Truth and ObjectivityPhilosophy, in seeking after truth, must also grapple with questions about the nature and status of truth itself. Is there, for example, such a thing as fully objective truth, or is our talk of "truth" merely a projection onto the world of what we find acceptable in moral argument, scientific theory, mathematical discourse? Such questions are at the center of Truth and Objectivity, which offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. Crispin Wright proposes a radically new framework for the discussion of the claims of the realists who think of truth as fully objective and the anti-realists who oppose them - a framework which rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both realist and antirealist to respect the intuition that judgements whose status they contest, such as those in moral argument and theoretical science, may often justifiably be regarded as true. The real issues that must be resolved if the contest between realist and anti-realist views of a range of judgements is to be properly adjudicated are different, and are here developed in detail from a sharply novel perspective. In addition, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, truth and "correspondence to fact," role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs, anti-realism about content, and the "quietism" toward this whole tradition of debate favored by some philosophers of Wittgensteinian sympathies. Wright's proposals are arrestingly original, interesting, and rich in implication. Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and will give new impetus to these debates in all areas of philosophy. |
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abstract objects accept actually affairs anti-realism anti-realist argument assertoric content basic equation belief best explanation best opinion biconditional Boghossian C-conditions characteristic claim Cognitive Command Cognitive Command constraint cognitive shortcoming colour comedy conception of truth concerning convergence Correspondence Platitude course David Wiggins debate deflationism deflationist determined dispute Disquotational Schema distinction divergent Dummett's epistemically epistemology Equivalence Schema Euthyphro Euthyphro contrast explanatory expressivist fact formulation funny Goldbach's Conjecture Horwich idea instance intuitive involved judgements justified kind least mathematical matter ment merely minimal truth aptitude minimalist minimally truth-apt moral moral realism notion of truth observation particular permissive philosophical possible priori proposition provisional equations realism reason recognise reflection regard relevant representational response satisfying semantic sense sentence Simon Blackburn Snow is white standards statements suggest superassertibility supervenience suppose theorist theory thought tion true truth condition truth predicate truth value vagueness warranted assertibility warrantedly assertible Wiggins Wittgenstein