|Publication number||US20070150756 A1|
|Application number||US 11/614,816|
|Publication date||28 Jun 2007|
|Filing date||21 Dec 2006|
|Priority date||23 Dec 2005|
|Also published as||CA2633371A1, CN101346930A, CN101346930B, EP1802030A1, EP1964316A1, US8356188, US20070150752, WO2007071754A1|
|Publication number||11614816, 614816, US 2007/0150756 A1, US 2007/150756 A1, US 20070150756 A1, US 20070150756A1, US 2007150756 A1, US 2007150756A1, US-A1-20070150756, US-A1-2007150756, US2007/0150756A1, US2007/150756A1, US20070150756 A1, US20070150756A1, US2007150756 A1, US2007150756A1|
|Original Assignee||Nagracard S.A.|
|Export Citation||BiBTeX, EndNote, RefMan|
|Patent Citations (2), Referenced by (11), Classifications (8), Legal Events (2)|
|External Links: USPTO, USPTO Assignment, Espacenet|
The present invention concerns the field of system-on-chip and in particular the security around it.
System-on-a-chip or System on Chip (SoC or SOC) is an idea of integrating all components of a computer or other electronic system into a single integrated circuit (chip). It may contain digital, analog, mixed-signal, and often radio-frequency functions—all on one chip. A typical application is in the area of embedded systems.
Secure environment for processors have been already disclosed, in particular with respect to multi-processing architecture. For example, a solution to limit the access to a secure memory was described in the document WO04015553. According to this solution, the processor has two modes of operations; in the first mode, called the secure mode, access is permitted to the secure memory; and in the unsecure mode, the access to the secure memory is forbidden. The unsecure mode is intended to development purposes, i.e. testing or debugging the circuit. During the execution in unsecure mode, the access to the secure memory is physically blocked, i.e. a “disable” signal is generated. This “disable” signal forbids any attempt to access the secure memory.
Another solution is described in the document PCT/EP2000/056145 in which a single chip descrambling processor processes the scrambled audio/video data in order to never leave access to the clear data. When the descrambling operation is done, the descrambling unit comprises an encryption engine to encrypt the descrambled data before they are temporarily stored in an external memory. When the processor finishes the organization task, the data are decrypted in the output module and sent to the displaying device
The aim of the present invention: is to provide a secure system-on-chip for processing data, this system-on-chip comprising at least a central processing unit, an input and an output channel, an encryption/decryption engine and a memory, characterized in that said input channel comprises an input encryption module to add an internal encryption layer on all incoming data said output channel comprising an output decryption module to remove the internal encryption layer on all outgoing data, said central processing unit receiving the encrypted data from the input encryption module and storing them in the memory, and while processing the stored data, said central processing unit reading the stored data from the memory, requesting the removal of the internal encryption layer of same in the encryption/decryption engine, processing the data and requesting encryption of the result by the encryption/decryption engine so as to add the internal encryption layer and storing the encrypted result, outputting the result to the output decryption module for removing the internal encryption layer and exiting the result via the output channel
The main feature of the invention is to add an encryption layer within the system-on-chip. The data entering into and exiting the system on chip are usually encrypted. An additional encryption layer is applied to these data so that all data stored in the systems-on-chip have at least one encryption layer. One the data are received in the system-on-chip, they are usually decrypted with the key pertaining to the transmission system and the result is stored in clear. In the present invention, one the encrypted message is read by the system-on-chip, an internal encryption layer is applied on this message and passed to the processing unit. Said unit can store it for further use or immediately process the message. While processing the message, the first step is to remove the internal encryption layer so that the data is in the same condition as received by the system-on-chip. After the message is processed and the right (e.g.) is extracted, this right is further encrypted to add the internal encryption layer before being stored.
The removal of the internal encryption layer occurs only at the later stage when the data are really used by the central unit, the clear data being never accessible in a static state, When processed, the data can be stored in clear if they are for internal purpose or re-encrypted (i.e. adding the internal encryption layer) if they are intended to be outputted from the system-on-chip.
Once re-encrypted the data are temporarily stored in a buffer before being sent to the output channel.
The key to encrypt and decrypt the data is in a preferred embodiment unique for that system-on-chip, This key can be preprogrammed at the manufacturing step or can be randomly generated at the initialization stage and never known by anybody. This key is used only internally. The algorithm used can be kept secret as well as the parameters of said algorithm. For example, the algorithm IdeaNxt is used as encryption engine and the values of the substitution box are randomly generated in the system-on-chip.
According to a particular embodiment, the encryption/decryption algorithm is asymmetric, so that a key pair (public/private) is used to respectively encrypt and decrypt the data.
According to an alternative embodiment, the input encryption module can be replaced by a signature module, the data being signed while entering in the system-on-chip and the signature stored together with the data. When the central unit wishes to use this data, the encryption/decryption engine which is now a signature verification engine, checks the signature and authorizes the use of the data if the signature is correct.
By data it is meant a single byte or a set of bytes e.g. to form a message or a entitlement message in the system-on-chip.
The invention will be better understood thanks to the attached figures in which:
The secure system-on-chip SOC is based on a central processing unit CPU. The aim of this unit is to execute the code and to perform the requested tasks. The system-on-chip SOC comprises two channels connected to the outer world, namely the input and the output channels, The input channel RCV comprises an input encryption module RCV-E which encrypts all the data coming from the outer world so as to add an internal encryption layer. In the same manner, the output channel SND comprises an output decryption module SND-D to decrypt the data received from the central unit CPU before sending them to the outer world so as to remove the internal encryption layer.
