CA2347480A1 - Method and device for protecting digital data by double re-encryption - Google Patents

Method and device for protecting digital data by double re-encryption Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CA2347480A1
CA2347480A1 CA002347480A CA2347480A CA2347480A1 CA 2347480 A1 CA2347480 A1 CA 2347480A1 CA 002347480 A CA002347480 A CA 002347480A CA 2347480 A CA2347480 A CA 2347480A CA 2347480 A1 CA2347480 A1 CA 2347480A1
Authority
CA
Canada
Prior art keywords
key
digital data
changeable
encrypted
unchangeable
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Abandoned
Application number
CA002347480A
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Makoto Saito
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Mitsubishi Corp
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of CA2347480A1 publication Critical patent/CA2347480A1/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/433Content storage operation, e.g. storage operation in response to a pause request, caching operations
    • H04N21/4334Recording operations
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00478Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier wherein contents are decrypted and re-encrypted with a different key when being copied from/to a record carrier
    • GPHYSICS
    • G11INFORMATION STORAGE
    • G11BINFORMATION STORAGE BASED ON RELATIVE MOVEMENT BETWEEN RECORD CARRIER AND TRANSDUCER
    • G11B20/00Signal processing not specific to the method of recording or reproducing; Circuits therefor
    • G11B20/00086Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy
    • G11B20/0021Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier
    • G11B20/00485Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier
    • G11B20/00492Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted
    • G11B20/00536Circuits for prevention of unauthorised reproduction or copying, e.g. piracy involving encryption or decryption of contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier characterised by a specific kind of data which is encrypted and recorded on and/or reproduced from the record carrier wherein content or user data is encrypted wherein encrypted content data is subjected to a further, iterated encryption, e.g. interwoven encryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/44Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs
    • H04N21/4405Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs involving video stream decryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/44Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs
    • H04N21/4408Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream, rendering scenes according to MPEG-4 scene graphs involving video stream encryption, e.g. re-encrypting a decrypted video stream for redistribution in a home network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N5/00Details of television systems
    • H04N5/76Television signal recording
    • H04N5/91Television signal processing therefor
    • H04N5/913Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N5/00Details of television systems
    • H04N5/76Television signal recording
    • H04N5/91Television signal processing therefor
    • H04N5/913Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection
    • H04N2005/91357Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by modifying the video signal
    • H04N2005/91364Television signal processing therefor for scrambling ; for copy protection by modifying the video signal the video signal being scrambled

Abstract

A method and a device capable of protecting digital data reliably. Digital data are doubly re-encrypted by using a fixed key and a variable key. The order of using the encrypting keys is first the variable key and then the fixed key, or first the fixed key and then the variable key. The working examples are exemplified by one using a software, one using a hardware and one using a combination of a software and a hardware. The hardware can use a fixed key which has been developed for digital video. The software performs encryption/decryption in a region other than a kernel portion which cannot be used by the user so as to keep the safety of the program and the key used.
Specifically, the encryption/decryption are performed by a filter driver in an I/O manager, a device driver serving as a disk driver/net driver and an RTOS
utilizing an HAL. Either or both of two filter drivers on both sides of a file system driver can be used.

Description

METHOD AND DEVICE FOR PROTECTING DIGITAL
DATA BY DOUBLE RE-ENCRYPTION
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a system for managing digital contents, and in particular, to a system used for managing copyrights of the digital contents, which claim the copyrights, and for protecting the secrecy of the digital contents so 1 o as to develop digital contents distribution and to realize digital contents economics.
PRIOR ART
Hitherto widely spread analog contents are deteriorated in quality each time when they are stored, copied, edited and transferred, and hence, no serious problem in the copyright occurs during these operations. However, the digital contents are not deteriorated in quality after repeatedly stored, copied, edited and transferred, and the control of the copyright is an important issue.
2 o Digital data such as digital video data, digital audio data, etc. is mostly supplied to users on pay basis by broadcasting, by a DVD, etc. In such a case, the data is encrypted and supplied to exclude the viewing without paying a fee.
The encrypted and supplied digital data is decrypted by using a crypt key, which is supplied to the user by certain means, and the data is viewed. Because the quality of the decrypted digital data is not deteriorated even when it is stored, copied or transferred, if the data is stored, copied or transferred by the user, secondary viewing free of charge may occur. Re-use of the decrypted digital data contents is against the benefit of the data contents provider. In this respect, relating systems and equipments have been developed to prohibit re-using, i.e., secondary utilization such as storage, copying or transferring the digital data content.

However, the prohibition of the secondary utilization comes less attractive for the users in using the digital data contents and it is now recognized that this may hinder the propagation of the use of the digital data contents. In this respect, it is now proposed to prevent illegitimate use by re-encrypting the decrypted digital data content so that the use of the digital data content is more attractive for the users.
When the digital data, which is stored in a medium and is given or lent to a user or which is transferred to the user, is used for secondary utilization such as storing, copying or transferring it, it is impossible for the copyright owner to protect him ( her ) self the copyright of the digital data, which is at hand of the users. Therefore, it is required to protect the copyright automatically and forcibly by a certain method.
Under such circumstances, the present inventor has made various proposals with the purpose of protecting the digital content copyrights.
In Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publications 46419/1994 ( GB-2269302; USSN
08/098,415 ) and 141004/1994 ( USP5,794,115; USP5,901,339 ), the present inventor has proposed a system for managing copyrights by obtaining a permit key from a key control center via a public telephone line, and also, an apparatus for such a purpose in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 132916/1994 ( GB-2272822;
USSN 08/135,634).
Also, in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publications 271865/1995 ( EPOfi77949A2;
USSN 08/416,037 ) and 185448/1996 ( EP0704785A2; USSN 08/536,747 ), a system for copyright management of the digital contents has been proposed.
In these systems and apparatus, those who wish to view an encrypted program requests viewing to a management center via a communication line using a communication device. Upon receipt of the request of viewing, the management center transmits a permit key and charges and collects a fee.
Upon receipt of the permit key, the requestor transmits the permit key to a receiving device by on-line or off line means. When the permit key is received, the receiving device decrypts the encrypted program by using the permit key.
The system described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 271865/1995 (EP0677949A2; USSN 08/416,037), uses a program for managing the copyright and copyright information, in addition to a key for the use permission, to manage the copyright of the digital contents in displaying ( including process to sound ) , storing, copying, editing and transferring the digital contents, including real-time transmission of digital video contents, in a database system. The program for copyright management watches and manages in a manner that the digital content is not used outside the permission or user's requests.

Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 271865/1995 ( EP0677949A2; USSN
08/416,037 ) describes that the digital content is supplied from a database in the encrypted state and is decrypted by the copyright management program only when it is displayed or edited, and is again in the encrypted state when it is stored, copied or transferred. Further, it describes that the copyright management program itself is encrypted and is decrypted by using a permit key, and the decrypted copyright management program performs decryption and encryption of the copyrighted data, and that, when utilization other than storing and displaying the data is performed, copyright information including information of a person who has performed the utilization is added to the original copyright information and stored as a history.
Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 287014/199fi ( USP5,867,579;
EP0715241A2 ) has proposed an apparatus for decryption/re-encryption having a configuration of a board, a PCMCIA card, an IC card or an IC for the copyright management and a crypt key escrow system. This application also describes the copyright management method applying to a video conference system and an electronic commerce system. USP5,805,706, also describes an apparatus for decryption/re-encryption having a configuration of an IC.
Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 272745/1996 ( USP5,646,999;
EP0709760 ) has proposed a system, in which a copyright of original data of edited data by using a plurality of data and the copyright of edited data are protected by confirming validity of the use request according to a digital signature on an edit program by combining a secret-key cryptosystem and a public-key cryptosystem.
Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 288940/1996 ( USP5,740,246;
EP0719045A2 ) has proposed various forms for applying the copyright management system to a database system, a video-on-demand ( VOD ) system or an electronic commerce system.
Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 329011/1996 ( USP5,848,158;
EP0746126A2 ) has proposed a system, in which copyrights of original data and new data are protected by using a third crypt key and a copyright label in case of using and editing a plurality of data.
As it can be understood from the data copyright management systems and the data copyright management apparatus proposed by the present inventor as described above, the management of data copyrights can be accomplished by encryption/decryption/re-encryption and limiting the usage by the copyright management program. The cryptography technique and limitation of the usage can be realized by using a computer.
In a case where secret information is exchanged via a network, the information is encrypted for preventing piracy.
It is described in USPs5,504,818 and USP5,515,441 that the information piracy during transmission is prevented by encryption. Using a plurality of keys in such a case is described in USPs5,504,816, 5,353,351, 5,475,757 and 5,381,480, and performing re-encryption is described in USP5,479,514.
The protection of the copyright in the secondary utilization of the digital data by the copyright management program can be realized by re-encryption/re-decryption of the decrypted digital data and by managing and performing the re-encryption/re-decryption by using the copyright management program.
It is needless to say that as the means for carrying out re-encryption/re-decryption there are the cases where a software is used and where a hardware is used.
Here, the operation to obtain encrypted data C from non-encrypted data M by using a key K is expressed as:
C=E (M, K), and to obtain decrypted data M from encrypted data C by using the key K is expressed as:
M=D (C, K).
When re-encryption/re-decryption of the decrypted data M is repeated, re-encryption is expressed as:
b' i : Ci=E ( D ( Ci-1, Ki-1 ), Ki ), where i is a positive integer, and re-decryption is expressed as:
~ :M=D (E (Ci-1, Ki-1), Ki).
Referring to Fig. 1, description will be given on an arrangement of a set-top box ( STB ) conventionally proposed and on a method for protecting the digital data performed in the set-top box.
The description is not given here on peripheral circuits not directly related to encryption/decryption, e.g., an amplifier unit and a compression/decompression unit.
In Fig. 1, reference numeral 1 represents the digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by a digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. The data is encrypted by using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, Kl) and is supplied to a set-top box 2.
When the encrypted digital data C1 is supplied to the set-top box 2, the encrypted digital data C1 is decrypted at a decryption unit 3 by using the first changeable key Kl obtained from a key center via the same route as or via a different route from that of the encrypted digital data C1:
M=D ( C1, Kl ) and data M thus decrypted is outputted to a display unit 4 or the like.
In a case where the decrypted data M is stored in a medium such as a digital video disk ( DVD ) RAM or a hard disk, etc., or it is transferred outside via a network, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted at an encryption unit 6 of an unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 5 by using an unchangeable key K0:
do:CO=E (M, KO) =E (D (C1, Kl), KO) and re-encrypted data CO is stored in or transferred to an external device 8.
In a case where the re-encrypted data CO is used again, the re-encrypted data CO read from a storage medium of the external device 8 or transferred via the network is re-decrypted by using the unchangeable key KO at a decryption unit 7 of the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 5:
~ :M=D (C0, KO) =D (E (D (C1, Kl), KO) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 4 or the like.
In this case, in order to ensure security, it may be arranged in such a manner that the re-encrypted data CO in the storage medium is erased when the re-encrypted data CO is read from the storage medium via a route shown by a broken line in the figure and that the data re-encrypted again by using the unchangeable key KO is re-stored.
In USP5,805,706, an integrated circuit for performing re-encryption/re-decryption is described.
In the set-top box as arranged above, it is easy to handle because re-encryption/re-decryption is automatically carried out by the hardware by using the unchangeable key K0, and it is effective for forcible re-encryption/re-decryption of the digital data, which must be protected.
However, as the unchangeable key KO is placed in the device, and there is possibility that the unchangeable key KO may be known to others, it may become impossible to protect the digital data thereafter.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
To solve the above problem, present invention provides a method and an apparatus for double re-encrypting the data by using a changeable key in addition to re-encrypting by using an unchangeable key.
In use of the unchangeable key and the changeable key, there are cases where the changeable key is used first and the unchangeable key is then used, and where the unchangeable key is used first and the changeable key is then used.
The key used first when re-encrypting is used finally when decrypting, and accordingly, even if data, which is subsequently re-encrypted, is cryptanalyzed, security is highly ensured. Therefore, in a case where a changeable key is used first and next, an unchangeable key is used for re-encryption, the possibility that the changeable key is known to others is very low even when the unchangeable key has been known to the others.
In the aspects of the embodiments, there are the cases executed by a software and by a hardware, and further, by a combination of the software and the hardware. In case of the hardware, a hardware using the unchangeable key developed for digital video can be used.
In a case executed by the software, in order to ensure the security of the program and the key used, encryption/decryption is performed in a region under a kernel which the users cannot handle. More concretely, encryption/decryption is performed at a filter driver, a device driver, i.e., a disk driver/network driver, and a real-time OS using HAL in an I/0 manager. There are two filter drivers with a file system driver interposed between them, and either one of the filter drivers may be used, or both may be used.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWllVGS
Fig. 1 shows a general arrangement of a conventionally proposed set-top box;
Fig. 2 shows a general arrangement of a first embodiment of the present invention applied to a set-top box;
Fig. 3 shows a general arrangement of a second embodiment of the present invention applied to a set-top box;
Fig. 4 shows a general arrangement of a third embodiment applied to an _g_ apparatus using a personal computer;
Fig. 5 shows a general arrangement of a fourth embodiment applied to an apparatus using a personal computer;
Fig. 6 is a drawing to give detailed explanation for the fourth embodiment;
and Fig. 7 shows a general arrangement of a fifth embodiment applied to an apparatus using a personal computer.
Fig. 8 shows a general arrangement of a sixth embodiment set-top box, which is a variation of the first embodiment;
Fig. 9 shows a general arrangement of a seventh embodiment set-top, which is a variation of the sixth embodiment;
Fig. 10 shows a general arrangement of an eighth embodiment using a personal computer;
Fig. 11 illustrates a detailed description on the eighth embodiment;
Fig. 12 illustrates an embodiment of a copyright management apparatus;
Fig. 13 illustrates another embodiment of the copyright management apparatus; and Fig. 14 illustrates still another embodiment of the copyright management apparatus.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
The following describes embodiments of the present invention.
Referring to Fig. 2, description will be given on an arrangement of a set-top box ( STB ) of a first embodiment of the present invention, and a method for protecting the digital data in the set-top box.
In the set-top box of this embodiment, similarly to the case of the conventional set-top box example as shown in Fig. 1, description is not given on peripheral circuits not directly related to encryption/decryption, e.g., an amplifier unit, a compression/decompression unit and an interface unit for the outside.
_g_ The difference of the present embodiment from the conventionally proposed set-top box shown in Fig. 1 is that a changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19 for performing encryption/decryption by using a second changeable key KZ is inserted between an unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15 for performing encryption/decryption by using the unchangeable key KO and a decryption unit 13.
In Fig. 2, reference numeral 11 represents digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. The digital data is encrypted by using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, K1) and is supplied to a set-top box 12.
When the encrypted digital data C1 is supplied to the set-top box 12, the encrypted digital data C1 is decrypted at the decryption unit 13 by using the first changeable key Kl obtained from a key center via the same route as or via a route different from that of the encrypted digital data C 1:
M=D ( C1, Kl ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to a display unit 14 or the like.
In a case where the decrypted data M, for which the copyright is claimed, is stored in an external device 18, i.e., in a medium of a digital video disk ( DVD ) R.AM or a hard disk, or in a case where the data is transferred to the outside via a network, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted by using a second changeable key K2 at an encryption unit 20 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19:
b'2:C2=E (M, K2) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2), further, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted by using an unchangeable key KO at an encryption unit 16 of the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15:
b' 2-0 : C2-0=E ( C2, KO ) =E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO), and the data is stored in the external device 18 or transferred as double re-encrypted data C2-0.
In a case where the double re-encrypted data C2-0 is used again, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium of the external device 18 or transferred via a network is re-decrypted at a decryption unit 17 of the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15 by using the unchangeable key K0:
~ 2 : C2=E ( C2-0, KO ) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted by using the second changeable key K2 at a decryption unit 21 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19:
~ :M=D (C2, K2) =D (E (D (C1, K1), K2), and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 14 or the like.
In this case, in order to ensure the security, it may be arranged in such a manner that, when the re-encrypted data C2-0 is read from the storage medium via a route shown by a broken line in the figure, the re-encrypted data C2-0 in the storage medium is deleted and the data re-encrypted by using the changeable key K2 and the unchangeable key KO is re-stored.
As described above, because the re-encryption using the second changeable key K2 is performed before the re-encryption using the unchangeable key, even when the unchangeable key KO has been known to others, as the data is also encrypted by using the second changeable key K2, it is very d~cult to cryptanalyze the encrypted data by further finding out the second changeable key K2.
Also, the second changeable key K2 is first used for re-encryption, and it is again used for re-decryption after the unchangeable key KO is used for double re-encryption and re-decryption. Accordingly, the security of the second changeable key K2 is highly ensured, and because it is used first, it strongly governs the encrypted data at the most effective manner.
In the description of the above embodiment, the encryption unit 20 and the decryption unit 21 are contained in the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19 and the encryption unit 16 and the encryption unit 17 are contained in the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15, while it is needless to say that these units 16, 17, 20 and 21 may be separately provided.
The operation as above can be easily implemented by providing a computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus in the set-top box 12.
Now, referring to Fig. 3, description will be given on another arrangement of the set-top box, which is a second embodiment of the present invention, and also, on a method for protecting the digital data carried out in this set-top box.
In this second embodiment set-top box, similarly to the conventional set-top box example shown in Fig. 1, description is not given on peripheral circuits not directly related to encryption/decryption, e.g., an amplifier unit and a compression/decompression unit.
The difference of the second embodiment set-top box from the first embodiment set-top box shown in Fig. 2 is that the position is replaced with each other between the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 35 for encryption/decryption using the unchangeable key KO and the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 39 for encryption/decryption using the second changeable key K2.
This unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 35 for encryption/decryption using the unchangeable key KO is connected to a decryption unit 33 and a display 34, and an external changeable key encryption/decryption unit 39 for encryption/decryption using the second changeable key K2 is connected to an external device 38. The second changeable key K2 may be supplied from the outside or may be generated in the set-top box.
In Fig. 3, reference numeral 31 represents digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by a digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. The data is encrypted by using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, Kl ) and is supplied to a set-top box 32.
When the encrypted digital data C1 is supplied to the set-top box 32, the encrypted digital data C1 is decrypted at the decryption unit 33 by using the first changeable key Kl obtained via the same route as or via a route different from that of the encrypted digital data C1:
M=D ( C1, Kl ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to a display unit 34 or the like.
In a case where the decrypted data M, which states the copyright, is stored in an external device 38, i.e., in a medium such as a digital video disk ( DVD
) R.AM or a hard disk, etc., or is transferred to the outside via a network, the re-encrypted data C2 is re-encrypted by using the unchangeable key KO at the encryption unit 36 of the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 35:
b'O:CO=E (M, KO) =E (D (C1, K1), KO), further, the decrypted data M is double re-encrypted at an encryption unit 40 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 39 by using the second changeable key K2:
b 0-2 : CO-2 =E ( C0, K2 ) =E (E (D (C1, Kl), KO), K2), and double re-encrypted data CO-2 is stored in the external device 38 or transferred.
In a case where the double re-encrypted data CO-2 is used again, the re-encrypted data CO-2 read from the storage medium of the external device 38 or transferred via a network is re-decrypted by using the external changeable key at the re-decryption unit 41 of the external changeable key encryption/decryption unit 39:
~ : o : CO=E ( CO-2, KZ ) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), KO), K2), further, the re-decrypted data CO is again re-decrypted by using the unchangeable key KO at a decryption unit 37 of the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 35:
~ : M=D ( C0, KO ) =D (E (D (C1, Kl), KO) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 34 or the like.
In this case, in order to ensure the security, it may be arranged in such a manner that, when the re-encrypted data C2-0 is read from the storage medium via a route shown by a broken line in the figure, the double re-encrypted data CO-2 in the storage medium is erased and the data re-encrypted by using the unchangeable key KO and the external changeable key K2 is re-stored.

