great inconvenience to users. When a user, having forgotten their password, attempts to logon from the trusted client using an incorrect password, the server, after evaluating the usage history and seeing that the logon originates from a trusted machine, can allow the user to change the account password, based on the increased level of trust inferred from the fact that is it unlikely that anyone other than the selected user has physical access to the trusted client. Allowing the password to be changed easily spares the user considerable inconvenience and spares the expense and waste of resources on the administrative side. In a case where a hacker has stolen the original password and, using the stolen password, has changed the account password, the user attempts to log on from the trusted machine with the original password. The server, detecting that the logon from the original user originates from the trusted client can allow the original user to change the password, based on implied trust from the signed statements. In another case, the rightful user of the account may change the password, after which someone else attempts to change the password from another client device. The server, seeing that the password was originally changed by a user logging on from a trusted client, resolves the conflict in favor of the user on the trusted client. Similarly, in the case of two users attempting to log on from different clients with the same password, the server resolves the conflict in favor of the user logging on from the trusted client.
- The invention also finds important application in the fields of e-commerce and network-based financial services. Many services require a second password or other credential to be provided when a higher level of authentication is needed. For example, Amazon.com requires no password to buy a product, but does require a password to change the address that the product is automatically shipped to (in a password-free purchase). AOL requires a second “shopping” password to perform an actual purchase, above and beyond the login password needed to access the email account and other services. In both cases, the signed statements (and implied trust in the hardware holding those statements) may be used in place of the secondary password. Thus, additional trust is deduced based on the signed statement.
- The invention is also advantageously deployed in deterring hackers. For example, hackers often launch brute force attacks, using software applications that automate the process of systematically trying different alphanumeric combinations to find the correct password. The server, recognizing that a login originates from a trusted client, can authenticate the password promptly. When the login originates from a non-trusted client, the server can extend the time period required for authenticating the password. The increased time can be long enough to encourage those attempting to hack into the account to abandon the effort.
- The invention can also be used to implement security policies. For example, changes to the account, such as changing passwords or preferences, or creating new sub-accounts may only be allowed when the user logs in from the trusted machine.
- Although the invention has been described herein with reference to certain preferred embodiments, one skilled in the art will readily appreciate that other applications may be substituted for those set forth herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Accordingly, the invention should only be limited by the Claims included below.
Claims (20)
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WO2004114082A2 (en) | 2004-12-29 |
US9397996B2 (en) | 2016-07-19 |
US20140041008A1 (en) | 2014-02-06 |
US8612747B2 (en) | 2013-12-17 |
US20040199770A1 (en) | 2004-10-07 |
US8181015B2 (en) | 2012-05-15 |
US20070118887A1 (en) | 2007-05-24 |
US7849307B2 (en) | 2010-12-07 |
US7174454B2 (en) | 2007-02-06 |
US20120222105A1 (en) | 2012-08-30 |
US8954730B2 (en) | 2015-02-10 |
WO2004114082A3 (en) | 2005-06-23 |
US20150128235A1 (en) | 2015-05-07 |
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