The central unit CPU has access to the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN, This engine has the same function as the input encryption module and the output decryption module. The key K loaded in the input encryption module is the same in the encryption part of the encryption/decryption engine. The same applies to the output decryption module and the decryption part of the encryption/decryption engine, for the decryption operations. When the central unit CPU needs some data, either directly coming from the input encryption module or fetched from the memory MEM, these data are first passed through the decryption engine to remove the internal encryption layer before they are used by the central unit CPU,
In the same manner, when the central unit CPU has completed a task and produces a result, the following step being to store the result (or output the result to the output channel). This result is previously passed through the encryption engine CR-EN for adding the internal encryption layer before being stored. This encrypted result can then be stored in a memory or sent to the output channel,
The central processing unit CPU can decide if the result is to be re-encrypted or left in clear. Instead of letting the processor to decide, the target location can select different behaviors as shown in
According to an alternative embodiment shows in the
According to an alternative embodiment, the encryption/decryption engine is directly located in the central unit CPU. When a data is read from the memory, e.g. loading a variable in the accumulator of the CPU (e.g. LDAA #1200 h for Motorola 68HC11), the data read at that location is passed automatically to the decryption engine so as to remove the internal encryption layer before being transferred to the accumulator. In the same manner, the instruction to store the content of the accumulator to the memory (e.g. STAA #1200 h) is not directly executed but the data in the accumulator is previously passed through the encryption engine (so as to add the internal encryption layer) before being stored at the location 1200 h.
In a particular embodiment, the encryption/decryption engine is shared with the input and output channel. The input encryption module is therefore a virtual module and encryption operations at the input channel are achieved by the encryption engine through a data multiplexer. The data entering into the system-on-chip SOC, in particular through the input channel are passed through the encryption engine before further manipulation e.g. to store the data in an input buffer the input encryption module is therefore a virtual module using the resource of the encryption/decryption engine in encryption mode. The same apply for the output; decryption module which uses the encryption/decryption engine in decryption mode.
The input encryption module RCV-E can comprise more than one encryption unit. According to a particular embodiment shows in the
The output decryption module as well as the encryption/decryption engine comprise in the same manner also two or more units.
Alternatively, if the processor CPU recognize that the received data stored in an input buffer, don't need to be processed but only have to be stored in a permanent memory NV-MEM, the processor can request from the encryption/decryption engine the decryption by only one decryption unit, i.e. the unit having the volatile key. The stored data still remain encrypted by the permanent key for later use.
The system-on-chip SOC can additionally comprise an autonomous supervision module SM that can deterministically control the system-on-chip SOC. This module SM, comprises a normal working condition definitions of the system-on-chip SOC, and disabling means when the normal conditions are no longer fulfilled. This is achieved by different means. A first means includes measuring the quantity of data outputted, e.g. counting the number of data sets outputted. This operation will be hereafter described as counting data. A second means includes defining time windows during which input or output operations are allowed. A block of data is therefore is allowed if the length of same do not exceed the maximum time defined for a block. A third means includes detecting the state of the central unit CPU and their respective, duration, and acting accordingly as will be illustrated hereafter. The central unit CPU typically has different possible states, such as acquisition state, processing state, waiting state and outputting result state. When a message arrives to the system-on-chip, the same switches from waiting state to acquisition state. During that acquisition state, the input channel is enabled by the supervision module SM. Also during the same acquisition state, the supervision module SM counts the data arriving and compares this number to a predefined maximum. Any abnormal situation leads to a warning state in which the central unit CPU can decide how to react. The supervision module SM has the capability, especially in case of a warning state, to block the input and output channels and/or the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN.
When the external message is received, the supervision module SM causes the central unit CPU to go to processing state. During this state, the input and output channels are disabled. The supervision module SM comprises a time pattern corresponding to the minimum processing time by the central unit CPU, and disables the channels during this time. The central unit CPU can inform the supervision module SM that no result will be outputted. This has the consequence that the supervision module, SM only enables the input channel for waiting a new message. The output channel then remains disabled.
In a case where the central unit CPU wishes to send data to the external world, it then informs accordingly the supervision module SM, which in turn enables the output channel. The supervision module SM still continues to watch the activities on the output channel by counting the data sent and applying a time window during which the sending is authorized.
In this embodiment of the invention, the supervision module SM is thus able to work with information received from the central unit CPU, as well as with preprogrammed working patterns,
This module can also watch the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN by counting the data encrypted or decrypted. In the same manner, the working pattern of the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN is supervised in term of data quantity processed and time. The supervision module can disable the encryption/decryption engine CR-EN if abnormal conditions are detected.
It is to be noted that the supervision module SM can be implemented in a system-on-chip without the encryption/decryption in the input/output channels The data are processed without adding an additional encryption (or decryption) level and the input/output channel is watched by the supervision module SM.
This System-on-chip SOC is used in secure access control module in charge of receiving management messages including, rights or keys. This module can also comprises an high speed descrambling unit to receive an encrypted video data stream.
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|International Classification||G06F21/72, G06F12/14, G06F11/30|
|Cooperative Classification||H04L63/0428, G06F21/72|
|European Classification||H04L63/04B, G06F21/72|
|21 Dec 2006||AS||Assignment|
Owner name: NAGRACARD S.A., SWITZERLAND
Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:KUDELSKI, ANDRE;REEL/FRAME:018669/0691
Effective date: 20061207
|27 Jul 2012||AS||Assignment|
Free format text: MERGER;ASSIGNOR:NAGRACARD S.A.;REEL/FRAME:028658/0550
Effective date: 20090515
Owner name: NAGRAVISION S.A., SWITZERLAND