As described above, because the re-encryption is performed using the second changeable key K2 before the re-encryption using the unchangeable key K0, even when the unchangeable key KO has been known to others, as the data is also encrypted by using the second changeable key K0, it is very difficult to cryptanalyze the encrypted data by further finding out the second changeable key KO K2.
In this arrangement, the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 39 is simply added to the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 35 of the conventionally proposed set-top box shown in Fig. 1, and accordingly, the set-top box can be easily designed.
In the description of this embodiment, the encryption unit 36 and the decryption unit 37 are contained in the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 35 and the encryption unit 40 and the encryption unit 41 are contained in the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 39, while it is needless to say that these units 36, 37, 40 and 41 may be separately provided.
The operation as above can be easily implemented by providing a computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus in the set-top box 32.
Digital data contents are handled not only in the set-top box but also in a computer such as a personal computer.
Referring to Fig. 4 through Fig. 7, description will be given on embodiments of the present invention applied to an apparatus using a personal computer.
Unlike the set-top box where all components are constituted of hardware and are operated only by the hardware, a personal computer is an apparatus, which is operated by controlling the hardware incorporated in the apparatus using software.
In order to efficiently operate the computer, an operating system ( OS ) is used, which manages the overall operation of the computer.
A conventional type operating system used in the personal computer comprises a kernel for providing basic services such as memory management, task management, interrupting and communication between processes, and an operating system service providing other services.
On the other hand, with the changes on the computer side situations, for example, the function improvement of a microprocessor and price decreasing of a RAM used as a main memory, and also with the increase of performance ability of computers requested by users, the improvement of the functions of the operation system to manage the overall computer operation has been required. Then, the scale of the operating system has become comparatively larger than before.
Since such an enlarged operating system occupies itself larger space in the hard disk where it is to be stored, the space to store application programs or data needed by the user is liable to be rather limited, and that may lead to inconvenience for the user to use the computer.
To cope with such situations, in the newest operating system, it is often designed in such a manner that an environmental subsystem for performing emulation of the other operating system and graphics, and a core subsystem such as a security subsystem are removed from the kernel as the subsystem part, which depends on the user. And operating system is constituted as basic parts consist a micro-kernel such as a HAL ( hardware abstraction layer ) to absorb differences of hardware, a scheduling function, an interrupt function, an IJO management function, etc., and a system service API ( application programming interface ) is interposed between the subsystem and the micro-kernel.
By the arrangement as above, expandability of the operating system required for the change or addition of functions is improved, and portability of the operating system corresponding to the intended purpose can be made much easier.
By the distributed arrangement of elements of the micro-kernel to a plurality of network computers, it is now possible to easily realize the distributed operating system.
Computers are used in computer peripheral units, various types of control units, communication devices, etc., in addition to personal computers typically represented by the desk-top type or notebook type personal computers. In such cases, unlike the operating system for a general-purpose personal computer, in which importance is put on man-machine interface, a real-time operating system is adopted, in which importance is placed on speedy execution, an operating system especially for embedding suitable for each of these units and devices.
As a matter of course, the cost for development is increased when developing an operating system specially for each of embedded different devices. For this reason, it is recently proposed to use a general-purpose operating system in the personal computer also for the embedded type real-time operating system. By arranging a program specibc for embedded type in a subsystem combined with a micro-kernel, it is now practiced to obtain embedded type real-time operating system.
Major functions of the operating system include task management such as scheduling or interrupt processing.
The task management has mainly two different types in the operating system: single task type, which only performs one task processing at the same time, and mufti-task type for performing a plurality of task processings at the same time. The mufti-task type is divided to mufti-task type where changeover of the task depends upon the task to be processed, and mufti-task type not dependent upon the task to be processed.
Among these, the single task type allocates one process to an MPU so that the MPU is not free until the process is completed. Non-preemptive mufti-task type allows the MPU to be allocated a plurality of processes by time division, so that process is not executed unless the process in execution gives the control back to the operating system. Preemptive mufti-task type interrupts the process in execution at a certain time interval, so that the control is forcibly transferred to the other process.
Therefore, real-time mufti-tasking can be achieved only by the preemptive type.
The task management in the computer is carried out according to the process, which is a unit having system resources such as a memory, a file, etc., and the process is managed according to a thread, which is a unit to allocate CPU
time with divided processes. In this case, the system resources are shared by all threads in the same process. This means that there are more than one thread to share the system resources in one process.
Each task to be processed by the mufti-task type has priority spectrum, which is generally divided to 32 steps. The normal task performing no interrupt is classified to dynamic classes, which are divided to 0 - 15 steps, and the task performing interrupt is classified to real-time classes to be divided to 16 -31 steps.
Interrupt processing is executed using interrupt enable time ( normally i0 milliseconds) called as a "time slice" as a unit. Ordinary interrupt is executed at 10-millisecond time slice.

Under such circumstances, a time slice has been recently proposed, in which interrupt enable time called as a "real-time slice" is 100 microseconds. If this real-time slice is used, it is possible to execute intemtpt with priority to the conventional interrupt of 10 milliseconds.
In a third embodiment shown in Fig. 4, changeable key encryption/decryption processing by a software and the management of a crypt key in the computer are carried out by a real-time OS in HAL.
In Fig. 4, reference numeral 51 represents an operating system in a computer; 56 a display unit for displaying output from the computer; 57 an unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit; and 58 a data storage medium such as a digital versatile disk ( DVD ) RAM or a hard disk, or a data transfer system such as a network.
The operating system 51 comprises an operating system service 52 and a system service API 53, which are a user region, and a kernel 54 and a HAL 55, which are a non-user region. The system service API 53 is arranged between the operating system service 52 and the kernel 54 and serves to mediate between the operating system service 52 and the kernel 54. The HAL 55 is arranged at the lowermost layer of the operating system 50 and serves to absorb differences between in the hardware for the software.
The operating system service 52 comprises an application 59, a subsystem 60 and a security subsystem 61. The kernel 54 comprises a plurality of micro-kernels 62 and 64 and a kernel 63. Micro-kernel 62 has task management functions such as scheduling, interrupt, etc., and the micro-kernel 64 has I/0 management function.
The micro-kernel 64 having I/0 management function comprises an I/0 manager 65, device drivers such as a disk driver 67 and a network driver 68, which are managed by the I/0 manager, and a filter driver 66 which is inserted when necessary between the I/0 manager 65 and the device drivers such as the disk driver 67 and the network driver 68.
The changeable key encryption/decryption processing in the computer is executed by a software. In case of the third embodiment, the changeable key encryption/decryption processing is carried out by the aforementioned real-time OS
(RTOS) with priority to other tasks at the HAL 55 in the operating system 51.
Similarly to the first embodiment shown in Fig. 2, digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by a digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. is encrypted using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, Kl) and is supplied. The supplied encrypted digital data C1 is decrypted by the operating system service 52 by using the first changeable key Kl provided from the key center via the same route as or via a route different from that of the encrypted digital data C1:
M=D ( C1, K1 ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 56 or the like.
In a case where the decrypted data M, which claims its copyright, is stored in a medium such as a digital versatile disk ( DVD ) RAM or a hard disk, or where it is transferred to the outside via a network, the decrypted data M is mandatorily re-encrypted at HAL 55 by using a second changeable key K2:
d2:C2=E (M, K2) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2).
Further, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted at the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57 by using an unchangeable key K0:
d 2-0 : C2-0 =E ( C2, KO ) =E (E (D (Cl, Kl), K2), KO), and the double re-encrypted data C2-0 is stored in an external device or transferred. The changeable key K2 may be provided from the outside or may be generated in a set-top box.
When the double re-encrypted data C2-0 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium or transferred via the network is re-decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57:
~ 2 : C2 =E ( C2-0, KO ) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO).
Further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key at the HAL 55 having the changeable key encryption/decryption function:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D (E (D (C1, K1), K2), and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to the display unit 56 or the like.
The real-time OS is executed in priority to every other task. In the third embodiment, the real-time OS is implemented at the HAL, being a contact point with the hardware in the operating system. Accordingly, the re-encryption of the digital data is performed in a reliable manner, and it is impossible for the decrypted data M as it is to be stored into the external device or to be transferred.
Also, re-encryption is performed using the second changeable key K2 before the re-encryption using the unchangeable key K0. As a result, even if the unchangeable key KO is known, it is very difficult to cryptanalyze the encrypted data by finding out the second changeable key K2, as the data is also encrypted by the second changeable key K2.
Because the second changeable key K2 is used first and is then used after the unchangeable key KO has been used, the key security can be ensured.
Because the second changeable key K2 is used first, it strongly governs the encrypted data.
The above operations can be easily implemented by arranging the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57 as a sub-computer structure having a CPU and a system-bus.
In a fourth embodiment shown in Fig. 5, the changeable key encryption/decryption by a software in the computer is carried out at a filter driver 66 placed in the I/0 management micro-kernel 64 in the kernel 54.
Fig. 6 shows an arrangement of the I/0 management micro-kernel 64 with the filter driver 66 placed in it.
In the I/0 management micro-kernel with no filter driver placed in it, a file system driver 69, an intermediate driver 70 and a device driver 71 are arranged from upper hierarchy to lower hierarchy. When necessary, a filter driver 66A
or a filter driver 66B is placed above the file system driver 69 or between the intermediate driver 70 and the device driver 71.
Because it can be designed to have these filter drivers 66A and 66B perform re-encryption/re-decryption and management of the key, the filter drivers 66A
or 66B is designed to carry out the re-encryption/re-decryption processing and the key management in this embodiment.
The filter driver is arranged, not in the operating system service unit 52 which the user can handle, but in the kernel 54 which the user cannot handle.
On the other hand, it is generally practiced to make the specification change to fit for the computer using the operating system. In particular, it is not very rare to change the I/0 manager therein.
Utilizing the above, the modules having the function of re-encryption/re-decryption processing and the key management are placed in the I/0 manager as the filter driver 66A or the filter driver 66B in the fourth embodiment.
Similarly to the first embodiment shown in Fig. 2, digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. is encrypted using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, Kl) and it is supplied. The encrypted and supplied digital data C1 is decrypted by the operating system service unit 52 using the first changeable key Kl provided from the key center via the same route as or via a route different from that of the encrypted digital data C1:
M=D ( C1, K1 ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 56 and the like.
In a case where the decrypted data M, which states its copyright, is stored in a medium such as a digital versatile disk ( DVD ) RAM or a hard disk, or in a case where it is transferred to the outside via a network, the decrypted data M is mandatorily re-encrypted at the filter driver 66A or 66B using the external changeable key K2:
b'2:C2=E (M, K2) =E (D (C1, K1), K2).
Further, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted at the internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57, using an unchangeable key K0:
b' 2-o : C2-0=E ( C2, KO ) =E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO), and double re-encrypted data C2-0 is stored into the external device or transferred. The changeable key K2 may be provided from the outside or may be generated in a set-top box.
When the double re-encrypted data C2-0 is utilized again, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium or transferred via the network is re-decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57:
~ 2:C2=E (C2-0, KO) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), KZ), KO).
Further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted at the filter driver 66A or 66B, using the second changeable key K2:
~ :M=D (C2, K2) =D (E (D (C1, Kl), K2) and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to the display unit 56 or the like.
The filter driver can be easily placed into the kernel of the operation system in a part of the I/0 manager. In so doing, the function of the re-encryption/re-decryption processing and the key management can be easily incorporated in the operation system. Also, since re-encryption is performed using the second changeable key K2 before the re-encryption using the unchangeable key K0, even if the unchangeable key KO is known to others, it is very difficult to cryptanalyze the encrypted data by finding out the second changeable key KO
because the data is also encrypted by the second changeable key K0.

Further, because the second changeable key KO is used first, and is then, used after the unchangeable key KO is used, the key security can be highly ensured. Also, because the second changeable key K2 is used first, it strongly governs the encrypted data. ' The above operations can be easily implemented by arranging the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57 as a sub-computer structure having a CPU and a system-bus.
In a fifth embodiment shown in Fig. 7, the changeable key encryption/decryption and the key management by a software in a computer are carried out at the disk driver 57 and the network driver 68 contained in the management micro-kernel 64 in the operating system 51.
As already explained in connexion with Fig. 6, the file system driver 69, the intermediate driver 70, and the device driver 71 are arranged from upper hierarchy to lower hierarchy in the I/0 management micro-kernel. The changeable key encryption/decryption processing and the key management can be carried out also in the device driver 71 positioned at the lowermost layer.
Similarly to the first embodiment shown in Fig. 2, the digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. is encrypted using the first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, K1) and it is supplied. The encrypted and supplied digital data C1 is decrypted by the operating system service unit 52 using the first changeable key K1 provided from the key center via the same route as or a route different from that of the encrypted digital data C 1:

M=D ( C1, K1 ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 56 or the like.
In a case where the decrypted data M, which states its copyright, is stored in a medium such as a digital versatile disk ( DVD ) RAM or a hard disk, or in a case where it is transferred to the outside via a network, the decrypted data M is mandatorily re-encrypted at the device driver 71, i.e., the disk driver 67 and the network driver 68, using the second changeable key K2:
b'2:C2=E (M, K2) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2).
Further, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted at the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57 using the unchangeable key KO placed in the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57:
b 2-0 : C2-0=E ( C2, KO ) =E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO), and double re-encrypted data C2-0 is stored in the external device or transferred.
The changeable key K2 may be provided from the outside or may be generated in a set-top box.
When the double re-encrypted data C2-0 is utilised again, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium or transferred via a network is re-decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57:
~2:C2=E (C2-0, KO) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO).
Further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted at the device driver 71, i.e., the disk driver 67 and the network driver fib, using the changeable key K2:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D (E (D (C1, K1), K2) and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to the display unit 56 or the like.
For the device driver, it is generally practiced to make the specification change to fit for the computer using the operating system or when the corresponding device has been mod~ed.
As the function of the re-encryption/re-decryption processing and the key management is incorporated into such the device driver, it allows to easily incorporate the function into the kernel of the operating system. Also, since re-encryption is performed using the second changeable key K2 before the re-encryption using the unchangeable key K0, even if the unchangeable key KO
is known to others, it is very difficult to cryptanalyze the encrypted data by finding out the second changeable key K2 because the data is also encrypted using the second changeable key K2.
There is a possibility if the second changeable key K2 may be known to others, while it is repeatedly used. In such a case, it is preferably designed in such a manner that the second changeable key K2 used for encryption is abandoned and it is again generated when necessary for decryption, as described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 185448/1996 ( EP0704885A2, USSN 08/53&,749 ) . If it is necessary to have the key for decryption, it should be obtained from the key center again.
For the security purpose, K1, K2 and KO may be based on different crypt algorithm.
These operations can be easily implemented by arranging the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 57 as a sub-computer structure having a CPU and a system-bus.

In the embodiments described above, the second changeable key K2 and the unchangeable key KO are used in addition to the first changeable key Kl. In the embodiments described below, a third changeable key K3 is used additionally so that more reliable copyright management of digital contents is provided.
Referring to Fig. 8, description will be given on an arrangement of a set-top box in a sixth embodiment of the present invention, which is a variation of the first embodiment, and also on a method for protecting digital data carried out in the set-top box.
In the set-top box of this embodiment, similarly to the first embodiment set-top box, no description is given on peripheral circuits not directly related to encryption/decryption, e.g., an amplifier unit and a compression/decompression unit.
The set-top box of the sixth embodiment has a difference from that of the first embodiment in distinguishing between a case where the decrypted data M
is stored in a storage medium 81 such as a hard disk, which is incorporated into or dedicated to the set-top box, and another case where the decrypted data M is stored in a removable medium, e.g., a DVD-RAM, in an external 82 or is transferred to the outside via a network.
The internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15 and further a changeable key encryption unit 80 are provided. In a case where the decrypted copyrighted data is stored, for example, in a hard disk as a storage medium 81, which is incorporated into or dedicated to the set-top box, it is double re-encrypted using an internal unchangeable key K0. On the other hand, in a case where it is stored in a removable medium, i.e., a DVD-RAM, or is transferred to the outside via the network, it is double re-encrypted, not by the internal unchangeable key KO
but by a third changeable key K3.

In Fig. 8, reference numeral 11 represents digital data, which is supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by a digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. The digital data is encrypted using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
CZ=E (M, K1) and encrypted digital data C 1 is supplied to a set-top box 12.
When the encrypted digital data C1 is supplied to the set top box 12, the encrypted digital data C1 is decrypted at a decryption unit 13 using a first changeable key Kl obtained from a key center:
M=D ( C1, K1 ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to a display unit 14 or the like.
In a case where the decrypted copyrighted data M is stored in a storage medium 81 such as a hard disk, which is incorporated into or is dedicated to the set-top box 12, or in a removable medium such as a DVD-RAM, or where it is transferred outside via a network, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted at an encryption unit 20 of a changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19 using a second changeable key K2, which is obtained from the key center or generated in the set-top box 12:
b' 2: C2=E (M, K2) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2).
In a case where the re-encrypted data C2 is stored in a hard disk of the storage medium 81 incorporated into or dedicated to the set-top box 12, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted at an encryption unit 16 of an internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15 using an unchangeable crypt key KO placed in the internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15:
b' 2-0: C2-0=E ( C2, KO ) =E (E (D (Cl, Kl), K2), KO) and the double re-encrypted data C2-0 is stored in the storage medium 81 or the like.
When the double re-encrypted data C2-0 stored in the storage medium 81 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium 81 is decrypted using the unchangeable crypt key KO placed in a decryption unit 17 of the internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15:
~ 2: C2=D (C2-0, KO) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO) =E (E (D (C1, K1), K2), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the changeable key K2 at a decryption unit 21 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D (E (D (C1, K1), K2) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 14 or the like.
In this case, in order to ensure security, when the re-encrypted data C2-0 is read from the storage medium 81 via a path shown by a broken line in the figure, it may be designed in a manner that the re-encrypted data C2-0 in the storage medium 81 is erased at that time, and that the data re-encrypted using the changeable key K2 and the internal unchangeable key KO is stored again.
In a case where the re-encrypted data C2 is stored in a DVD-RAM of a removable medium, or it is transferred outside via a network at the externals 82, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted using a third changeable key K3, which is obtained from the key center or generated in the set-top box 12, at a changeable key encryption unit 80:
b' 2-3: C2-3=E ( C2, K3 ) =E (E (M, K2), K3).
When the double re-encrypted data C2-3 sent to the externals 82 is utilized, the double re-encrypted data C2-3 is decrypted using the third changeable key stored at a decryption unit 84 of a changeable key encryption/decryption unit 83:
~ 2: C2=D ( C2-3, K3 ) =D (E (M, K2), K3), K3) =E ( M, K2 ), further, the re-encrypted data C2 thus obtained is decrypted using the second changeable key K2 at a decryption unit 85 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 83:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D (E (M, K2), K2) and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to a display unit 86 or the like.
These operations can be easily achieved by providing a sub-computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus in the set-top box 12.
Referring to Fig. 9, description will be given on an arrangement of a set-top box of a seventh embodiment, which is a variation of the sixth embodiment, and also on a method for protecting digital data carried out in the set-top box.
In the set-top box of this embodiment again, similarly to the sixth embodiment set-top box, no description is given on peripheral circuits not directly related to encryption/description, e.g., an amplifier unit and a compression/decompression unit.
The seventh embodiment set-top box has difference from that of the sixth embodiment that the inserted positions are exchanged between the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15 for performing encryption/decryption using the unchangeable key KO and the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19 for performing encryption/decryption using the second changeable key K2, and that there is further provided a changeable key encryption unit 87 for performing encryptior~/decryption using the second changeable key K2 for the case where the data is stored in a DVD-RAM of a removable medium or is transferred outside via a network at the externals 82.
The digital data 11, which is supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial wave broadcasting, digital CATV broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by a digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc., is encrypted using a first changeable key K1 in order to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, K1) and encrypted digital data C1 is supplied to the set-top box 12.
When the encrypted digital data Cl is supplied to the set-top box 12, the encrypted digital data C1 is decrypted at the decryption unit 13 using the first changeable key Kl obtained from the key center:
M=D ( C1, K1 ) and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to the display unit 14 or the like.
In a case where the copyrighted and decrypted data M is stored in the storage medium 81 such as a hard disk incorporated into or dedicated to the set-top box 12, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted to re-encrypted data CO using the unchangeable crypt key KO at the internal unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15:
b' 0: CO=E (M, KO) " CA 02347480 2001-04-12 =E (D (C1, K1), KO).
The re-encrypted data CO is double re-encrypted at the encryption unit 20 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19 using the second changeable key K2 obtained from the key center or generated in the set-top box 12:
'd 0-2: CO-2=E ( C0, K2 ) =E ( E ( M, KO ) , K2 ) and the double re-encrypted data CO-2 is stored in the storage medium 81 or the like.
When the double re-encrypted data CO-2 stored in the storage medium 81 is utilized, the double re-encrypted data CO-2 read from the storage medium 81 is re-decrypted at the decryption unit 21 of the changeable key encryption/
decryption unit 19 using the second changeable key K2:
~ 0: CO=D ( CO-2, K2 ) =D ( E ( C0, K2 ), K2 ), further, the re-decrypted data CO is re-decrypted again using the unchangeable key KO at the decryption unit 17 of the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15:
~ :M=D ( C0, KO ) =D (E (M, KO), KO) and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to the display unit 14 or the like.
In this case, in order to ensure security, when the re-encrypted data CO-2 is read from the storage medium 81 via a route shown by a broken line in the figure, it may be designed in a manner that the re-encrypted data CO-2 in the storage medium 81 is erased at that time, and that the data re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 and the unchangeable key KO is stored again.

In a case where the decrypted data M is stored in a DVD-RAM of a removable medium or is transferred outside via a network at the externals 82, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted to re-encrypted data C3 using a third changeable key K3 obtained from the key center or generated in the set-top box 12 at the changeable key encryption unit 80:
'd 3 : C3 = E ( M, K3 ) =E (D (C1, Kl), K3).
The re-encrypted data C3 is encrypted to double re-encrypted data C3-2 at the changeable key encryption unit 87 using the second changeable key K2 obtained from the key center or generated at the set-top box 12:
b' 3-2: C3-2=E ( C3, K2 ) =E (E (D (C1, K1), K3), K2) and the double re-encrypted data C3-2 is stored in the DVD-RAM or is transferred via a network in the externals 82.
When the double re-encrypted data C3-2 sent to the externals 82 is utilized, the double re-encrypted data C3-2 is decrypted using the third changeable key at the decryption unit 84 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 83:
~ 3: C3=D ( C3-2, K2 ) =D (E (C3, K2), K2), further, the double re-encrypted data C2 thus obtained is decrypted using the third changeable key K3 at the decryption unit 85 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 83:
~ : M=D ( C3, K3 ) =D ( E ( M, K3 ), K3 ) and the decrypted data M thus obtained is outputted to the display unit 86 or the like.

In the above embodiment, the third changeable key K3 is used at the changeable key encryption unit 80 and the second changeable key K2 is used at the changeable key encryption unit 87, while this may be performed in reverse order.
Also, it may be designed in a manner that the encryption unit 20 of the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19 serves the function of the changeable key encryption unit 87.
While description has been given on the above in the case where the encryption unit 16 and the decryption unit 17 are contained in the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 15 and the encryption unit 20 and the decryption unit 21 are contained in the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 19, it is needless to say that these units 16, 17, 20 and 21 may be separately provided.
These operations can be easily achieved by providing a sub-computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus in the set-top box 12.
Description will be given on a variation, which is applied to an embodiment using a personal computer.
This eighth embodiment shown in Fig. 10 is a variation of the fourth embodiment shown in Fig. 5. In the embodiment, detailed description common to the fourth embodiment arrangement is not given here.
The eighth embodiment has a difference from the fourth embodiment in distinguishing between the cases where the decrypted data M is stored in a storage medium 81 such as a hard disk incorporated into or dedicated to the computer, and where it is stored in a removable medium 92 such as a DVD-RAM or is transferred outside via a network 93.
For this purpose, changeable key encryption units 90 and 91 are provided as a hardware 88, in addition to the unchangeable key encryption/decryption unit 89.

In a case where the copyrighted and decrypted data is stored in the hard disk 81 of the storage medium incorporated into or dedicated to the computer, it is double re-encrypted and decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the encryption/decryption unit 91 via a disk driver 67. In a case where the data is stored in the DVD-RAM 89 of the removable medium, it is double re-encrypted and decrypted using the third changeable key K3 at the encryption/ decryption unit 90 via the disk driver 67. In a case where the data is transferred outside via the network 93, it is double re-encrypted and decrypted using the third changeable key K3 at the changeable key encryption./decryption unit 91 via a network driver 68.
Similarly to the first embodiment shown in Fig. 2, the digital data supplied by broadcasting means such as digital terrestrial broadcasting, digital CATV
broadcasting, digital satellite broadcasting, etc., by network means such as Internet, or by a digital storage medium such as a DVD, a CD, etc. is encrypted using a first changeable key Kl to prevent illegitimate use:
C1=E (M, Kl) and is supplied. The encrypted digital data C1 thus supplied is decrypted at the operating system service 52 using the first changeable key K1 provided from the key center via the same route as or a route different from that of the encrypted digital data C 1:
M=D ( Cl, Kl ) and the decrypted data M is outputted to the display unit 56 or the like.
In cases where the decrypted data M is stored in the storage medium 81 incorporated into or dedicated to the computer, such as a hard disk, where it is stored in a medium such as the DVD-RAM, and where it is transferred outside via a network, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted at a filter driver 6fi using the second changeable key K2 obtained from the key center or generated in the operating system service 52:

b' 2: C2=E (M, K2 ) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2).
Further, when the re-encrypted data C2 is stored in a computer-incorporated or -dedicated storage medium 81, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted using an unchangeable key KO at the encryption/decryption unit 89 in the hardware 88:
b' 2-O:C2-0=E (C2, KO) =E (E (D (C1, K1), K2), KO) and double re-encrypted data C2-0 is stored in the hard disk 81 or the like.
In a case where the double re-encrypted data C2-0 stored in the storage medium 81 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium is re-decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the encryption/decryption unit 89 in the hardware 88:
~ 2: C2=E (C2-0, KO) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), KO), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key at the filter driver 66 having encryption/ decryption function:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D ( E ( D ( C1, Kl ), K2 ), and the decrypted data M is outputted by the operating system of the computer to the display unit 56 or the like to be utilized.
When the re-encrypted data C2 is stored in a DVD-RAM of the removable medium, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 at the changeable key encryption/decryption unit 90 of the hardware:
t~/ 2-3: C2-3=E (C2, K3) =E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), K3) and double re-encrypted data C2-3 is stored in the removable medium, the DVD-RAM.

In a case where the double re-encrypted data C2-3 stored in the removable medium 92 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-3 read from the removable medium 92 is re-decrypted using the third changeable key K3 obtained from the key center or generated in the operating system service 52 at the encryption/decryption unit 90 in the hardware:
~ 2: C2=E ( C2-3, K3 =D ( E ( E ( D ( C1, Kl ), K2 ), K3 ), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key at the filter driver 66 having encryption/ decryption function:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D ( E ( D ( Cl, Kl ), k2 ) and the decrypted data M is outputted by the operating system of the computer to the display unit 56 or the like to be utilized.
When the re-encrypted data C2 is transferred outside via the network 93, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 at the encryption/decryption unit 91:
b' 2-3: C2-3 =E ( C2, K3 ) =E ( E ( D ( C1, Kl ), K2 ), K3 ) and double re-encrypted data C2-3 is transferred outside via the network 93.
In a case where the double re-encrypted data C2-3 transferred from the outside via the network 88 is utilized, the encrypted data C2-3 is re-decrypted using the third changeable key K3 at the encryption/decryption unit 91:
~ 2: C2=E (C2-3, K3) =D (E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2) K3), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key at the filter driver 66 having encryption/ decryption function:
~:M=D (C2, K2) =D (E (D (C1, Kl), K2) and the decrypted data M is outputted by the operating system of the computer to the display unit 56 or the like to be utilized.
In the above embodiment, in order to facilitate the explanation, it has been described that the encryption/decryption units 90 and 91 are separate, while it is needless to say that these units may be a single unit.
The encryption/decryption as described above is managed by a real-time OS
(RTOS ) as already explained, with priority to the other tasks at HAL 55 in the operating system 51.
These operations can be easily achieved by designing the hardware 88 as the sub-computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus.
Fig. 11 shows a concrete arrangement of the encryption/ decryption using I/O
management micro-kernel 64 having the filter driver 66 which serves the changeable key encryption/decryption processing of the eighth embodiment.
In the I/0 management micro-kernel 64, a file system driver 69, an intermediate driver 70, and device drivers, i.e., a disk driver 67 and a network driver 68, are arranged from upper hierarchy to lower hierarchy. When necessary, a filter driver 66A or a filter driver 66B for performing changeable key encryption/decryption is inserted above the file system driver 69 or between the intermediate driver 70 and the device driver.
Because these filter drivers 66A and 66B can perform re-encryption/re-decryption, it is designed to have the filter driver 66A or carry out the re-encryption/re-decryption processing and the management of crypt keys in this embodiment.
In cases where the copyrighted and decrypted data M is stored in a storage medium such as a hard disk, incorporated therein or dedicated thereto, where it is stored in a removable medium such as a DVD-RAM or where it is transferred outside via a network, the decrypted data M is re-encrypted at the filter driver 66A
or 66B using the second changeable key K2 obtained from the key center or generated in the 1/0 management micro-kernel 64:
b' 2: C2=E (M, K2) =E (D (C1, K1), K2).
Further, in a case where the re-encrypted data C2 is stored in a computer-incorporated or -dedicated storage medium 81, the re-encrypted data is double re-encrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the encryption/decryption unit 89 in the hardware 88:
~/ 2-0: C2-0=E (C2, KO) =E (E (D (C1, K1), K2), KO) and double re-encrypted data C2-0 is stored in the hard disk 81 or the like.
When the double re-encrypted data C2-0 stored in the storage medium 81 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-0 read from the storage medium 81 is re-decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the encryption/decrypted unit 89 in the hardware 88:
~ 2: C2=E (C2-0, KO) =D (E (E (D (Cl, K1), K2), KO), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key at the filter driver 66 having encryption/decryption function:
~: M=D (C2, K2) =D (E (D (C1, K1), K2) and the decrypted data M is outputted by the operating system of the computer to the display unit 56 or the like to be utilized.
Also, in a case where the re-encrypted data C2 is stored in the removable medium such as a DVD-RAM, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted using the third changeable key k3 obtained from the key center or generated in the I/0 management micro-kernel 64, at the encryption/decryption unit 90 in the hardware 88:
b' 2-3: C2-3=E ( C2, K3 ) =E ( E ( D ( C1, Kl ), K2 ), K3 ) and double re-encrypted data C2-3 is stored in a removable medium such as the DVD-RAM.

When the double re-encrypted data C2-3 stored in the removable medium 92 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-3 read from the removable medium 92 is re-decrypted using the third changeable key K3 at the encryption/decryption unit 90 in the hardware 88:
~ 2: C2=E (C2-3, K3) =D (E (E (D (Cl, Kl), K2), K3), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key KZ
at the filter driver 66 having encryption/decryption function:
~: M=D (C2, K2) =D (E (D (C1, K1), K2) and the decrypted data M is outputted by the operating system of the computer to the display unit 56 or the like to be utilized.
Also, in a case where the re-encrypted data C2 is transferred outside via the network 93, the re-encrypted data C2 is double re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 at the encryption/decryption unit 91:
b' 2-3: C2-3=E (C2, K3) =E (E (D (C1, Kl), K2), K3) and double re-encrypted data C2-3 is transferred outside via the network 93.
When the double re-encrypted data C2-3 transferred from the outside via the network 93 is utilized, the re-encrypted data C2-3 is re-decrypted using the third changeable key K3 at the encryption/decryption unit 91:
~ 2: C2=E (C2-3, K3) =D (E (E (D (C1, K1), K2), K3), further, the re-decrypted data C2 is decrypted using the second changeable key at the filter driver 66 having encryption/decryption function:
~ : M=D ( C2, K2 ) =D ( E ( D ( C1, Kl ), K2 and the decrypted data M is outputted by the operating system of the computer to the display unit 56 or the like to be utilized.
It is generally practiced that the specification of the device driver is changed to fit for the computer using the operating system or according to the corresponding device modified.
By providing the device driver with the function for the re-encryption/re-decryption processing and the management of a key, it allows to easily incorporate the function into the kernel of the operation system. Also, by re-encrypting the data using the second changeable key K2 before it is re-encrypted using the unchangeable key K0, it is very difficult to cryptanalyze the encrypted data, even if the unchangeable key is known to others, by finding out the second changeable key K2 because the data is also encrypted using the second changeable key K2.
Further, because the second changeable key K2 is used first and then, is used after the unchangeable key KO is used, high security of the key is ensured.
Because the second changeable key K2 is used first, it also strongly governs the encrypted data.
When the second changeable key K2 is repeatedly used, there is a possibility if it may be known to others. In such a case, it is preferably designed in such a manner that the second changeable key K2 used for encryption is abandoned and it is again obtained from the key center or generated, when necessary for decryption, as described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 185448/1996 ( EP0704885A2, USSN 08/536, 749 ) .
In order to perform re-encryption/re-decryption of digital data as above, it is necessary to add, to the digital data, information to identify that storage or transfer of the digital data is restricted. In a case where the digital data is stored or transferred without being edited, illegitimate use of the digital data can be prevented by the method and the apparatus for re-encryption/re-decryption as described above.

However, when the digital data is edited, there is a possibility that the information to identify the restriction of storage or transfer may be lost.
In such the case, it may d be designed in a manner that all of the data are re-encryptec~/re-decrypted using a key specific to the device ( a master key ) .
In so doing, even the digital data which has been edited, for example, by the "cut & paste" method, can be prevented from illegitimate use by re-encryption/re-decryption.
Also, it may be designed in a manner that the digital data without the information to identify the restriction of storage or transfer only is re-encrypted/re-decrypted by using the master key, and that the digital data provided with the information to identify the restriction of storage or transfer is re-encrypted/re-decrypted using the method and the apparatus as explained in the above embodiments.
In a case where the copyrighted and encrypted digital data is utilized in a specific device such as a set-top box, illegitimate storing, copying or transferring can be relatively easily prevented. Also, in a case where the copyrighted and encrypted digital data is utilized on a computer, the management of storing, copying or transferring the decrypted digital data can be executed by using the decryption/re-encryption apparatus described in Japanese Patent Laid-Open Publication 287014/1996 ( USP5,867,579; EP0715241A2 ) or by using the decryption/re-encryption apparatus described in USP5,805,706.
However, the digital data decrypted for the purpose of displaying or printing is present on the bus of the computer, and it is possible to store, copy or transfer the decrypted digital data via a device connected to the bus. In the following, description will be given on a copyright management apparatus, which solves this problem.
Fig. 12 shows a structural example of a copyright management apparatus, in which a first changeable key and a second changeable key are used.
Also, this copyright management apparatus can be realized configured in a sub-board, a PCMCIA card, an IC card or an IC package for the purpose of security.
In Fig. 12, reference numeral 101 represents a CPU. A ROM 103, a RAM
104, a hard disk drive 105, a flexible disk drive 105, a CD-ROM drive 107, a modem 108, etc. are connected to a system-bus 102 connected to the CPU 101.
Reference numeral 109 represents a copyright management apparatus, which comprises a decryption/encryption unit 110, a video interface 113, an audio interface 114, and a printer interface 115.
A display unit 116, a speaker 117 and a printer 118 are connected to the video interface 113, the audio interface 114, and the printer interface 115 respectively on the outer side of the computer.
The decryption/encryption unit 110 comprises a decryption unit 111 and an encryption unit 112.
The decryption unit 111 and the encryption unit 112 of the decryption~encryption unit 110 are connected to the system-bus 102 of the computer. The video interface 113, the audio interface 114, and the printer interface 115 are connected to the decryption unit 111.
This arrangement can be easily achieved by designing the copyright management apparatus 109 as a sub-computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus.

In cases where the decrypted digital data M is stored in the hard disk drive 105, where it is copied at the flexible disk drive 105 or where it is transferred via the modem 108, the decrypted digital data is re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 at the re-encryption unit 115:
b 2: C2=E (M, K2 ) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2), the re-encrypted digital data C2 is supplied to the system-bus 102, and is stored in the hard disk drive 105, copied in the flexible disk drive 105 or transferred via the modem 108.
The encrypted digital data C1 encrypted using the first changeable key K1 is supplied to the decryption unit 111 from the system-bus 1U2, and is decrypted using the first changeable key K1:
M=D (C1, Kl).
In a case where the decrypted digital data M is outputted to the display unit 116 or the speaker 117, it is turned to analog at the video interface 113 and the audio interface 114 in the copyright management apparatus 109 and is outputted in a predetermined signal form.
When the decrypted digital data M is outputted to the printer 118, print data is outputted via the printer interface 115.
When this copyright management apparatus 109 is used, the decrypted digital data other than the data outputted to the printer is not present outside the copyright management apparatus 109. Because the data outputted to the printer is still data, digital data of a moving picture or of audio data is not present outside the copyright management apparatus 109.
In the computer, non-encrypted digital data is also present in addition to the decrypted digital data.

In order to process the non-encrypted digital data and the decrypted data by distinguishing between them, it is necessary to provide a video interface, an audio interface and a printer interface, and this would make the system more complicated and costly. To avoid such situation, it may be designed in a manner that non-encrypted digital data is processed at the video interface lI3 and the audio interface 114 in the copyright management system 109.
Fig. 13 shows another arrangement example of a copyright management apparatus, in which an unchangeable key is used in addition to the first and the second changeable keys.
This copyright management apparatus can be realized configured in a sub-board, a PCMCIA card, an IC card, or an IC package for security purpose.
In Fig. 13, reference numeral 101 represents a CPU. A ROM 103, a RAM
104, a hard disk drive 105, a flexible disk drive 105, a CD-ROM drive 107, a modem 108, etc. are connected to a system-bus 102 connected to the CPU 101.
Reference numeral 120 represents a copyright management apparatus. The copyright management apparatus 120 has, in addition to the decryption/encryption unit 110, an unchangeable key encryption unit 121, a crypt video interface 122, a crypt audio interface 123, and a crypt printer interface 124.
The decryption/encryption unit 110 has a decryption unit 111 and an encryption unit 112.
Also, an encrypted digital video display unit 125, an encrypted digital audio player 126, and an encrypted digital data printer 127, which arranged outside of the computer, are connected to the crypt video interface 122, the crypt audio interface 123, and the crypt printer interface 124.
The decryption unit 111 and the encryption unit 112 of the decryption/encryption unit 110 are both connected to the computer system-bus 102. The unchangeable key encryption unit 121 is further connected to the decryption unit 111.
The crypt video interface 122, the crypt audio interface 123, and the crypt printer interface 124 are connected to the unchangeable key encryption unit 121.
The encrypted data display unit 125 is connected to the crypt video interface 122, the encrypted audio data player 126 is connected to the crypt audio interface 123 and the encrypted data printer 127 is connected to the crypt printer interface 124.
The above arrangement can be easily realized by designing the copyright management apparatus 120 as a sub-computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus.
The encrypted data display unit 125 has an unchangeable key decryption unit 128 connected to the crypt video interface 122, a D/A converter 131 connected to the unchangeable key decryption unit 128, and a display unit 116 connected to the D/A converter 131.
The encrypted audio data player 126 has an unchangeable key decryption unit 129 connected to the crypt audio interface 123, a D/A converter 132 connected to the unchangeable key decryption unit 129, and a speaker 117 connected to the D/A
converter 132.
The encrypted data printer 127 has an unchangeable key decryption unit 130 connected to the crypt printer interface 124 and a printer 118 connected to the unchangeable key decryption unit 130.
It is needless to say that the encrypted data display unit 125, the encrypted audio data player 126 and the encrypted data printer 127 have other components such as an amplifier.

The encrypted digital data C1 encrypted using the first changeable key K1 is supplied to the decryption unit 111 from the system-bus 102, and it is decrypted using the first changeable key Kl:
M=D ( Cl, Kl ).
When the decrypted digital data M is stored at the hard disk drive 105 or is copied at the flexible disk drive 105 or is transferred via the modem 108, it is re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 at the re-encryption unit 115:
b' 2: C2=E (M, K2 ) =E (D (C1, Kl), K2), the re-encrypted digital data C2 is supplied to the system-bus 102, and it is stored at the hard disk drive 105, copied at the flexible disk drive 105, or transferred via the modem 108.
When the decrypted digital data M is outputted to the encrypted data display unit 125, the encrypted audio data player 126 or the encrypted data printer 127, it is re-encrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key encryption unit 121 in the copyright management apparatus 120:
b' 0: CO=E (M, KO ) =E (D (C1, Kl), KO).
The re-encrypted digital data CO is arranged to be provided to the encrypted data display unit 125, the encrypted audio data player 126 and the encrypted data printer 127 at the crypt video interface 122, the crypt audio interface 123 and the printer interface 124 respectively, and an encrypted display signal CdO, an encrypted audio signal Ca0 and an encrypted print signal Cp0 are respectively outputted.
When the encrypted display signal Cd0 is inputted to the encrypted data display unit 125 from the crypt video interface 122, it is decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key decryption unit 128:
Md=D ( CdO, KO ), the decrypted display signal Md is converted to a displayable analog signal at the D/A converter 131 and it is displayed on the display unit 116.
If the display unit 116 is a digital display unit, which can display the digital data as it is, the D/A converter 131 is unnecessary.
When the encrypted audio signal Ca0 is inputted to the encrypted audio data player 126 from the crypt audio interface 123, it is decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key decryption unit 129:
Ma=D ( CaO, KO ), the decrypted audio signal MA is converted to a playable analog signal at the D/A
converter 132, and it is played at the speaker 116.
The encrypted print signal Cp0 inputted to the encrypted data printer 127 from the crypt printer interface 124 is decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key decryption unit 130:
Mp=D ( CpO, KO ) and the decrypted print signal Mp is printed by the printer 118.
When this copyright management apparatus 120 is used, no decrypted data is present outside the copyright management apparatus 120.
As aforementioned, non-encrypted digital data is also present in addition to the decrypted digital data in the computer.
In order to process the non-encrypted digital data and the decrypted digital data by distinguishing between them, it is necessary to provide a video interface, an audio interface and a printer interface, and this would make the system more complicated and costly. To avoid such situation, it may be designed in a manner that the non-encrypted digital data is processed at the unchangeable key re-encryption unit 121 of the copyright management apparatus 120.
Fig. 14 shows another arrangement example of the copyright management apparatus, in which an unchangeable key encryption unit is provided to follow the video interface, the audio interface and the printer interface.
The copyright management apparatus can be realized configured in a sub-board, a PCMCIA card, an IC card or an IC package for security purpose.
In Fig. 14, reference numeral 101 represents a CPU. A ROM 103, a RAM
104, a hard disk drive 105, a flexible disk drive 105, a CD-ROM drive 107, a modem 108, etc. are connected to a system-bus 102 connected to the CPU 101.
Reference numeral 140 represents a copyright management apparatus, which comprises a decryption/re-encryption unit 110, a video interface 113, an audio interface 114, a printer interface 141, and an unchangeable key encryption unit 134.
The decryption/re-encryption unit 110 has a decryption unit 111 and an re-encryption unit 112.
The unchangeable key encryption unit 134 has an unchangeable key encryption unit for video 142, an unchangeable key encryption unit for audio 136, and an unchangeable key encryption unit for print 137. The unchangeable key encryption units for video, audio and print may be arranged in a single unit if it is available for sufficient encryption capacity.
The decryption unit 111 and the re-encryption unit 112 of the decryption/encryption unit 110 are connected to the system-bus 102 of the computer. Further, the video interface 113, the audio interface 114 and the printer interface 115 are connected to the decryption unit 111, and the unchangeable key encryption unit for video 135, the unchangeable key encryption unit for audio and the unchangeable key encryption unit for print 137 are connected to these interfaces.
An encrypted digital video display unit 125, an encrypted digital audio player 126 and an encrypted digital data printer 127 arranged outside the computer are connected respectively to the unchangeable key encryption unit for video 135, the unchangeable key encryption unit for audio 163 and the unchangeable key encryption unit for print 137.
The above arrangement can be easily realized by designing the copyright management apparatus 120 as a sub-computer arrangement having a CPU and a system-bus.
The encrypted data display unit 125 has an unchangeable key decryption unit 128 connected to the unchangeable key encryption unit for video 135, a D/A
converter 131 connected to the unchangeable key decryption unit 128, and a display unit 116 connected to the D/A converter 131.
The encrypted audio data player 126 has an unchangeable key decryption unit 129 connected to the unchangeable key encryption unit for audio 136, a D/A
converter 132 connected to the unchangeable key decryption unit 129, and a speaker 117 connected to the D/A converter 132.
The encrypted data printer 127 has an unchangeable key decryption unit 130 connected to the unchangeable key encryption unit for print 137 and a printer connected to the unchangeable key decryption unit 130.
It is needless to say that the encrypted data display unit 125, the encrypted audio data player 126 and the encrypted data printer 127 have other components such as an amplifier.
The encrypted digital data Cl encrypted using the first changeable key Kl is supplied to the decryption unit 111 from the system-bus 102 and it is decrypted using the first changeable key K1:
M=D ( Cl, Kl ) .
When the decrypted digital data M is stored at the hard disk drive 105 or copied at the flexible disk drive 105 or transferred via the modem 108, it is re-encrypted using the second changeable key K2 at the re-encryption unit 115:
b' 2: C2=E (M, K2 ) =E ( D ( C1, Kl ), K2 ), the re-encrypted digital data C2 is supplied to the system-bus 102, and it is then stored at the hard disk drive 105, copied at the flexible disk drive 105 or transferred via the modem 108.
When the decrypted digital data M is outputted to the encrypted data display unit 125, the encrypted audio data player 126 or the encrypted data printer 127, the decrypted digital data M is arranged to digital data Md, Ma and Mp to be provided to the display unit 116, the speaker 117 and the printer 118 respectively at the video interface 131, the audio interface 132 and the printer interface 133 in the copyright management apparatus 120. Then, these digital data are encrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key encryption unit for video 135, the unchangeable key encryption unit for audio 136 and the unchangeable key encryption unit for print 137:
Cd0=E (Md, KO) Ca0=E (Ma, KO ) Cp0=E (Mp, KO) and the encrypted display signal CdO, the encrypted audio signal Ca0 and the encrypted print signal Cp0 are outputted.
The encrypted display signal Cd0 is inputted to the encrypted data display unit 125 from the unchangeable key encryption unit for video 135, and it is decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key decryption unit 128:
Md=D ( CdO, KO ) .
The decrypted display signal Md is converted to a displayable analog signal at the D/A converter 131, and is displayed on the display unit 116.
If the display unit 116 is a digital display unit, which can display the digital data as it is, the D/A converter 131 is unnecessary.
The encrypted audio signal Ca0 is inputted to the encrypted audio data player 126 from the unchangeable key encryption unit 136, and it is decrypted using the unchangeable key KO at the unchangeable key decryption unit 129:
Ma=D ( CaO, KO ).
The decrypted audio signal Ma is converted to a playable analog signal at the D/A
converter 132, and is played at the speaker 116.
The encrypted print signal Cp0 is inputted to the encrypted data printer 127 from the unchangeable key encryption unit 137, and it is decrypted using the unchangeable key K0:
Mp=D ( CpO, KO ).
The decrypted audio signal Mp is printed by the printer 118.
When this copyright management apparatus 140 is used, no decrypted data is present outside the copyright management apparatus 120.
As aforementioned, non-encrypted digital data is also present in addition to the decrypted digital data in the computer.
In order to process the non-encrypted digital data and the decryption data by distinguishing between them, it is necessary to provide a video interface, an audio interface and a printer interface, and this would make the system more complicated and costly. To avoid such situation, it may be designed in a manner that the non-encrypted digital data is processed at the video interface 131, the audio interface 132 and the printer interface 133 of the copyright management apparatus 140.
A secret-key cryptosystem is often used as a cryptosystem for encrypting digital data. The most popular DES ( Data Encryption Standard) in the secret-key cryptosystems carries out encryption/decryption per 64-bit block unit of data.
It is a typical block cipher method in the secret-key cryptosystem and has been widely adopted. Using this encryption/decryption per block processing allows to realize a more high speed encryption/decryption processing.
In doing so, a plurality of encryption units and decryption units are provided in the encryption/decryption unit. It allows these plurality of encryption units and decryption units to be, in order, allocated the encryption/decryption processings of data blocks to be carried out. And then, encryption/decryption processing results, thus obtained, are synthesized.
Further, it brings a supplemental effect that it is possible to use a respective crypt key for each data block and also to adopt a respective cryptosystem for each data block. Then, more highly securing the digital data is possible.

Claims (86)

I claim:
1. A method for protecting decrypted digital data, to which encrypted digital data is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said method comprising the steps of:
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the changeable key;
encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the changeable key by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored, copied or transferred;
decrypting said copied, stored or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys, by using said unchangeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the changeable key; and decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the changeable key, by using said changeable key to said decrypted digital data.
2. A method for protecting decrypted digital data, to which encrypted digital data is decrypted, from illegitimate use, comprising the steps of:
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key;
encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using a changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored, copied or transferred;
decrypting said copied, stored or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys, by using said changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the changeable key; and decrypting said digital data decrypted by the changeable key key, by using said unchangeable key to said decrypted digital data.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said changeable key are carried out by a software.
4. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said changeable key are carried out by a hardware.
5. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said changeable key is supplied from the outside of a device.
6. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said changeable key is generated in a device.
7. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a software.
8. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a hardware.
9. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said unchangeable key is already placed in said device.
10. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said unchangeable key is generated in said device.
11. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein said unchangeable key is supplied from the outside of said device.
12. The method according to claim 9, 10 or 11, wherein said unchangeable key is specific to said device.
13. The method according to claim 9, 10 or 11, wherein said unchangeable key is not specific to said device.
14. An apparatus for protecting decrypted digital data, to which encrypted digital data is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
a changeable key re-encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a changeable key to digital data re-encrypted;
an unchangeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the changeable key by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored, copied or transferred;
an unchangeable key decryption unit for decrypting said copied, stored or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys, by using said unchangeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key;
and a changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, by using said changeable key to said decrypted digital data.
15. An apparatus for protecting decrypted digital data, to which encrypted digital data is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
an unchangeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key;
a changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using a changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored, copied or transferred;
a changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said copied, stored or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by changeable-unchangeable keys, by using said changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key; and an unchangeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, by using said unchangeable key to said decrypted digital data.
16. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, in which encrypting and decrypting by using said changeable key are carried out by a software.
17. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, in which encrypting and decrypting by using said changeable key are carried out by a hardware.
18. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said changeable key is supplied from the outside of a device.
19. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said changeable key is generated in a device.
20. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, in which encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are earned out by a software.
21. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, in which encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a hardware.
22. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said unchangeable key is already placed in said device.
23. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said unchangeable key is generated in said device.
24. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said unchangeable key is supplied from the outside of said device.
25. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said unchangeable key is specific to said device.
26. The apparatus according to claim 14 or 15, wherein said unchangeable key is not specific to said device.
27. A method for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said method comprising the steps of:
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys to be stored;
decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys by using said unchangeable key to said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using a third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys to be copied or transferred;
decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys by using said third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key; and decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using said second changeable key to decrypted digital data.
28. A method for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said method comprising the steps of:
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys to be stored;
decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys by using said unchangeable key to said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using a third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys to be copied or transferred;
decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys by using said third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key; and decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using said second changeable key to decrypted digital data.
29. A method for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said method comprising the steps of:
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, and encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using a second changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored;
decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key;
decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using said unchangeable key to decrypted digital data;
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key, and encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys to be copied or transferred;
decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key; and decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key by using said third changeable key to decrypted digital data.
30. A method for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said method comprising the steps of:
encrypting said decrypted digital data by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, and encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using a second changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored;
decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key;
decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using said unchangeable key to decrypted digital data;

encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key, and encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys to be copied or transferred;
decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key; and decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key by using said third changeable key to decrypted digital data.
31. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said second changeable key are carried out by a software.
32. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said second changeable key are carried out by a hardware.
33. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30; wherein said second changeable key is supplied from the outside of a device.
34. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said second changeable key is generated in a device.
35. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said third changeable key are carried out by a software.
36. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said third changeable key are carried out by a hardware.
37. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said third changeable key is supplied from the outside of a device.
38. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said third changeable key is generated in a device.
39. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a software.
40. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a hardware.
41. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said unchangeable key is already placed in said device.
42. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said unchangeable key is generated in said device.
43. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said unchangeable key is supplied from the outside of said device.
44. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said unchangeable key is specific to a device.
45. The method according to claim 27, 28, 29 or 30, wherein said unchangeable key is not specific to a device.
46. An apparatus for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
a second changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
an unchangeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second, changeable key by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys to be stored;
an unchangeable key decryption unit for decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys by using said unchangeable key to said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
a third changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using a third changeable key to 62a digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys to be copied or transferred;
a third changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys by using said third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key; and a second changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using said second changeable key to decrypted digital data.
47. An apparatus for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
a second changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
an unchangeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys to be stored;
an unchangeable key decryption unit for decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by unchangeable-second-changeable keys by using said unchangeable key to said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key;
a third changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using a third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys to be copied or transferred;
a third changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by third-changeable-second-changeable keys by using said third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key; and a second changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the second changeable key by using said second changeable key to decrypted digital data.
48. An apparatus for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
an unchangeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, and a second changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using a second changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored;
a second changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, and an unchangeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using said unchangeable key to decrypted digital data;
a third changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key, and a second changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys to be copied or transferred; and a second changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key, and a third changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key by using said third changeable key to decrypted digital data.
49. An apparatus for protecting decrypted digital data, to which digital data encrypted by a first changeable key is decrypted, from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
an unchangeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, and a second changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using a second changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys to be stored;
a second changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said stored digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-unchangeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key, and an unchangeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the unchangeable key by using said unchangeable key to decrypted digital data;
a third changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said decrypted digital data by using a third changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key, and a second changeable key encryption unit for encrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key to digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys to be copied or transferred; and a second changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said copied or transferred digital data double re-encrypted by second-changeable-third-changeable keys by using said second changeable key to digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key, and a third changeable key decryption unit for decrypting said digital data re-encrypted by the third changeable key by using said third changeable key to decrypted digital data.
50. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said second changeable key are carried out by a 65a software.
51. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said second changeable key are carried out by a hardware.
52. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said second changeable key is supplied from the outside of a device.
53. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said second changeable key is generated in a device.
54. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said third changeable key are carried out by a software.
55. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said third changeable key are carried out by a hardware.
56. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said third changeable key is supplied from the outside of a device.
57. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said third changeable key is generated in a device.
58. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a software.
59. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a hardware.
60. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said unchangeable key is already placed in the device.
61. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said unchangeable key is generated in the device.
62. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said unchangeable key is supplied from the outside of the device.
63. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said unchangeable key is specific to said device.
64. The apparatus according to claim 46, 47, 48 or 49, wherein said unchangeable key is not specific to said device.
65. A method for protecting digital data from illegitimate use, said method comprising the steps of:
determining whether said digital data is subject to be protected or not;
encrypting said digital data determined being subject to be protected by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data encrypted by the unchangeable key;
storing, copying or transferring said digital data determined being not subject to be protected and said digital data encrypted by the unchangeable key;
decrypting said stored, copied or transferred digital data encrypted by the unchangeable key by using said unchangeable key to decrypted digital data; and utilizing said stored, copied or transferred digital data and said decrypted digital data.
66. The method according to claim 65, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a software.
67. The method according to claim 65, wherein said steps of encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a hardware.
68. The method according to claim 65, in which encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are controlled by identifying information which is added to said digital data.
69. The method according to claim 68, in which encrypting and decrypting are carried out by presence of said identifying information.
70. The method according to claim 68, in which encrypting and decrypting are carried out by absence of said identifying information.
71. The method according to claim 65, wherein said unchangeable key is already placed in a device.
72. The method according to claim 65, wherein said unchangeable key is generated in the device.
73. The method according to claim 65, wherein said unchangeable key is supplied from the outside of the device.
74. The method according to claim 71, 72 or 73, wherein said unchangeable key is specific to the device.
75. The method according to claim 71, 72 or 73, wherein said unchangeable key is not specific to the device.
76. An apparatus for protecting digital data from illegitimate use, said apparatus comprising:
determining means as to whether said digital data is subject to be protected or not;
means for encrypting said digital data determined being subject to be protected by using an unchangeable key in a device to digital data encrypted by the unchangeable key;
means for storing, copying or transferring said digital data determined being not subject to be protected and said digital data encrypted by the unchangeable key;
means for decrypting said stored, copied or transferred digital data encrypted by the unchangeable key by using said unchangeable key to decrypted digital data;
and means for utilizing said stored, copied or transferred digital data and said decrypted digital data.
77. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a software.
78. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are carried out by a hardware.
79. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein encrypting and decrypting by using said unchangeable key are controlled by identifying information which is added to said digital data.
80. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein encrypting and decrypting are carried out by presence of said identifying information.
81. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein encrypting and decrypting are carried out by absence of said identifying information.
82. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein said unchangeable key is already placed in a device.
83. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein said unchangeable key is generated in the device.
84. The apparatus according to claim 76, wherein said unchangeable key is supplied from the outside of the device.
85. The apparatus according to claim 82, 83 or 84, wherein said unchangeable key is specific to the device.
86. The apparatus according to claim 82, 83 or 84, wherein said unchangeable key is not specific to the device.
CA002347480A 1998-10-15 1999-10-15 Method and device for protecting digital data by double re-encryption Abandoned CA2347480A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP30941898A JP4763866B2 (en) 1998-10-15 1998-10-15 Method and apparatus for protecting digital data by double re-encryption
JP10/309418 1998-10-15
PCT/JP1999/005704 WO2000022777A1 (en) 1998-10-15 1999-10-15 Method and device for protecting digital data by double re-encryption

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
CA2347480A1 true CA2347480A1 (en) 2000-04-20

Family

ID=17992773

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CA002347480A Abandoned CA2347480A1 (en) 1998-10-15 1999-10-15 Method and device for protecting digital data by double re-encryption

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (3) US7093295B1 (en)
EP (1) EP1122910A1 (en)
JP (1) JP4763866B2 (en)
CN (1) CN1330819A (en)
AU (1) AU6123599A (en)
CA (1) CA2347480A1 (en)
WO (1) WO2000022777A1 (en)

Families Citing this family (150)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JPH07271865A (en) 1994-04-01 1995-10-20 Mitsubishi Corp Method for managing copyright of data base
US6744894B1 (en) 1994-04-01 2004-06-01 Mitsubishi Corporation Data management system
US7036019B1 (en) 1994-04-01 2006-04-25 Intarsia Software Llc Method for controlling database copyrights
US7302415B1 (en) 1994-09-30 2007-11-27 Intarsia Llc Data copyright management system
US6424715B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2002-07-23 Mitsubishi Corporation Digital content management system and apparatus
EP0715241B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2004-01-14 Mitsubishi Corporation Apparatus for data copyright management system
EP0709760B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2006-05-31 Intarsia Software LLC Data copyright management system
US7362775B1 (en) 1996-07-02 2008-04-22 Wistaria Trading, Inc. Exchange mechanisms for digital information packages with bandwidth securitization, multichannel digital watermarks, and key management
US5613004A (en) 1995-06-07 1997-03-18 The Dice Company Steganographic method and device
US8595502B2 (en) 1995-09-29 2013-11-26 Intarsia Software Llc Data management system
US7801817B2 (en) 1995-10-27 2010-09-21 Makoto Saito Digital content management system and apparatus
US7664263B2 (en) 1998-03-24 2010-02-16 Moskowitz Scott A Method for combining transfer functions with predetermined key creation
US6205249B1 (en) 1998-04-02 2001-03-20 Scott A. Moskowitz Multiple transform utilization and applications for secure digital watermarking
US5889868A (en) 1996-07-02 1999-03-30 The Dice Company Optimization methods for the insertion, protection, and detection of digital watermarks in digitized data
US7095874B2 (en) 1996-07-02 2006-08-22 Wistaria Trading, Inc. Optimization methods for the insertion, protection, and detection of digital watermarks in digitized data
US7159116B2 (en) 1999-12-07 2007-01-02 Blue Spike, Inc. Systems, methods and devices for trusted transactions
US7346472B1 (en) 2000-09-07 2008-03-18 Blue Spike, Inc. Method and device for monitoring and analyzing signals
US7457962B2 (en) 1996-07-02 2008-11-25 Wistaria Trading, Inc Optimization methods for the insertion, protection, and detection of digital watermarks in digitized data
US7177429B2 (en) 2000-12-07 2007-02-13 Blue Spike, Inc. System and methods for permitting open access to data objects and for securing data within the data objects
US7730317B2 (en) * 1996-12-20 2010-06-01 Wistaria Trading, Inc. Linear predictive coding implementation of digital watermarks
JP4763866B2 (en) 1998-10-15 2011-08-31 インターシア ソフトウェア エルエルシー Method and apparatus for protecting digital data by double re-encryption
US7664264B2 (en) 1999-03-24 2010-02-16 Blue Spike, Inc. Utilizing data reduction in steganographic and cryptographic systems
US7475246B1 (en) 1999-08-04 2009-01-06 Blue Spike, Inc. Secure personal content server
US6701528B1 (en) * 2000-01-26 2004-03-02 Hughes Electronics Corporation Virtual video on demand using multiple encrypted video segments
US7284064B1 (en) 2000-03-21 2007-10-16 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus to determine broadcast content and scheduling in a broadcast system
US8095508B2 (en) 2000-04-07 2012-01-10 Washington University Intelligent data storage and processing using FPGA devices
WO2001093002A2 (en) * 2000-05-30 2001-12-06 Dataplay, Incorporated Method of decrypting data stored on a storage device using an embedded encryption/decryption means
JP3505482B2 (en) 2000-07-12 2004-03-08 株式会社東芝 Encryption device, decryption device, extended key generation device, extended key generation method, and recording medium
US8140859B1 (en) 2000-07-21 2012-03-20 The Directv Group, Inc. Secure storage and replay of media programs using a hard-paired receiver and storage device
US7457414B1 (en) 2000-07-21 2008-11-25 The Directv Group, Inc. Super encrypted storage and retrieval of media programs with smartcard generated keys
US7203311B1 (en) * 2000-07-21 2007-04-10 The Directv Group, Inc. Super encrypted storage and retrieval of media programs in a hard-paired receiver and storage device
US7127615B2 (en) 2000-09-20 2006-10-24 Blue Spike, Inc. Security based on subliminal and supraliminal channels for data objects
WO2002047388A2 (en) 2000-11-14 2002-06-13 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Networked subscriber television distribution
US8127326B2 (en) 2000-11-14 2012-02-28 Claussen Paul J Proximity detection using wireless connectivity in a communications system
JP2002261748A (en) * 2000-12-28 2002-09-13 Sony Corp Data transmitter, method therefor, data recorder and method thereof
JP4752113B2 (en) * 2001-01-16 2011-08-17 ソニー株式会社 Electronic device and signal transmission method
RU2294057C2 (en) 2001-01-16 2007-02-20 Награкард С.А. Method for encoded data storage
US7328455B2 (en) * 2001-06-28 2008-02-05 Intel Corporation Apparatus and method for enabling secure content decryption within a set-top box
DE10135888A1 (en) * 2001-07-24 2003-03-13 Scm Microsystems Gmbh Process for the local recording of digital data for digital television
JP2003037589A (en) 2001-07-26 2003-02-07 Sony Corp Device and method for data recording, and device and method for data reproducing
JP3870734B2 (en) * 2001-07-31 2007-01-24 ソニー株式会社 Recording medium reproducing apparatus and method, and recording / reproducing apparatus
JP4659357B2 (en) 2001-09-21 2011-03-30 ザ・ディレクティービー・グループ・インコーポレイテッド Method and apparatus for controlling paired operation of conditional access module and integrated receiver and decoder
US7409562B2 (en) 2001-09-21 2008-08-05 The Directv Group, Inc. Method and apparatus for encrypting media programs for later purchase and viewing
US8943540B2 (en) 2001-09-28 2015-01-27 Intel Corporation Method and apparatus to provide a personalized channel
US8312265B2 (en) 2001-12-11 2012-11-13 Pinder Howard G Encrypting received content
US20030135553A1 (en) * 2002-01-11 2003-07-17 Ramesh Pendakur Content-based caching and routing of content using subscription information from downstream nodes
TWI244645B (en) 2002-01-28 2005-12-01 Sony Corp Information recording apparatus and method, information reproduction apparatus and method, information recording medium, program storage medium
US7287275B2 (en) 2002-04-17 2007-10-23 Moskowitz Scott A Methods, systems and devices for packet watermarking and efficient provisioning of bandwidth
US7516470B2 (en) 2002-08-02 2009-04-07 Cisco Technology, Inc. Locally-updated interactive program guide
US7908625B2 (en) 2002-10-02 2011-03-15 Robertson Neil C Networked multimedia system
US7545935B2 (en) * 2002-10-04 2009-06-09 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Networked multimedia overlay system
US8046806B2 (en) 2002-10-04 2011-10-25 Wall William E Multiroom point of deployment module
US7360235B2 (en) 2002-10-04 2008-04-15 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Systems and methods for operating a peripheral record/playback device in a networked multimedia system
US7487532B2 (en) * 2003-01-15 2009-02-03 Cisco Technology, Inc. Optimization of a full duplex wideband communications system
US8094640B2 (en) 2003-01-15 2012-01-10 Robertson Neil C Full duplex wideband communications system for a local coaxial network
US7100047B2 (en) * 2003-01-23 2006-08-29 Verdasys, Inc. Adaptive transparent encryption
US7472272B2 (en) 2003-01-23 2008-12-30 Verdasys, Inc. Digital asset usage accountability via event journaling
JP4655452B2 (en) 2003-03-24 2011-03-23 富士ゼロックス株式会社 Information processing device
IL155416A0 (en) * 2003-04-13 2003-11-23 Nds Ltd System for securing access to data streams
JP2006526227A (en) 2003-05-23 2006-11-16 ワシントン ユニヴァーシティー Intelligent data storage and processing using FPGA devices
US10572824B2 (en) 2003-05-23 2020-02-25 Ip Reservoir, Llc System and method for low latency multi-functional pipeline with correlation logic and selectively activated/deactivated pipelined data processing engines
JP3984951B2 (en) * 2003-11-21 2007-10-03 キヤノン株式会社 Content usage frequency limiting method, content usage terminal device, content usage system, computer program, and computer-readable recording medium
US7802095B2 (en) * 2004-02-03 2010-09-21 Music Public Broadcasting, Inc. Method and system for preventing unauthorized recording of media content on a Macintosh operating system
US7720817B2 (en) 2004-02-04 2010-05-18 Netapp, Inc. Method and system for browsing objects on a protected volume in a continuous data protection system
US7783606B2 (en) 2004-02-04 2010-08-24 Netapp, Inc. Method and system for remote data recovery
US7315965B2 (en) 2004-02-04 2008-01-01 Network Appliance, Inc. Method and system for storing data using a continuous data protection system
US7426617B2 (en) 2004-02-04 2008-09-16 Network Appliance, Inc. Method and system for synchronizing volumes in a continuous data protection system
US7904679B2 (en) 2004-02-04 2011-03-08 Netapp, Inc. Method and apparatus for managing backup data
KR100574974B1 (en) * 2004-02-26 2006-05-02 삼성전자주식회사 Apparatus and method having conditional access and copy protection scheme for encoded broadcast data
EP1764697A4 (en) * 2004-04-14 2009-04-01 Panasonic Corp Terminal device and copyright protection system
CN1332353C (en) * 2004-04-28 2007-08-15 英华达(上海)电子有限公司 Method for implementing image copyright control
US20050289311A1 (en) * 2004-06-29 2005-12-29 David Durham System and method for secure inter-platform and intra-platform communications
US20060005015A1 (en) * 2004-06-30 2006-01-05 David Durham System and method for secure inter-platform and intra-platform communications
US8028135B1 (en) 2004-09-01 2011-09-27 Netapp, Inc. Method and apparatus for maintaining compliant storage
US7433473B2 (en) * 2004-09-10 2008-10-07 Nagracard S.A. Data transmission method between a broadcasting center and a multimedia unit
US7644135B2 (en) * 2004-10-25 2010-01-05 Texas Instruments Incorporated Method of improving communications data throughput on embedded systems and reducing the load on the operating system and central processing unit
CN100393033C (en) * 2004-11-18 2008-06-04 耿健 Method for implementing computer driving service security network system
US7581118B2 (en) * 2004-12-14 2009-08-25 Netapp, Inc. Disk sanitization using encryption
US7774610B2 (en) 2004-12-14 2010-08-10 Netapp, Inc. Method and apparatus for verifiably migrating WORM data
WO2006066999A2 (en) * 2004-12-22 2006-06-29 International Business Machines Corporation Method, system and computer program product for handling data
US9507919B2 (en) * 2005-04-22 2016-11-29 Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc Rights management system for streamed multimedia content
JP4755851B2 (en) * 2005-05-31 2011-08-24 三菱電機インフォメーションシステムズ株式会社 Confidentiality computer and program
US7953980B2 (en) * 2005-06-30 2011-05-31 Intel Corporation Signed manifest for run-time verification of software program identity and integrity
US8839450B2 (en) 2007-08-02 2014-09-16 Intel Corporation Secure vault service for software components within an execution environment
US9325944B2 (en) 2005-08-11 2016-04-26 The Directv Group, Inc. Secure delivery of program content via a removable storage medium
US7748037B2 (en) 2005-09-22 2010-06-29 Intel Corporation Validating a memory type modification attempt
US7876998B2 (en) 2005-10-05 2011-01-25 Wall William E DVD playback over multi-room by copying to HDD
US7702629B2 (en) 2005-12-02 2010-04-20 Exegy Incorporated Method and device for high performance regular expression pattern matching
KR101240053B1 (en) * 2005-12-16 2013-03-06 엘지전자 주식회사 Method for System for protecting copy of multi stream contents
EP1802030A1 (en) * 2005-12-23 2007-06-27 Nagracard S.A. Secure system-on-chip
EP1811415A1 (en) * 2005-12-23 2007-07-25 Nagracard S.A. Secure system-on-chip
US8656191B2 (en) 2005-12-23 2014-02-18 Nagravision S.A. Secure system-on-chip
JP4692297B2 (en) * 2006-01-23 2011-06-01 ブラザー工業株式会社 Information distribution system, information distribution method, node device, and node processing program
US7752401B2 (en) 2006-01-25 2010-07-06 Netapp, Inc. Method and apparatus to automatically commit files to WORM status
US7954114B2 (en) 2006-01-26 2011-05-31 Exegy Incorporated Firmware socket module for FPGA-based pipeline processing
US8379841B2 (en) 2006-03-23 2013-02-19 Exegy Incorporated Method and system for high throughput blockwise independent encryption/decryption
US8689320B2 (en) * 2006-03-24 2014-04-01 Kyocera Document Solutions Inc. Image forming apparatus with hard disk drive securely formatted
US7925896B2 (en) * 2006-03-30 2011-04-12 Texas Instruments Incorporated Hardware key encryption for data scrambling
US8775319B2 (en) 2006-05-15 2014-07-08 The Directv Group, Inc. Secure content transfer systems and methods to operate the same
US8001565B2 (en) 2006-05-15 2011-08-16 The Directv Group, Inc. Methods and apparatus to conditionally authorize content delivery at receivers in pay delivery systems
US8996421B2 (en) 2006-05-15 2015-03-31 The Directv Group, Inc. Methods and apparatus to conditionally authorize content delivery at broadcast headends in pay delivery systems
US7992175B2 (en) 2006-05-15 2011-08-02 The Directv Group, Inc. Methods and apparatus to provide content on demand in content broadcast systems
US8095466B2 (en) 2006-05-15 2012-01-10 The Directv Group, Inc. Methods and apparatus to conditionally authorize content delivery at content servers in pay delivery systems
US7921046B2 (en) 2006-06-19 2011-04-05 Exegy Incorporated High speed processing of financial information using FPGA devices
US9178693B2 (en) 2006-08-04 2015-11-03 The Directv Group, Inc. Distributed media-protection systems and methods to operate the same
US9225761B2 (en) 2006-08-04 2015-12-29 The Directv Group, Inc. Distributed media-aggregation systems and methods to operate the same
JP4843531B2 (en) 2006-09-29 2011-12-21 富士通株式会社 Encryption conversion apparatus, encryption conversion method, and encryption conversion program
US8326819B2 (en) 2006-11-13 2012-12-04 Exegy Incorporated Method and system for high performance data metatagging and data indexing using coprocessors
US8423789B1 (en) * 2007-05-22 2013-04-16 Marvell International Ltd. Key generation techniques
US8010809B1 (en) 2007-06-22 2011-08-30 Qlogic, Corporation Method and system for securing network data
EP2186250B1 (en) 2007-08-31 2019-03-27 IP Reservoir, LLC Method and apparatus for hardware-accelerated encryption/decryption
US8099718B2 (en) * 2007-11-13 2012-01-17 Intel Corporation Method and system for whitelisting software components
US8156565B2 (en) * 2008-04-28 2012-04-10 Microsoft Corporation Hardware-based protection of secure data
US8374986B2 (en) 2008-05-15 2013-02-12 Exegy Incorporated Method and system for accelerated stream processing
US8393008B2 (en) * 2008-05-21 2013-03-05 Microsoft Corporation Hardware-based output protection of multiple video streams
JP5871619B2 (en) 2008-12-15 2016-03-01 アイ・ピー・リザブワー・エル・エル・シー Method and apparatus for high-speed processing of financial market depth data
KR100992448B1 (en) * 2008-12-29 2010-11-05 주식회사 엑스크립트 Pcmcia scrambler, and sender and receiver for broadcasting using thereof
US8364601B2 (en) * 2008-12-31 2013-01-29 Intel Corporation Methods and systems to directly render an image and correlate corresponding user input in a secure memory domain
US8868907B2 (en) 2009-03-18 2014-10-21 University Of Louisville Research Foundation, Inc. Device, method, and system for processing communications for secure operation of industrial control system field devices
US8402267B1 (en) * 2009-03-18 2013-03-19 University Of Louisville Research Foundation, Inc. Security enhanced network device and method for secure operation of same
JP5208903B2 (en) * 2009-10-28 2013-06-12 株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・ドコモ Content control apparatus and content control method
US8700896B1 (en) * 2010-08-25 2014-04-15 Symantec Corporation Techniques for automatic management of file system encryption drivers
JP6045505B2 (en) 2010-12-09 2016-12-14 アイピー レザボア, エルエルシー.IP Reservoir, LLC. Method and apparatus for managing orders in a financial market
US10121196B2 (en) 2012-03-27 2018-11-06 Ip Reservoir, Llc Offload processing of data packets containing financial market data
US11436672B2 (en) 2012-03-27 2022-09-06 Exegy Incorporated Intelligent switch for processing financial market data
US9990393B2 (en) 2012-03-27 2018-06-05 Ip Reservoir, Llc Intelligent feed switch
US10650452B2 (en) 2012-03-27 2020-05-12 Ip Reservoir, Llc Offload processing of data packets
EP2912579B1 (en) 2012-10-23 2020-08-19 IP Reservoir, LLC Method and apparatus for accelerated format translation of data in a delimited data format
US10133802B2 (en) 2012-10-23 2018-11-20 Ip Reservoir, Llc Method and apparatus for accelerated record layout detection
US9633093B2 (en) 2012-10-23 2017-04-25 Ip Reservoir, Llc Method and apparatus for accelerated format translation of data in a delimited data format
US9305172B2 (en) * 2013-03-15 2016-04-05 Mcafee, Inc. Multi-ring encryption approach to securing a payload using hardware modules
US9369441B2 (en) 2013-06-04 2016-06-14 Intel Corporation End-to-end secure communication system
US9571280B2 (en) 2013-06-04 2017-02-14 Intel Corporation Application integrity protection via secure interaction and processing
EP2930935A1 (en) * 2014-04-11 2015-10-14 Television Broadcasts Limited Method of delivering media content
GB2541577A (en) 2014-04-23 2017-02-22 Ip Reservoir Llc Method and apparatus for accelerated data translation
US10176342B2 (en) * 2014-07-31 2019-01-08 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp Protecting memory storage content
US10043015B2 (en) 2014-11-20 2018-08-07 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Method and apparatus for applying a customer owned encryption
US10366244B2 (en) * 2015-06-09 2019-07-30 International Business Machines Corporation Performing an operation on sensitive data
US10027640B2 (en) 2015-09-22 2018-07-17 Qualcomm Incorporated Secure data re-encryption
US10942943B2 (en) 2015-10-29 2021-03-09 Ip Reservoir, Llc Dynamic field data translation to support high performance stream data processing
CN107015931A (en) * 2016-01-27 2017-08-04 三星电子株式会社 Method and accelerator unit for interrupt processing
WO2018046103A1 (en) * 2016-09-10 2018-03-15 Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. Secure key management and peer-to-peer transmission system with a controlled, double-tier cryptographic key structure and corresponding method thereof
US10778654B2 (en) * 2016-09-16 2020-09-15 Arris Enterprises Llc Method and apparatus for protecting confidential data in an open software stack
EP3560135A4 (en) 2016-12-22 2020-08-05 IP Reservoir, LLC Pipelines for hardware-accelerated machine learning
CN110008654B (en) * 2018-01-04 2021-04-09 北大方正集团有限公司 Electronic file processing method and device
CN109040088B (en) * 2018-08-16 2022-02-25 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 Authentication information transmission method, key management client and computer equipment
CN110704852B (en) * 2019-09-26 2021-06-08 江苏方天电力技术有限公司 Encryption system for RTOS system program image file
US11671251B1 (en) 2019-11-29 2023-06-06 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Application programming interface to generate data key pairs
US11626985B1 (en) * 2019-11-29 2023-04-11 Amazon Technologies, Inc. Data reencryption techniques
CN115151908A (en) * 2020-02-21 2022-10-04 惠普发展公司, 有限责任合伙企业 Computing device for encryption and decryption of data

Family Cites Families (232)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4078152A (en) * 1976-04-26 1978-03-07 International Business Machines Corporation Block-cipher cryptographic system with chaining
US4225884A (en) 1977-02-14 1980-09-30 Telease, Inc. Method and system for subscription television billing and access
US4168396A (en) 1977-10-31 1979-09-18 Best Robert M Microprocessor for executing enciphered programs
US4278837A (en) 1977-10-31 1981-07-14 Best Robert M Crypto microprocessor for executing enciphered programs
JPS54105533A (en) 1978-02-07 1979-08-18 Canon Inc Power drive device of camera
US4352952A (en) 1978-06-12 1982-10-05 Motorola Inc. Data security module
CA1155518A (en) 1979-02-20 1983-10-18 William S.H. Cheung Encoding of information
US4465901A (en) 1979-06-04 1984-08-14 Best Robert M Crypto microprocessor that executes enciphered programs
US4319079A (en) * 1979-09-13 1982-03-09 Best Robert M Crypto microprocessor using block cipher
US4862268A (en) 1980-03-31 1989-08-29 General Instrument Corporation Addressable cable television control system with video format data transmission
US4386233A (en) 1980-09-29 1983-05-31 Smid Miles E Crytographic key notarization methods and apparatus
US4423287A (en) 1981-06-26 1983-12-27 Visa U.S.A., Inc. End-to-end encryption system and method of operation
USRE33189E (en) 1981-11-19 1990-03-27 Communications Satellite Corporation Security system for SSTV encryption
JPS58116571A (en) 1981-12-29 1983-07-11 富士通株式会社 Instruction coding method for microcomputer and microcomputer used for execution thereof
US4567512A (en) 1982-08-19 1986-01-28 World Video Library, Inc. Recorded program communication system
US4558176A (en) 1982-09-20 1985-12-10 Arnold Mark G Computer systems to inhibit unauthorized copying, unauthorized usage, and automated cracking of protected software
US5253294A (en) * 1983-02-22 1993-10-12 At&T Bell Laboratories Secure transmission system
US4588991A (en) 1983-03-07 1986-05-13 Atalla Corporation File access security method and means
EP0121853A3 (en) 1983-04-04 1988-01-13 BURROUGHS CORPORATION (a Delaware corporation) Data processing system having public encryption and private decryption keys
US4623918A (en) 1983-05-02 1986-11-18 Teleglobe Pay-Tv System, Inc. Pay television system utilizing multi-frequency passive filters
US4613901A (en) 1983-05-27 1986-09-23 M/A-Com Linkabit, Inc. Signal encryption and distribution system for controlling scrambling and selective remote descrambling of television signals
WO1985000491A1 (en) 1983-06-30 1985-01-31 Independent Broadcasting Authority Encrypted broadcast television system
GB2143352A (en) 1983-07-15 1985-02-06 Philips Electronic Associated Authorising coded signals
US4791565A (en) 1984-06-20 1988-12-13 Effective Security Systems, Inc. Apparatus for controlling the use of computer software
US4751732A (en) 1984-07-06 1988-06-14 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba Broadcasting system
US4890319A (en) 1984-09-21 1989-12-26 Scientific-Atlantic, Inc. Method for controlling copying of protected information transmitted over a communications link
US4829569A (en) 1984-09-21 1989-05-09 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Communication of individual messages to subscribers in a subscription television system
CA1238427A (en) 1984-12-18 1988-06-21 Jonathan Oseas Code protection using cryptography
US4709266A (en) 1985-01-14 1987-11-24 Oak Industries Inc. Satellite scrambling communication network using geographically separated uplinks
US4694491A (en) * 1985-03-11 1987-09-15 General Instrument Corp. Cryptographic system using interchangeable key blocks and selectable key fragments
FR2580885B1 (en) 1985-04-19 1988-07-08 Radiotechnique SYSTEM FOR THE SECRET TRANSMISSION OF AUDIO SIGNALS, AND TELEVISION FOR RECEIVING SUCH SIGNALS
EP0341801A3 (en) 1985-10-29 1990-02-07 Payview Limited Video scrambling systems
US4710955A (en) 1985-11-25 1987-12-01 General Instrument Corporation Cable television system with two-way telephone communication path
US4852154A (en) 1986-02-04 1989-07-25 Pacific Bell Pay-per-view CATV system
US4864494A (en) 1986-03-21 1989-09-05 Computerized Data Ssytems For Mfg., Inc. Software usage authorization system with key for decrypting/re-encrypting/re-transmitting moving target security codes from protected software
ES2169054T3 (en) 1986-04-18 2002-07-01 Nagra Plus Sa PAYMENT TELEVISION SYSTEM.
US4890321A (en) 1986-07-08 1989-12-26 Scientific Atlanta, Inc. Communications format for a subscription television system permitting transmission of individual text messages to subscribers
US4799156A (en) 1986-10-01 1989-01-17 Strategic Processing Corporation Interactive market management system
US4759062A (en) 1986-10-06 1988-07-19 International Electronics Technology Corporation Arrangement for and method of protecting private security codes from unauthorized disclosure
US4977594A (en) 1986-10-14 1990-12-11 Electronic Publishing Resources, Inc. Database usage metering and protection system and method
US4827508A (en) 1986-10-14 1989-05-02 Personal Library Software, Inc. Database usage metering and protection system and method
DE3717261A1 (en) 1987-05-22 1987-11-19 Paul Bamberg Method for selecting television programmes by telephone
US4850017A (en) 1987-05-29 1989-07-18 International Business Machines Corp. Controlled use of cryptographic keys via generating station established control values
GB2217949B (en) * 1988-03-29 1992-08-05 Aisin Seiki Data encryption
US4864615A (en) 1988-05-27 1989-09-05 General Instrument Corporation Reproduction of secure keys by using distributed key generation data
US4995080A (en) 1988-08-04 1991-02-19 Zenith Electronics Corporation Television signal scrambling system and method
EP0354774B1 (en) 1988-08-11 1996-04-10 International Business Machines Corporation Data cryptography using control vectors
US5247575A (en) 1988-08-16 1993-09-21 Sprague Peter J Information distribution system
US4916737A (en) 1988-11-14 1990-04-10 Teleglobe Pay-Tv System, Inc. Secure anti-piracy encoded television system and method
US4919545A (en) 1988-12-22 1990-04-24 Gte Laboratories Incorporated Distributed security procedure for intelligent networks
US4910776A (en) * 1989-02-24 1990-03-20 Miu Automation Encryption printed circuit board
US4977595A (en) 1989-04-03 1990-12-11 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Method and apparatus for implementing electronic cash
JPH02268092A (en) 1989-04-10 1990-11-01 Pioneer Electron Corp Catv system and catv terminal equipment
DE69031191T2 (en) 1989-05-15 1998-02-12 Ibm System for controlling access privileges
US5008935A (en) * 1989-06-30 1991-04-16 At&T Bell Laboratories Efficient method for encrypting superblocks of data
US5046093A (en) 1989-09-05 1991-09-03 General Instrument Corporation CATV subscriber apparatus with intelligent remote control
ZA907106B (en) 1989-10-06 1991-09-25 Net 1 Products Pty Ltd Funds transfer system
FR2654851B1 (en) 1989-11-23 1992-03-27 Schlumberger Ind Sa METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR SECURE OPERATION OF SOFTWARE.
US5365466A (en) * 1989-12-19 1994-11-15 Bull Cp8 Method for generating a random number in a system with portable electronic objects, and system for implementing the method
JPH03214834A (en) 1990-01-19 1991-09-20 Canon Inc Multi-medium network system
US5237610A (en) 1990-02-01 1993-08-17 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Independent external security module for a digitally upgradeable television signal decoder
US5029207A (en) 1990-02-01 1991-07-02 Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. External security module for a television signal decoder
JP3143108B2 (en) 1990-03-13 2001-03-07 株式会社日立製作所 File encryption method and file encryption system
EP0450841B1 (en) 1990-03-29 1996-08-21 Gte Laboratories Incorporated Video control system
JP2943815B2 (en) 1990-04-06 1999-08-30 日本電子株式会社 Length measuring method in electron beam length measuring machine
US5060262A (en) 1990-05-07 1991-10-22 Bevins Jr George L Video scrambling, audio masking and data transmission methods for wireless cable systems
US5036461A (en) 1990-05-16 1991-07-30 Elliott John C Two-way authentication system between user's smart card and issuer-specific plug-in application modules in multi-issued transaction device
EP0459046A1 (en) 1990-05-31 1991-12-04 International Business Machines Corporation Computer software protection
US5204961A (en) 1990-06-25 1993-04-20 Digital Equipment Corporation Computer network operating with multilevel hierarchical security with selectable common trust realms and corresponding security protocols
US5091938B1 (en) 1990-08-06 1997-02-04 Nippon Denki Home Electronics Digital data cryptographic system
US5220604A (en) 1990-09-28 1993-06-15 Digital Equipment Corporation Method for performing group exclusion in hierarchical group structures
US5173939A (en) 1990-09-28 1992-12-22 Digital Equipment Corporation Access control subsystem and method for distributed computer system using compound principals
US5224163A (en) 1990-09-28 1993-06-29 Digital Equipment Corporation Method for delegating authorization from one entity to another through the use of session encryption keys
US5315657A (en) 1990-09-28 1994-05-24 Digital Equipment Corporation Compound principals in access control lists
US5227893A (en) 1990-10-31 1993-07-13 International Business Machines Corporation Pseudo-bar code control of image transmission
JP3053106B2 (en) * 1990-11-02 2000-06-19 株式会社日立製作所 Encryption processing device and decryption processing device
IT1241339B (en) 1990-12-06 1994-01-10 Sisvel Spa SYSTEM FOR THE TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF CODED TELEVISION SIGNALS.
US5142579A (en) 1991-01-29 1992-08-25 Anderson Walter M Public key cryptographic system and method
IL100866A (en) 1991-02-06 1995-10-31 Igen Inc Method and apparatus for magnetic microparticulate based luminescence assay including plurality of magnets
EP0501760B1 (en) 1991-02-27 1998-09-23 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Method for detecting improper rewriting of stored data
US5146497A (en) 1991-02-27 1992-09-08 Motorola, Inc. Group rekey in a communication system
US5161189A (en) * 1991-03-11 1992-11-03 Motorola, Inc. Encryption and decryption of chained messages
JP2781906B2 (en) 1991-03-29 1998-07-30 パイオニア株式会社 CATV center device and program supply method in cable net
US5504818A (en) 1991-04-19 1996-04-02 Okano; Hirokazu Information processing system using error-correcting codes and cryptography
US5138659A (en) 1991-05-02 1992-08-11 General Instrument Corporation Conversion of television signal formats with retention of common control data stream
US5224162A (en) 1991-06-14 1993-06-29 Nippon Telegraph And Telephone Corporation Electronic cash system
US5438508A (en) 1991-06-28 1995-08-01 Digital Equipment Corporation License document interchange format for license management system
FR2681490B1 (en) 1991-09-12 1998-09-18 Gemplus Card Int PROCEDURE AND DEVICE FOR CERTIFICATION OF MESSAGES TRANSMITTED BY FAX
US5453601A (en) 1991-11-15 1995-09-26 Citibank, N.A. Electronic-monetary system
US5457540A (en) 1992-01-06 1995-10-10 Canon Kabushiki Kaisha Image processing method and apparatus in which identification information is added based on image density
US5428685A (en) 1992-01-22 1995-06-27 Fujitsu Limited IC memory card and method of protecting data therein
US5442706A (en) 1992-02-27 1995-08-15 Hughes Aircraft Company Secure mobile storage
JP3073590B2 (en) 1992-03-16 2000-08-07 富士通株式会社 Electronic data protection system, licensor's device and user's device
US5291598A (en) 1992-04-07 1994-03-01 Gregory Grundy Method and system for decentralized manufacture of copy-controlled software
JP2659896B2 (en) 1992-04-29 1997-09-30 インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレイション Structured document copy management method and structured document copy management device
US5349662A (en) 1992-05-21 1994-09-20 International Business Machines Corporation Method of and apparatus for providing automatic detection of user activity
US5515538A (en) 1992-05-29 1996-05-07 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Apparatus and method for interrupt handling in a multi-threaded operating system kernel
US5353351A (en) 1992-06-09 1994-10-04 At&T Bell Laboratories Secure teleconferencing
US5367388A (en) 1992-07-27 1994-11-22 Scitex Corporation Ltd. Electronic separation scanner
JP3217137B2 (en) 1992-07-28 2001-10-09 株式会社日立製作所 Video signal recording device, playback device, and transmission device
US5323464A (en) 1992-10-16 1994-06-21 International Business Machines Corporation Commercial data masking
US5319705A (en) 1992-10-21 1994-06-07 International Business Machines Corporation Method and system for multimedia access control enablement
JPH06141004A (en) 1992-10-27 1994-05-20 Mitsubishi Corp Charging system
FR2698510B1 (en) 1992-11-26 1994-12-23 Schlumberger Ind Sa Communication network.
US5270773A (en) 1992-11-27 1993-12-14 Xerox Corporation Image producing device with security to prevent disclosure of sensitive documents
US5341425A (en) 1992-12-02 1994-08-23 Scientific Atlanta, Inc. Methods and apparatus for uniquely encrypting data at a plurality of data transmission sites for transmission to a reception site
US5465299A (en) 1992-12-03 1995-11-07 Hitachi, Ltd. Electronic document processing system and method of forming digital signature
US5986690A (en) 1992-12-09 1999-11-16 Discovery Communications, Inc. Electronic book selection and delivery system
JPH06223041A (en) 1993-01-22 1994-08-12 Fujitsu Ltd Rarge-area environment user certification system
US6415271B1 (en) 1993-02-10 2002-07-02 Gm Network Limited Electronic cash eliminating payment risk
US5444782A (en) 1993-03-09 1995-08-22 Uunet Technologies, Inc. Computer network encryption/decryption device
US5414772A (en) 1993-06-23 1995-05-09 Gemplus Development System for improving the digital signature algorithm
US5455863A (en) 1993-06-29 1995-10-03 Motorola, Inc. Method and apparatus for efficient real-time authentication and encryption in a communication system
US5428606A (en) 1993-06-30 1995-06-27 Moskowitz; Scott A. Digital information commodities exchange
US5400403A (en) 1993-08-16 1995-03-21 Rsa Data Security, Inc. Abuse-resistant object distribution system and method
US5715393A (en) 1993-08-16 1998-02-03 Motorola, Inc. Method for remote system process monitoring
US5345508A (en) 1993-08-23 1994-09-06 Apple Computer, Inc. Method and apparatus for variable-overhead cached encryption
IL110891A (en) 1993-09-14 1999-03-12 Spyrus System and method for data access control
US5347581A (en) 1993-09-15 1994-09-13 Gemplus Developpement Verification process for a communication system
US5381480A (en) 1993-09-20 1995-01-10 International Business Machines Corporation System for translating encrypted data
US5410602A (en) 1993-09-27 1995-04-25 Motorola, Inc. Method for key management of point-to-point communications
CA2129075C (en) 1993-10-18 1999-04-20 Joseph J. Daniele Electronic copyright royalty accounting system using glyphs
US5369702A (en) 1993-10-18 1994-11-29 Tecsec Incorporated Distributed cryptographic object method
US5680452A (en) 1993-10-18 1997-10-21 Tecsec Inc. Distributed cryptographic object method
US5841886A (en) 1993-11-18 1998-11-24 Digimarc Corporation Security system for photographic identification
CA2136919A1 (en) 1993-12-09 1995-06-10 John Timothy Hember Local area network encryption decryption system
US5584023A (en) 1993-12-27 1996-12-10 Hsu; Mike S. C. Computer system including a transparent and secure file transform mechanism
US5450493A (en) 1993-12-29 1995-09-12 At&T Corp. Secure communication method and apparatus
US5499340A (en) 1994-01-12 1996-03-12 Isogon Corporation Method and apparatus for computer program usage monitoring
US5666411A (en) 1994-01-13 1997-09-09 Mccarty; Johnnie C. System for computer software protection
US5509074A (en) 1994-01-27 1996-04-16 At&T Corp. Method of protecting electronically published materials using cryptographic protocols
US5504816A (en) 1994-02-02 1996-04-02 Gi Corporation Method and apparatus for controlling access to digital signals
US5497420A (en) 1994-02-07 1996-03-05 Le Groupe Vide/ otron Lte/ e Cable TV system using passwords
US5479514A (en) 1994-02-23 1995-12-26 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for encrypted communication in data networks
US5511121A (en) 1994-02-23 1996-04-23 Bell Communications Research, Inc. Efficient electronic money
US5835601A (en) 1994-03-15 1998-11-10 Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba File editing system and shared file editing system with file content secrecy, file version management, and asynchronous editing
JPH07319691A (en) 1994-03-29 1995-12-08 Toshiba Corp Resource protective device, privilege protective device, software utilization method controller and software utilization method control system
JP3139910B2 (en) 1994-03-31 2001-03-05 株式会社日立製作所 Information receiving / recording / reproducing device and information receiving device
JPH07271865A (en) 1994-04-01 1995-10-20 Mitsubishi Corp Method for managing copyright of data base
US7036019B1 (en) 1994-04-01 2006-04-25 Intarsia Software Llc Method for controlling database copyrights
US6744894B1 (en) 1994-04-01 2004-06-01 Mitsubishi Corporation Data management system
US5974141A (en) 1995-03-31 1999-10-26 Mitsubishi Corporation Data management system
US5553139A (en) * 1994-04-04 1996-09-03 Novell, Inc. Method and apparatus for electronic license distribution
JPH07283809A (en) 1994-04-08 1995-10-27 Mitsubishi Corp Ciphering key system
US5495533A (en) 1994-04-29 1996-02-27 International Business Machines Corporation Personal key archive
US5504817A (en) 1994-05-09 1996-04-02 Yeda Research And Development Co. Ltd. At The Weizmann Institute Of Science Method and apparatus for memory efficient variants of public key encryption and identification schemes for smart card applications
US5515441A (en) 1994-05-12 1996-05-07 At&T Corp. Secure communication method and apparatus
US5475757A (en) 1994-06-07 1995-12-12 At&T Corp. Secure data transmission method
US5577121A (en) 1994-06-09 1996-11-19 Electronic Payment Services, Inc. Transaction system for integrated circuit cards
US6091835A (en) 1994-08-31 2000-07-18 Penop Limited Method and system for transcribing electronic affirmations
JP3542088B2 (en) 1994-09-09 2004-07-14 富士通株式会社 Data content utilization system
US5606609A (en) 1994-09-19 1997-02-25 Scientific-Atlanta Electronic document verification system and method
US6002772A (en) 1995-09-29 1999-12-14 Mitsubishi Corporation Data management system
US7302415B1 (en) 1994-09-30 2007-11-27 Intarsia Llc Data copyright management system
DE69532153T2 (en) 1994-09-30 2004-09-02 Mitsubishi Corp. Data copyright management system
US6449717B1 (en) 1994-09-30 2002-09-10 Mitsubishi Corporation Data copyright management system
US6741991B2 (en) 1994-09-30 2004-05-25 Mitsubishi Corporation Data management system
JPH08185448A (en) * 1994-09-30 1996-07-16 Mitsubishi Corp System and device for managing data copyright
JPH08101867A (en) 1994-09-30 1996-04-16 Fujitsu Ltd Software use permission system
DE4435901A1 (en) * 1994-10-07 1996-04-11 Siemens Ag Data backup method in a telecommunications system
US5864683A (en) 1994-10-12 1999-01-26 Secure Computing Corporartion System for providing secure internetwork by connecting type enforcing secure computers to external network for limiting access to data based on user and process access rights
EP0715241B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2004-01-14 Mitsubishi Corporation Apparatus for data copyright management system
US6076077A (en) 1995-10-27 2000-06-13 Mitsubishi Corporation Data management system
US6424715B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2002-07-23 Mitsubishi Corporation Digital content management system and apparatus
US6789197B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2004-09-07 Mitsubishi Corporation Apparatus for data copyright management system
EP0709760B1 (en) 1994-10-27 2006-05-31 Intarsia Software LLC Data copyright management system
JPH08125651A (en) * 1994-10-28 1996-05-17 Hitachi Ltd Signal processor
US5634012A (en) 1994-11-23 1997-05-27 Xerox Corporation System for controlling the distribution and use of digital works having a fee reporting mechanism
US6182218B1 (en) 1994-12-13 2001-01-30 Mitsubishi Corporation Digital content management system using electronic watermark
EP0719045B1 (en) 1994-12-13 2003-10-29 Mitsubishi Corporation Crypt key system for secure electronic transactions
US5646997A (en) 1994-12-14 1997-07-08 Barton; James M. Method and apparatus for embedding authentication information within digital data
US5485577A (en) 1994-12-16 1996-01-16 General Instrument Corporation Of Delaware Method and apparatus for incremental delivery of access rights
US5606613A (en) 1994-12-22 1997-02-25 Pitney Bowes Inc. Method for identifying a metering accounting vault to digital printer
US5771383A (en) 1994-12-27 1998-06-23 International Business Machines Corp. Shared memory support method and apparatus for a microkernel data processing system
US5623549A (en) * 1995-01-30 1997-04-22 Ritter; Terry F. Cipher mechanisms with fencing and balanced block mixing
DE69637733D1 (en) 1995-02-13 2008-12-11 Intertrust Tech Corp SYSTEMS AND METHOD FOR SAFE TRANSMISSION
US5604800A (en) 1995-02-13 1997-02-18 Eta Technologies Corporation Personal access management system
US5642418A (en) 1995-02-21 1997-06-24 Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. Satellite television system and method
GB9503738D0 (en) 1995-02-24 1995-04-19 Int Computers Ltd Cryptographic key management
JPH08242229A (en) 1995-03-01 1996-09-17 Fujitsu Ltd State matching processing system for monitoring network
US5651064A (en) 1995-03-08 1997-07-22 544483 Alberta Ltd. System for preventing piracy of recorded media
US5553145A (en) 1995-03-21 1996-09-03 Micali; Silvia Simultaneous electronic transactions with visible trusted parties
KR0160685B1 (en) 1995-03-31 1998-12-15 김광호 Card reader/writer controller of personal computer with illegal use prevention operation by chip-in card
IL113375A (en) * 1995-04-13 1997-09-30 Fortress U & T Ltd Internationally regulated system for one to one cryptographic communications with national sovereignty without key escrow
JPH08328880A (en) 1995-05-31 1996-12-13 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Computer operation management system for operating system capable of simultaneous executing of plural application programs
JPH08329011A (en) 1995-06-02 1996-12-13 Mitsubishi Corp Data copyright management system
GB2301978A (en) * 1995-06-09 1996-12-18 Ibm Voice processing system
JPH0922352A (en) 1995-07-07 1997-01-21 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Copyright managing device
US6006328A (en) 1995-07-14 1999-12-21 Christopher N. Drake Computer software authentication, protection, and security system
US5638445A (en) * 1995-09-19 1997-06-10 Microsoft Corporation Blind encryption
US5689561A (en) * 1995-10-06 1997-11-18 Pace; Michael Computer-based trading card system and method
US5765152A (en) 1995-10-13 1998-06-09 Trustees Of Dartmouth College System and method for managing copyrighted electronic media
US5689587A (en) 1996-02-09 1997-11-18 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Method and apparatus for data hiding in images
US5748744A (en) * 1996-06-03 1998-05-05 Vlsi Technology, Inc. Secure mass storage system for computers
TW313642B (en) 1996-06-11 1997-08-21 Ibm A uniform mechanism for using signed content
US5889868A (en) 1996-07-02 1999-03-30 The Dice Company Optimization methods for the insertion, protection, and detection of digital watermarks in digitized data
US5710814A (en) * 1996-07-23 1998-01-20 Cheyenne Property Trust Cryptographic unit touch point logic
US6044367A (en) 1996-08-02 2000-03-28 Hewlett-Packard Company Distributed I/O store
US6061451A (en) * 1996-09-03 2000-05-09 Digital Vision Laboratories Corporation Apparatus and method for receiving and decrypting encrypted data and protecting decrypted data from illegal use
US5848155A (en) 1996-09-04 1998-12-08 Nec Research Institute, Inc. Spread spectrum watermark for embedded signalling
US5765176A (en) 1996-09-06 1998-06-09 Xerox Corporation Performing document image management tasks using an iconic image having embedded encoded information
US5802175A (en) * 1996-09-18 1998-09-01 Kara; Salim G. Computer file backup encryption system and method
US5825879A (en) * 1996-09-30 1998-10-20 Intel Corporation System and method for copy-protecting distributed video content
US5825892A (en) 1996-10-28 1998-10-20 International Business Machines Corporation Protecting images with an image watermark
US6519623B1 (en) 1996-10-31 2003-02-11 International Business Machines Corporation Generic semaphore for concurrent access by multiple operating systems
FR2755809B1 (en) 1996-11-13 1999-05-28 Thomson Multimedia Sa METHOD FOR PROTECTING INFORMATION TRANSMITTED FROM A SECURITY ELEMENT TO A DECODER AND PROTECTION SYSTEM USING SUCH A METHOD
US5982896A (en) * 1996-12-23 1999-11-09 Pitney Bowes Inc. System and method of verifying cryptographic postage evidencing using a fixed key set
CN1135852C (en) 1997-01-27 2004-01-21 皇家菲利浦电子有限公司 Method and system for transferring content information and supplemental information relating thereto
US6026430A (en) 1997-03-24 2000-02-15 Butman; Ronald A. Dynamic client registry apparatus and method
US6101255A (en) * 1997-04-30 2000-08-08 Motorola, Inc. Programmable cryptographic processing system and method
US6385723B1 (en) * 1997-05-15 2002-05-07 Mondex International Limited Key transformation unit for an IC card
US6236727B1 (en) * 1997-06-24 2001-05-22 International Business Machines Corporation Apparatus, method and computer program product for protecting copyright data within a computer system
US6311171B1 (en) * 1997-07-11 2001-10-30 Ericsson Inc. Symmetrically-secured electronic communication system
JP3265241B2 (en) 1997-09-10 2002-03-11 シャープ株式会社 Rice cooker and high frequency heating device
US6438666B2 (en) * 1997-09-26 2002-08-20 Hughes Electronics Corporation Method and apparatus for controlling access to confidential data by analyzing property inherent in data
US6160891A (en) 1997-10-20 2000-12-12 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Methods and apparatus for recovering keys
US6549626B1 (en) * 1997-10-20 2003-04-15 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Method and apparatus for encoding keys
US7024681B1 (en) 1997-12-04 2006-04-04 Verizon Laboratories Inc. Method and apparatus for near video on demand
JP3660815B2 (en) 1997-12-10 2005-06-15 株式会社日立製作所 Digital broadcast signal receiving apparatus and recording / reproducing apparatus
US6333983B1 (en) * 1997-12-16 2001-12-25 International Business Machines Corporation Method and apparatus for performing strong encryption or decryption data using special encryption functions
US6144739A (en) * 1998-01-20 2000-11-07 Motorola, Inc. Computer network protection using cryptographic sealing software agents and objects
JPH11234264A (en) 1998-02-17 1999-08-27 Canon Inc Electronic papermarking system, electronic information distribution system using the same and storage medium
US6226618B1 (en) * 1998-08-13 2001-05-01 International Business Machines Corporation Electronic content delivery system
JP4763866B2 (en) 1998-10-15 2011-08-31 インターシア ソフトウェア エルエルシー Method and apparatus for protecting digital data by double re-encryption
JP3102417B2 (en) 1998-10-30 2000-10-23 富士ゼロックス株式会社 Image processing apparatus and image processing method
US6851053B1 (en) 1999-03-02 2005-02-01 Microsoft Corporation Multiparty conference authentication
US6415031B1 (en) * 1999-03-12 2002-07-02 Diva Systems Corporation Selective and renewable encryption for secure distribution of video on-demand
US7330970B1 (en) * 1999-07-13 2008-02-12 Microsoft Corporation Methods and systems for protecting information in paging operating systems
JP4181282B2 (en) 1999-09-16 2008-11-12 株式会社東芝 Electronic currency terminal
GB2406416A (en) * 2000-10-31 2005-03-30 Advanced Risc Mach Ltd Describing an integrated circuit configuration
US6874089B2 (en) 2002-02-25 2005-03-29 Network Resonance, Inc. System, method and computer program product for guaranteeing electronic transactions
JP4268844B2 (en) 2003-07-15 2009-05-27 Tdk株式会社 Manufacturing method of multilayer ceramic electronic component and multilayer ceramic electronic component

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US8024810B2 (en) 2011-09-20
CN1330819A (en) 2002-01-09
US7093295B1 (en) 2006-08-15
JP4763866B2 (en) 2011-08-31
US20120093319A1 (en) 2012-04-19
AU6123599A (en) 2000-05-01
US20060288426A1 (en) 2006-12-21
WO2000022777A1 (en) 2000-04-20
EP1122910A1 (en) 2001-08-08
JP2002101089A (en) 2002-04-05

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US7093295B1 (en) Method and device for protecting digital data by double re-encryption
US6182218B1 (en) Digital content management system using electronic watermark
US6424715B1 (en) Digital content management system and apparatus
EP0884669B1 (en) Digital copyright management system using electronic watermark
EP0752663B1 (en) Copyright control system
EP1607825A2 (en) Digital content management system and apparatus
US7757101B2 (en) Data processing apparatus, data processing system, and data processing method therefor
US6684198B1 (en) Program data distribution via open network
JPH10303880A (en) Service providing system
US7801817B2 (en) Digital content management system and apparatus
TWI490724B (en) Method for loading a code of at least one software module
JPH088851A (en) Information distribution system and information distribution method
JP3925095B2 (en) Data receiver
US7412725B2 (en) Copyright protection system, digital information processing apparatus and copyright protection method
US20100241863A1 (en) Device for reproducing digital content, secure electronic entity, system comprising said elements and method for reproducing digital content
US20070005512A1 (en) IC chip, board, information processing equipment and storage medium
JPH09146887A (en) Information fetch device
JP2005010957A (en) Content protection system, content protection method, and program which makes computer perform its method
JP4676457B2 (en) Digital content management system using digital watermark
JP2004193793A (en) Processing method and system for contents, computer program, and recording medium
JP4369916B2 (en) Service providing system, user terminal and semiconductor information storage card
JP2003067252A (en) Information storing/displaying system and information storing/displaying method
JP2001338268A (en) Equipment to which memory card is applicable

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
FZDE Discontinued
FZDE Discontinued

Effective date: 20051017